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1. Introduction:  
 
In this diploma thesis I will try to show how neotraditional actors (e.g. chiefs, queenmothers, 
stool fathers, elders, ‘linguists’ and development chiefs) are involved in the Ghanaian 
development arena. This goal will be tackled by carrying out a comparison of neotraditional 
actors (NTAs) and politicians as the major agents of development, a study of the roles of 
NTAs, both by means of a survey and a media analysis, reflections on the different sources of 
power of NTAs on the basis of a short history of chieftaincy and development in Ghana, and a 
detailed study of the development arena in Hagodzi, a small village in the Volta Region. The 
results of the research done in Hagodzi will be put in relation to different concepts around the 
term development broker, or courtier, which was coined by Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 
in the 1990ies. 
I have created the new and unhandy short cut NTA (neotraditional actor) for two main 
reasons: Firstly, it is simply wrong to talk of chiefs when all the actors of the neotraditional 
system are concerned: there are many important offices, some of them only assigned to 
women, and the term ‘chief’ obstructs a clear view of these offices. And secondly, there exists 
no alternative to the problematic term ‘traditional’ for designating actors such as chiefs. I am 
aware that, by using the term ‘neotraditional’, I am not proposing a ‘sustainable’ solution to 
this problem. If the ‘neo’ in ‘neotraditional’ designates the changes that started in the period of 
colonisation, there are many aspects of neotraditional rule which would be in fact 
‘traditional’. This is maybe the reason why Carola Lentz uses the term ‘(neo)-traditional’(see 
e.g. 2006: 917). However, it is quite visible in the north of Ghana that European colonisation 
was not in fact the first one. And could not the expansion of the Asante Empire also be 
described as a form of colonisation? Having attached the prefix ‘neo’, the word ‘traditional’ 
somehow loses its right to exist. But I think it is neither possible to clear the term ‘tradition’ of 
these problematic implications nor to replace it by another term. The word ‘neotraditional’ 
should therefore rather be considered a pragmatic workaround than a new, viable proposal. 
Because of the broad scope both of the term development and of the neotraditional sector, it is 
necessary to specify the fields involved. The erosion of the former position of the chief as the 
overall leader since World War II has led to a situation where many of the roles of 
neotraditional actors (NTAs) have become the object of vivid discussions. This involves roles 
in connection with land, law, culture and identity, politics and party politics, conflict and 
development. The present thesis will focus on the role of NTAs in politics, party politics, the 
development business and – to a lesser extent – conflict. This will involve a close examination 
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of two intersections: the one between chieftaincy and politics, and the one between 
chieftaincy and the development business.   
The outcomes of the thesis can be useful both to NGOs and public development associations 
of the North, which are quite hesitant to collaborate with NTAs, and to local public actors. 
The guiding questions of my studies in the last four years have circled around the power, the 
resilience and the malleability of neotraditional institutions and the consequences of these 
qualities for the place of NTAs in the political system. Since independence, the traditional 
arena has been a scene of conflict about identity and resources, partly because its place in 
Ghanaian society remained unclear. In spite of being officially excluded, chieftaincy is an 
important part of the political system. NTAs are strongly involved in party politics and party 
politics is strongly involved in neotraditional systems. In the phase of state decay in the 
1970s, NTAs regained political ground in the local arena. In the 1990s, this struggle in the 
political field encroached on the development arena. NTAs began to invest in the 
development sector. With the turn of the millennium, the international community also 
focused on governments as the primary stakeholders of development in the South again. This 
reinforces the necessity to clarify the relation between the state and neotraditional institutions 
in Ghana.      
NTAs are not only gold-draped paramount chiefs, ruling over thousands (sometimes even 
millions) of people. Paramount chiefs (about 200 throughout Ghana) are only the tip of the 
iceberg of much larger neotraditional systems with long lists of offices reaching down to the 
village level, where the formal political system has not yet arrived. This has forced all 
political leaders since colonialism to deal with NTAs – with different effects on research in 
the social sciences. One strong theoretical current, which is linked to the traditional elite, still 
describes the ‘traditional’ system as a more or less consensual political system, a form of 
African democracy, which should be used to develop Africanised forms of government. This 
old discussion has been picked up in the phase of democratisation and mingled with the term 
‘civil society’. The rare empirical works available (see Ubink 2008) do not support these 
theories, normally circling around the idea of consensual decision making in neotraditional 
settings. Neotraditional systems are neither a form of civil society nor a substitute for it, as 
they are structured hierarchically, traditionally based on descent and age. But they are still the 
most visible political institutions on the village level, partly because of the lack of formal 
political institutions on this level and partly because of their malleability. The village level is 
particularly affected by permanent negotiation processes over land and status. These processes 
lead to violence in the higher tiers of chieftaincy, but also to participation, especially in the 
5 
 
lower tiers. If the population doesn’t accept a chief, the various courts involved cannot change 
the situation (Interview Daanaa).  
In the development arena, this has led to a situation where the neotraditional system is 
increasingly being used as a cultural asset to attract investment both from the state and from 
private institutions.  The example of Hagodzi will show the resulting flexibility of this system. 
For fifteen years, a mechanic who acts as a development broker for this village has been 
regarded as a chief by the district administration and the media, although all of the higher 
chiefly tiers concerned reject him. He has never been formally installed and has never tried to 
declare his descent. Both careers, his career as a ‘royal’ and his career as a development 
broker, started with the swift repair of a Jeep owned by a German NGO. 
 1.1 Hagodzi 
 
Right from the beginning of my field work in the Keta District, I always described my 
intentions with the same words: ‘I want to know how development works at the interface 
between the government, NGOs and private actors like churches and chiefs.’ To enlighten this 
relationship, I focused on the official structure of development on the local level on the one 
hand and on the specific make-up and work-flow of projects and the background of certain 
brokers on the other hand. The outcome of this field work accordingly consists in a detailed 
picture of the local 
development arena and a 
variety of more or less 
congruent ‘stories’ about 
projects and the actors 
involved. In this chapter I will 
give a short characterisation of 
the area and the method 
applied. In chapter four I will 
go on to describe the different 
projects and trajectories.  
Hagodzi is situated in the Keta District, about 150 km to the east of Accra. Because of its 
proximity to the Volta Delta, most of the year it is surrounded by various distributaries of the 
Volta River and forms an island together with two other small villages, Mamime and 
Lawshime. Only during two months of the dry season it is possible to access these three 
villages by foot. In the rainy season, lasting from May to July, the water even separates 
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Mamime from the other two villages. The island is not connected to the power grid and 
possesses no public or commercial facilities besides a church and a school. To reach the next 
market in Atiavi, the villagers have to walk about two hours and to cross several rivers by 
canoe. The next small clinic can be reached in one hour, but due to a lack of canoes and 
ferrymen it may also take hours to cross the river in the direction of the clinic. This often 
leads to deaths because of snake-bites and particularly in cases of birth complications. 
 The changing water level and periodic bushfires force most of the residents to grow sugar 
cane for the production of schnapps. Most of the schnapps is then sold on the local market to 
buy maize, which is the most important staple food aside from cassava. According to Kwame 
Layisi (all names marked in italics have been changed), a former assemblyman of the village, 
most of the crops are regularly destroyed by fire. One of the roughly ten English-speaking 
persons who permanently stay on the island (out of about 1000 registered residents), Layisi 
sells about 400 litres of schnapps per year, generating a profit of about 240 Ghanaian cedi (= 
US$240). The average population is likely to earn even less (interview K. Layisi). Virtually all 
of the income from the distillery is spent on food, particularly maize, fish, salt, onions and 
even cassava dough. In May, June and July, when the rainy season starts, the population also 
sells fresh fish on the local market. Subsistence production mainly consists of cassava, and to 
a lesser extent of chicken, fish and goat. 
 The majority of young people who finish JSS schooling go to Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi and 
Tema to become carpenters, masons, tailors and hairdressers. Because of the difficult situation 
in the village, most of them stay there. These persons have often been depicted as ‘volunteers’ 
because they are expected to send money home for Christmas and Easter and for burials.  
During a two-week stay, I permanently did interviews on three topics: I asked (1) how the 
interviewees defined development, (2) which development projects were under way or 
planned and who participated in planning and implementation and (3) I also asked the 
interviewees to specify the five most important development actors. 
I asked the people to define development mainly to avoid an additional section on current 
definitions of development in the present thesis. Kwame Layisi defined development simply 
as a process of change which involves communal participation to achieve better education and 
health. For him, the development of the village would be catalysed by the construction of a 
feeder road to the island, which would particularly enable better health care (interview K. 
Layisi). Other interview partners also mentioned the connection to the power grid, the 
building of bridges and the creation of self-confidence as important steps towards 
development. Development thus wasn’t exclusively defined as material development, but 
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mainly so. 
The only building projects carried out in the village so far have been the construction and 
maintenance of a school and a kindergarten (which is at the same time a catholic church), the 
supply of pipe-borne water to the village and the construction of a wooden bridge. Apart from 
that, we made out four projects that had not been realised or had been stopped because of 
insufficient funding: a KVIP (Kumasi Ventilated Improved Pit) latrine, a foot bridge, a plan to 
irrigate certain parts of the island and a fish-pond. We focused on the water project because it 
had been completed only recently and involved a considerable number of stakeholders, 
particularly on the island. 
This thread will be taken up again in chapter four. After an outline of the history of 
chieftaincy and development and a chapter on current intersections between chieftaincy and 
development in Ghana, I will then come back to Hagodzi as a case study for chiefly 
engagement in development. 
 
 2. History of chieftaincy and development 
 
In this chapter I will try to give an overview of the history of chieftaincy in Ghana with a 
special focus on the role of the NTAs as agents of development. Geographically, I will focus 
on the Volta Region, as it is the centre of attention of this thesis. However, repeated references 
to the Ashanti Region or even smaller units like Akyem Abuakwa, a paramountcy in the 
Eastern Region, cannot be avoided because of their far-reaching influence on national politics, 
particularly concerning chieftaincy. The meaning of the term development will change in 
different contexts throughout this brief historical outline, but in the end it should become 
clearer why the roles of chiefs are currently constrained to certain specific notions of 
development. 
This historical overview will deal in depth with the relationship of NTAs and (local) politics. 
Most of the senior chiefs in Ghana have quite an interesting political background. 
Metaphorically speaking, they have danced through history: they had to turn round and round 
again, if they didn’t want to miss the tune (cf. NRR 2004: 8.12.4). From 1951-1966, it was up 
to Kwame Nkrumah to call the tune: Contrary to his initial belief in the continuity between 
African ‘communalism’ and modern communism, he eventually changed the whole structure 
of chieftaincy by making sure that virtually all paramount chiefs of Ghana were party 
stalwarts. The following regimes with K.A. Busia and Edward Akufo-Addo as the leading 
proponents of the chiefly elite again started a sweeping programme of conversion. In spite of 
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the descent of these leaders, the way how they instrumentalised chiefly power remained the 
same. The long rule of Jerry Rawlings – from 1979 to 2000, with a short break from 1979-
1981 - was rather ambiguous in its effects on chieftaincy. Despite verbal assaults in the 
revolutionary beginning, the regime didn’t readopt the policies of Nkrumah. In 1992, after 
nearly one decade of structural adjustment monitored by the World Bank, it drafted the 
Constitution of the Fourth Republic, which is still valid today and wasn’t changed 
significantly by the pro-chief NPP government (2000-2008). 
 
 2.1. Ghana under Nkrumah 
 
The fight for independence in Ghana took place on two fronts: the exterior and the interior. 
Most of the chiefs were against independence, because they expected their position to be less 
powerful afterwards. During the Second World War, they stood against a more or less united 
front of educated and wealthy elites from the coastal area, which had been neglected by the 
British and as a consequence started to agitate against the colonial power. The reasons for this 
total disregard were to be found in systematic racism, based on the belief that the chiefs were 
some sort of natural rulers, while the elite was designated as ‘deracinated, anomalous and 
self-seeking’. Most of the chiefs were illiterate (as many chiefs in the North still are), and as 
such, they were seen as unprogressive. Because of their role as middlemen between the 
colonial power and the population they were in a certain sense doomed right from the start of 
the nationalist movement: they had to carry out the repressive policies of the British with little 
funds and as a consequence lined their own pockets if they didn't exploit the population for 
the colonial power. In spite of many officials secretly being of the same opinion as the 
nationalist elite, no changes took place until the Second World War. On the contrary, British 
reliance on chieftaincy virtually turned into sacralisation. A transformation, it was argued until 
the Second World War, would be far too dangerous,1
In the area on which I will focus in the next chapters, the financial situation of the colonial 
administration was even worse. The Volta Region had been under a mandate of the League of 
Nations and later was a United Nations Trust Territory. The only investments in this region 
resulted in the construction of a few feeder roads. In practice, as Nugent puts it, ‘colonial 
administration was an exercise of fire fighting’ in these areas (Nugent 1996a: 206). Contrary 
to the South-West, the chieftaincies of the North and the Volta Region were quite small before 
 since the chiefs were performing the 
tasks of a non-existing British administration (Rathbone 2000: 7-15).  
                                                 
1 This argument is still very important for the policies concerning chieftaincy today. 
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the coming of the colonialists and the amalgamation policies introduced by the British in the 
Volta Region to reduce the number of chieftaincies were not successful. In 1922, the southern 
part of British Togoland consisted of 68 divisions, which were again divided into a huge 
number of subdivisions. All of these subdivisions had their own courts. In the District of Ho 
alone, Nugent counts 234 courts for this point in time. Out of this chaos, the colonial power 
created six states: Buem, Avatime, Akpini, Asogli, Krachi and Anlo. Both these new 
prescribed geographic affiliations and the new confusion about who was to rule over whom 
fuelled conflict and discontent (Nugent 1996: 207-211). 
The turnaround of the colonial regime during the Second World War again primarily had 
economic reasons. It became clear that the high demand for raw materials (vegetable oils and 
fats) during the war could not be met by the chiefly institutions and that they were not capable 
of earning more foreign exchange by selling cocoa, gold and diamonds either. Hence the 
starting point of the new development paradigm in Ghana, which was strongly associated with 
economic growth and modernisation at that point in time. And of course, the ‘traditional 
authorities’ didn't yet fit in this concept (Gocking 2005: 77).  
As soon as in 1943, the colonial power enacted a new constitution, which was to guarantee a 
transformation towards something like a constitutional monarchy, with a majority of non-
officials in the Legislative Council. In the coastal areas, this new Legislative Council was 
elected directly, in the other areas, the two most influential Councils of Chiefs, the 
‘Asanteman Council’ (for the Ashanti Region) and the Joint Provisional Council (Eastern and 
Western Region) functioned as electoral councils. The riots of 1948, which marked the rise of 
Kwame Nkrumah, were partly triggered by these ‘elections’: seven out of nine selected 
representatives of the Joint Provisional Council in the Legislative Council were chiefs, 
although the colonial administration and the modern elite advised the Councils of Chiefs to 
send also non-royals to the Legislative Council (Rathbone 2000: 19f). 
Subsequently, the so-called Coussey Committee was set up, which consisted of Africans only 
and worked out a new constitution. That was already the start of the process of formal 
depolitisation of chieftaincy: in 1952 the powers of the State Councils, the most important 
councils of chiefs on the district level, were restricted to tasks concerning chieftaincy matters 
and were replaced by Local Councils, where only one third of the members could be chiefs or 
people appointed by them (Thomi 1999/2000: 104). 
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 2.1.1 Confrontations on the national level 
 
The conflict between the chiefs and the modern elite, which was in fact already on its way to 
become the new ruling class, reached its first peak in 1949 with the separation of the 
Convention Peoples Party (CPP) from the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), which had 
previously been home to the elite. The stalwarts of the CPP were often depicted as ‘small 
boys’ or ‘veranda boys’ (see Nugent 1996a), who were not related to the royal families and 
had often been fighting directly against chiefs in their areas. The former conflict between a 
new bourgeoisie and a ‘feudalist’ class now transformed into a Marxist struggle for 
independence against the collaborators of the colonial power. The CPP became the party of 
the ‘workers and peasants’, but even more importantly that of the ‘youth’. This word has a 
very particular, specific meaning in the African context. In Ghana the word ‘youth’ most of 
the time indicates people who are not part of any royal family. Accordingly, nobility also has a 
different meaning in the African context.  The members of ‘royal’ families enjoyed some 
privileges, for instance in connection with the administrative apparatus of chieftaincy. Police 
and jail staff, for instance, usually only consisted of kinsmen of the chief (Rathbone 2000: 
21f). Contrary to the European notion of nobility, Ghanaian royals can be found in every 
village. Normally, the ‘royal’ family in a village is the one said to have founded the village. 
This wide definition of nobility also is an explanation for why the UGCC, representing the old 
educated elite, and the chiefs forged an alliance prior to the election. Faced with the rise of the 
CPP, they were pragmatic and buried the hatchet. In the north, even CPP members hardly had 
any conflicts with chief, because virtually all educated citizens came from royal families 
(Drah 1992: 15). 
When Nkrumah was sworn in as prime minister2
                                                 
2 He was formally to be made prime minister in 1952. 
 in 1951, the power struggle between the 
chiefs and the CPP was already decided on the national level. The new government was to be 
a diarchic regime, its executive powers should be shared between the colonialists and elected 
Africans. Because of the striking victory of the CPP, governor Charles Noble Arden-Clarke 
decided to give a majority of the seats in the executive council to the CPP and only a minority 
to the different Councils of Chiefs (Gocking 2005: 97f). As the chiefs pushed for four 
ministerial posts and the governor stood firm again, the Territorial Council of the chiefs 
threatened to form a ‘shadow government’, ‘ready to be called on when the CPP failed’. 
Finally, Arden-Clarke agreed to give two ministerial posts to the chiefs. At that time, one 
could probably still speak of two systems of government, which also resulted in open hostility 
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between the two factions (Rathbone 2000: 29f). The most famous statement of Nkrumah 
concerning chieftaincy describes this relationship very good: 
 
Those of our chiefs who are with us […] we do honor […] those […]who join forces 
with the imperialists […] there shall come a time when they will run and leave their 
sandals behind them; in other words chiefs in league with imperialists who obstruct 
our path […] will one day run away and leave their stools. (Accra Evening News , 5 
January 1950, q.i. Gocking 2005 : 94) 
 
Both the stool and the sandals are part of the chiefs’ regalia. To appear barefooted in public is 
a taboo for chiefs and normally results in the destoolment, the dethronement, of a chief. The 
invitation of chiefs to join forces with the CPP is often cited as an example of the dual 
strategy that characterised all governments after the independence in their relationship with 
chiefs: their active involvement in party politics was formally condemned, but secretly 
encouraged, if it seemed to be useful. 
 In 1954 the CPP already held all portfolios in an entirely African cabinet. ‘In many respects’, 
Rathbone remarks, ‘the struggle against colonial rule was over’ (2000: 83f).  The achievement 
of independence was no more a political issue, but an administrative and constitutional 
exercise and the important conflicts were already those between different African factions. 
With the foundation of the National Liberation Movement (NLM), the defence reactions of 
the chiefs now seemed to be bolstered by a political party.  However, the formation of this 
movement was partly a result of the chiefs being more and more excluded from national 
decision making and, as would especially become evident after the fall of Nkrumah in 1966, 
the NLM didn’t prove to be an effective advocate for all chiefs. It was more or less confined 
to what is today the Ashanti Region  (Hadjor 1988: 62). 
Until 1954 the Councils of Chiefs had served as ‘electoral councils’ which were able to 
nominate a certain percentage of the legislative assembly. From then on this assembly 
consisted exclusively of elected members, which led to a significant loss of seats for the 
Ashanti Region. This induced a rare example of regional unity: Both the Asante Youth 
Associations and the CPP branch of the Ashanti Region called for a stronger representation of 
the Ashanti Region in the Legislative Council together with the newly formed NLM 
(Rathbone 2000: 64). This also led to the formation of the Northern People's Party, whose 
stalwarts often came from the CPP (Hadjor 1988: 61). 
By 1954 it had already become clear that Ghana would be independent a few years later. the 
British were considering 1956 as the potential year of independence, which led to widespread 
debates about a new constitution. The NLM naturally demanded a federalist system of 
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government. Because it was not yet represented in government, the stalwarts tried to push 
their agendas via lobbying in London and through an enforced polarisation on the local level, 
which again led to more local wrangles in connection with enstoolment and destoolment 
conflicts (Rathbone 2000: 70f). Because the achievement of independence was finally still 
dependent on the consent of the British, the CPP had to deal with these aspirations. 
Additionally, British citizens had voted for conservative governments since 1951. This meant 
that there was no way to smash the NLM by mere force (Hadjor 1988: 63). 
The chiefly faction of the NLM even went a step further and again demanded the 
establishment of a second legislative chamber for the chiefs, which had already been rejected 
in 1951. Nkrumah was bound to negotiate again and suggested to establish an ‘impartial 
committee’ instead, which should deal with appeals from the Territorial Councils (the regional 
councils of chiefs) and the State Councils (the Local Councils of chiefs). Neither the second 
parliament nor the ‘impartial committee” were established, however, because the CPP stopped 
to negotiate after independence (Rathbone 2000: 83, cf. Botwe-Asamoah 2005: 33).   
Despite the NLM’s capability of establishing stable relations with the British, they were still 
more in favour of the CPP.  The constitutional advisor, who was commissioned to make an 
inquiry into the regionalist demands of the NLM, even came out with another unfavourable 
proposal. He suggested establishing Regional Assemblies and Regional Houses of Chiefs, 
both of which were endorsed, with the effect that chieftaincy became even more constrained 
to the regional field and had very limited functions on the national level from then on. The 
Regional Houses of Chiefs could only consider matters referred to them by the government 
and were called upon to advise the government on African social customs and customary law. 
These tasks were already quite similar to the tasks of the National House of Chiefs today. 
Additionally, the CPP was not content with the establishment of the Regional Assemblies and 
abolished them after independence. Thus, the overall effect of these two measures was a 
further balkanisation of the institution of chieftaincy (Rathbone 2000: 79-87).   
In 1956 the CPP again had to call elections, because the NLM had successfully convinced the 
secretary of state that the support of the population for the CPP – and therefore for 
independence - was unclear. The CPP won again and most of the chiefs subsequently accepted 
the supremacy of the CPP. The opposition, however, tried its best to postpone independence. 
Kofi Busia for instance, the leader of the NLM, told the British public: 'Sometimes I wonder 
why you are in such a hurry to leave us. Your experiment in the Gold Coast is not complete. 
We still need you – our country is not ready for parliament democracy.' (Nkrumah 1959: 181, 
q.i. Hadjor 1988: 63).  
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Also the NLM chiefs in the Ashanti Region under the leadership of the Okyenhene revolted. 
They wanted to introduce separate national flags and coats of arms for the Ashanti and the 
Northern Territories. Apart from the Northern Territories being not very enthusiastic about this 
idea, Rathbone also questions whether constructing such a nation without access to the sea 
would have been reasonable. He assumes that only the extremists of the NLM really believed 
in this idea, which for the rest of the movement rather was a bargaining exercise (Rathbone 
2000: 96f).  
In December 1956 the amalgamation of British Togoland (the western share of the former 
German protectorate of Southern Togoland) with the Gold Coast took place. In an election 
held under UN supervision only 58% of the registered voters opted for integration into the 
Gold Coast. At the same time the ruling government again tried to reopen the knotty issue of 
paramountcies in this area, which later came to be called the Volta Region. The Van Lare 
Commission (1956) recommended a working definition of paramountcy as a stool which did 
not owe allegiance to any other stool. This meant that only 7 areas enjoyed unambiguous 
status as paramountcies: Krachi, Peki, Anlo, Buem, Avatime, Ho, and Kpamdu. The status of 
the rest stayed unclear, because the Van Lare Commission had to draw distinctions between 
states which were made subordinate to another stool or which had successfully defended their 
independent status and those which had cooperated with the colonial powers. While the 
Germans forced the chiefs to swear binding allegiances, the British assured that the former 
‘independent’ states were not tying themselves to the new paramount chiefs. This created 
different grades of resistance, which didn’t reflect the economic and historical backgrounds of 
these states. Additionally, the Van Lare Commission was already used by Nkrumah to transfer 
power to his allies in the Volta Region. These were particularly the states that had resisted the 
British amalgamation policies to the end – namely Anfoega, Gbi, Likpe, Ve, Nkonya and 
Santrokofi. All of these were accorded paramount status. As we will see, the chiefs of these 
states were downgraded again after the fall of Nkrumah, and in 1974 they were allowed to 
become full members of the House of Chiefs without being paramount chiefs. Since then the 
status of most of the chiefs in this area has been contested continuously (Nugent 1996a: 220-
223). This has recently contributed to serious conflicts in Anlo, the paramountcy were I did 
research in 2008. The enstoolment of a new paramount chief (Awomefia) in the years to come 
could again lead to the creation of about 15 new paramountcies (interview Kumasah 2008). 
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 2.1.2 Decentralisation in the 1950ies  
After becoming prime minister in 1951, Nkrumah did not hesitate to circumscribe the power 
of the chiefs also on the local level. The State Councils were transformed into Local Councils 
that continued to consist of one chiefly third, but were to be financed entirely by the chiefs. In 
spite of these additional expenditures, the whole financial basis of chieftaincy in the Colony 
(the South) and the Ashanti Region (revenues from stool lands) now was to be raised by the 
Local Councils. Additionally, selling stool land was forbidden without the permission of 
Local Councils and also the revenue from “native councils” - the various councils of chiefs or 
traditional councils on different levels - had to go directly to them. In return, the local courts 
were to give out annual grants for the maintenance of the traditional councils (Rathbone 2000: 
31f; Thomi 1999/2000: 104). According to Thomi, these rearrangements of 1952 can also be 
seen as attempts of the colonial power to reconcile the non-royal elite (Thomi 1999/2000: 
104).  
In the Volta Region, the traditional councils, except for Buem, never had control over the stool 
land. Until now, the government still has to negotiate with numerous families that possess the 
land. Together with the thoroughly weak neotraditional system in the Volta Region, this 
contributed to rather smooth processes of rearrangements (Nugent 1996a: 211). 
In the South-West, in contrast, these measures constituted the basis for a shift of political 
power. In this respect Rathbone quotes J. Hagan, who was ‘cheered loudly by his own 
benches’ when he spoke during a debate on the Local Government Ordinance:   
For 107 years our chiefs have been exercising their rights […] but that privilege has 
been abused [...] our confidence is now gone […] their future is doomed […] we want 
them to abstain themselves from politics and wash their hands of financial matters. 
(Legislative Assembly Debates, 22 December 1951; q.i. Rathbone 2000: 32)   
This statement was quite reasonable at that point in time. Many chiefs had abused their 
positions and exercised arbitrary power. Especially among Southern chiefs it had been 
common until independence to talk of chieftaincies as sovereign powers. The attempt to cut 
off their financial basis was nevertheless quite hard to carry out because it was the chiefs, who 
collected the money. They were thereby capable of hiding income or they openly defied the 
Local Councils. The result was a considerable amount of chaos that left the Ministry of Local 
Government totally overstrained.  Many Local Councils broke down entirely and were 
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subordinated to committees of management, which were in turn under direct control by the 
Minister of Local Government. Rathbone calls these committees of management ‘systems of 
direct rule’ (Rathbone 2000: 43ff).  
The bargaining power of the chiefs was high as long as the CPP had to be careful not to shock 
the colonial power. Additionally, it was afraid to lose already ‘converted’ chiefs and thus it 
used the existing Local Government Ordinance, which already allowed the cabinet to vary the 
proportion of traditional members in any local council. Pro-CPP chiefs could be kept, others 
could be fired. This led to a further disordered system of local government, which was 
transformed into a system of absolute control with the Staff (Local Government Council) 
Regulations of 1955. From then on, the government controlled the appointments and 
dismissals of senior local council officers (Rathbone 2000: 83ff). 
This fierce enforcement of interests in the countryside also catalysed existing chieftaincy 
disputes. Until today, there have rarely been any succession cases which have passed off 
totally peacefully. A case of succession almost necessarily leads to the formation of factions if 
the town or village where the case arises isn’t already split up into permanent factions. This 
means that it was rarely the CPP leaders that created such conflicts to pursue their own 
interests, but they inevitably added fuel to the fire, e.g. by threatening the chiefs not to meddle 
with political parties, while at the same time trying by all means to secure their loyalty 
(Rathbone 2000: 34ff,45,64). The main reason for local actors to stick to a particular party 
was the well-organised machinery of such institutions. By doing that, the chiefs were able to 
use the partisan press, the party’s resources and, quite frequently, the gangs of bully-boys, 
who were paid on a daily basis and often worked for both the CPP and the other parties at the 
same time. Additionally, party politics was (and is still) seen as something like a horse 
gamble: if the right party was to win, the affiliation would pay off in terms of development 
projects (Rathbone 2000: 92ff). This way of thinking was to be generalised by the CPP in the 
years after independence.   
In the Volta Region the chiefs realised very quickly that it was useless to fight the 
government’s plans on their own. Some chiefs, like the chief of Anfoega, had been able to 
resist the amalgamation policies of the British and were now welcomed with open arms by 
Nkrumah. Others became members of the Togoland Congress, a political party who fought for 
a united nation of the Ewe, by far the most dominant ethnic group in the Volta Region and in 
Togo (Nugent 1996a: 211).  
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The Handling of destoolment and enstoolment  
In 1955 the CPP amended a law that regulated succession conflicts, which were called 
‘constitutional matters’ in the Coussey Constitution of 1950. The idea behind this amendment 
is still upheld today: the task of resolving these sensitive issues should be removed from the 
realm of politics. At that time, this statement was not only hypocritical, as such statements 
still are today, but it was simply wrong: the CPP wanted to install a ‘local constitutional 
committee’, which was naturally appointed by the CPP and which should regulate such issues. 
These demands were based on the right of the governor under the 1944 legislation ‘to grant, 
withhold or withdraw recognition’ of paramount and other senior chiefs. Since 1944, no 
governor had exercised these powers, and due to the fact that the Gold Coast enjoyed self-
government since 1954, it would also have been obligatory for a governor to ask the cabinet 
first. The new amendment of the State Councils Ordinance did little more than unify the laws 
of the entire Gold Coast, which included the downgrading of the rights of chiefs in the 
Ashanti Region and emphasizing the rights of the governor and his government. It basically 
allowed sub-chiefs to appeal over the head of their paramounts to appeals commissioners, 
which reduced the power of paramount chiefs (Rathbone 2000: 83f).   
The Reformation of the Courts  
In the 1950ies the native courts were described as an ‘intensely personal form of jurisdiction’, 
which was largely unregulated and scantily reviewed by the colonial state. Customary law 
was almost the only type of law that concerned the normal citizen, with the exception of 
major crimes, and it was often abused: crimes were frequently trumped up and the fine was 
shared among the chiefly members of the tribunals. The fact that matters like ‘market 
vending, hawking, letter writing, sale of ‘native medicines’ and the ‘operation of shrines’ had 
to be allowed by native courts often led to bribery (Rathbone 2000: 47ff).  
Although the colonial government had also changed its mind about native courts in the 
1940ies, no transformations took place until 1958. In 1953, the CPP started to replace chiefs 
with party stalwarts, without having a legal basis for these measures. In Anloga the Minister 
of Local Governance deleted six names from the old panel list of the Anlo Native Court, all of 
them chiefs. He then added the names of six members, none of whom were chiefs. In the Keta 
Court, three panelists’ names were eliminated, including that of a chief, and the names of 
three non-chiefs were added. The same happened everywhere in the country. From 1958 on, 
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the courts were called local courts, but apart from that, the old system was left intact almost 
entirely. It continued to be an intensely personal system of jurisdiction, now administered by 
government (CPP) nominees. 
The reasons for this strategy of just changing the persons and not changing the rules were 
quite convincing. The government had not enough resources and not enough lawyers to 
construct something new. In 1946, out of 136 students in the UK, only 12 were reading law. In 
1948 it were 29 out of 253. Only in 1958 the University of Ghana (Legon) established a law 
faculty. (Rathbone 2000: 52ff). Nkrumah therefore had no choice but to utilise a small group 
of specialists trained during the colonial area, which was quite critical of the CPP.  As a 
consequence, the Native Court System survived well into the independence period, but 
without chiefly control (Hadjor 1988: 68).   
 2.1.3 Akyem Abuakwa: Seldom far from the centre of the frame 
 
The Akan ‘state’ of Akyem Abuakwa has been one of the centres of power in Ghana until 
today and its history shows a startling amalgamation of ‘modern’ and neotraditional 
governance. The first relevant paramount chief of this area, the so-called Okyenhene, was 
named Nana Ofori Atta I, ruled from 1912 to 1943 and was loyal to the colonial power. The 
following Okyenhene, Nana Ofori Atta II, already fought on the side of the nationalists. This 
front was united until the foundation of the CPP, and Nana Ofori Atta II was considered one 
of the most radical elements. This also led the CPP to describe the Okyenhene as ‘a chief of 
the people’ in 1950. However, because of the Okyenhene’s former political power and the 
involvement of many royals in party politics, Akyem Abuakwa became one of the most 
contested arenas of the struggle for independence from within. A few months later the party 
rivalry had already become so dominant that the Okyenhene declared himself an opponent of 
the CPP and started to intimidate citizens during elections and forbade the open display of the 
CPP flag. He also began to arrest CPP members and did not cooperate with the government in 
transforming the local political institutions. Minor chiefs, who declared themselves CPP 
sympathizers, were insulted, brought to court, fined and in some cases destooled. The most 
convincing reasons for these harsh actions are to be found in the kinship of Nana Ofori Atta 
II. Three of the famous ‘Big Six’, the founding fathers of the UGCC, came from the royal 
family of Akyem Abuakwa. One of the half brothers of the Okyenhene was J.B. Danquah, 
besides Nkrumah the most important of the ‘Big Six’. Another founding father was Edward 
Akufo-Addo, the son-in-law of the former Okyenhene (and the father of Nana Akufo-Addo, 
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the presidential candidate of Ghana's New Patriotic Party for the 2008 elections). The third 
founding father from Akyem Abuakwa was W.E.A. Ofori Atta, a son of the Okyenhene (cf. 
Botwe-Asamoah 2005: 28ff).  
But the family also produced a CPP leader: Aaron Ofori Atta was a nephew of Danquah and a 
half brother of W.E.A. Ofori Atta. He was going to be the Minister of Local Government and 
the elected representative for the Akyem Abuakwa Central constituency under Nkrumah 
(Botwe-Asamoah 2005: 29). His opponent in the election for the latter office was his uncle 
J.B. Danquah, who went abroad after this defeat. Before having been defeated, Danquah is 
credited with the following statement: ‘He [Aaron Ofori Atta] run away from his father’s 
house and is insulting those who gave him his education’ (Rathbone 2000: 62). 
Naturally, the CPP cracked down on Akyem Abuakwa quite resolutely. Nkrumah accused the 
leaders of Akyem Abuakwa of planning his assassination, which led to riots all over Akyem 
Abuakwa. Almost every week one sub-chief or another was attacked by 'his' people. 
 
 2.1.4 The defeat of the chiefs   
The official prostration of the powerful chiefs in the Ashanti Region happened already in 
October 1957, seven months after the declaration of independence. Nkrumah announced a 
cabinet reshuffle in which Krobo Edusei emerged as Minister of the Interior, whose 
responsibilities included police and internal security matters.  Edusei was a well-known 
hardliner whose sister had been shot in her yard by NLM supporters when preparing food for 
her children (Botwe-Asamoah 2005: 114). By virtue of his new office he began to visit 
paramount chiefs. On the 10th of October he arrived in the extremely hostile territory of 
Akyem Abuakwa where he talked with the Okyenhene and his council. The following public 
speech by the Okyenhene was commented as ‘amusing, cowardly and ridiculous’ by the 
Akyem Abuakwa CPP executive. The Okyenhene stated, that ‘he could not give support to 
one political party against another’ and that ‘it will be the constant care of the Okyeman 
Council and myself to see to it that the government of Ghana as by law established receives 
our co-operation.’ He went on that the council members would now go about ‘forgetting their 
party affiliations to take part in a re-dedication of ourselves to service in the interests of our 
land and people’. Rathbone is sure, that this statement is the product of at least serious 
intimidation and could have been drafted in its entirety by the CPP. The same spectacle took 
place a few weeks later in the palace of the Asantehene. Krobo Edusei also had a discussion 
with the so-called king of the Ashanti, who stated afterwards that chiefs should not take part 
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in party politics, although he had ‘been no other than the president of the National Liberation 
Movement’, as the Ashanti regional CPP executive noted quite accurately. In this process both 
of the two ‘monarchs’ had been seriously humiliated in public. But the government hadn’t yet 
finished and went on with the withdrawal of official recognition of the Okyenhene because he 
didn’t accept the appeals commissioners’ judgements in traditional succession and 
destoolment disputes. It even contemplated the use of violence against gatherings of Akyem 
Abuakwa people in front of the palace, accompanied by drumming and the singing of war 
songs throughout the night of withdrawal of the official  recognition of the Okyenhene 
(Rathbone 2000: 112ff). 
It was obvious that it would have been far too dangerous to remove the Asantehene, but apart 
from that, the government deconstructed the Ashanti Confederacy at the stroke of a pen. 
According to Rathbone, the amount of public rage against these decisions was remarkably 
low. Eight new paramount chiefs were enstooled and two were degraded. The chiefs wore 
black ‘mourning cloths’ during their following meeting in the Asanteman Council, but they 
passed a decidedly mild resolution. They did not accept the exclusion of the degraded chiefs, 
but 80 policemen hindered them from entering the hall. In response, J.B. Danquah again 
argued for secessionism and rejected the authority of the state concerning the stool revenues. 
In the meantime, the political career of the Okyenhene came to an end. The government set up 
a commission of inquiry which again concluded that he had abused his powers and ought to 
be removed permanently. But still, the second most powerful chief of Ghana didn’t want to 
move out of his palace. While wearing his traditional battledress, he was thus forcibly ejected 
from his palace by the police, and was excluded from the whole ‘state’ of Akyem Abuakwa. 
Being a trigger for the destoolment of over hundred minor chiefs in Akyem Abuakwa, this 
case was clearly used as an example for all the other chiefs who didn’t want to cooperate 
(Rathbone 2000: 123-30,146).  
At the same time, the government went about to implement the constitutional plan to establish 
Regional Houses of Chiefs. The difference between ‘paramount’ and ‘divisional’ chiefs was 
officially abolished and the government was to ordain the hierarchy from now on. 
Additionally, all State Councils (minor councils of chiefs) had to confirm their affiliation to a 
particular Regional House of Chiefs. If they didn’t take orders, they were destooled. Chiefs 
who had lost government recognition were ultimately forced to leave their towns. The 
example of the Okyenhene was enough to convince a number of other chiefs who were not 
recognised in this process (foremost because they were NLM sympathizers) to leave their 
palaces and to surrender their stool regalia (Rathbone 2000: 130f). 
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On 13 February 1959 the government passed the Chiefs (Recognition) Bill, which formalised 
all the measures which had already been taken. From now on, (1) no destoolment or 
enstoolment was effective if the government didn’t agree, (2) a chief could lose his position 
without being formally destooled if the government wanted to do so and (3) chiefs could be 
ordered into internal exile. This bill was the manifestation of a total reconstruction of the 
bases of chieftaincy. Customary laws, like enstoolment or destoolment procedures, which 
normally involved a considerable degree of participation of the population concerned, were 
now virtually outlawed. Chiefs now were clients of the government. During three long cabinet 
meetings on 4, 5 and 25 September 1959, the government ‘recognised’ the enstoolment of 84 
and the destoolment 32 chiefs. This scale of reconstruction by far exceeded the internal 
changes made in colonial times. According to Rathbone, the colonial predecessors were much 
more nervous and less powerful than the CPP. Virtually all paramount chiefs were CPP 
sympathizers at this point (Rathbone 2000: 141-45).  
After his enstoolment, the new Okyenhene acted out the new role of chiefs in the upcoming 
decades: after stressing his complete loyalty to Nkrumah, he pointedly asked for government-
funded development in the area. Given the behaviour of the government concerning local 
development, this was a very promising strategy. Nkrumah is told to have said the following 
at a CPP rally in Agona Nyakrom on New Year’s Day in 1958:  
‘If you continue to be loyal to me, I will consider extending amenities to you. I will extend 
electricity and pipe-borne water to all the towns and villages.’ In a run-up to a by-election in 
Aflao, about 50 kilometres to the East of Keta, Krobo Edusei was even more direct: ‘You 
think I am a fool to give you water to drink and you vote against me? After the election if you 
vote CPP, I will give you water to drink.’ The voters of Aflao didn’t seem to like this 
statement and voted for an independent candidate. And as predicted, the piped water supply 
was not forthcoming (Rathbone 2000: 148).  
But after all, the Volta Region was able to profit a lot from this type of bribery. The chiefly 
resistance in this Region was not as strong as in the Akan-speaking areas and especially in the 
urban centres their power was quite small. Consequently, Nkrumah used public funds a lot to 
tranquillise the secessionist aspirations of the Voltarians. The most impressive of these efforts 
is without doubt the Akosombo Dam, the biggest and most expensive development project 
ever realised in Ghana. Since these development efforts mainly focused on urban areas, the 
chiefs were mostly spectators of this process (Nugent 1996a: 212).   
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Centralisation and Authoritarianism 
 
After independence, the CPP also started quite a disconcerting process of centralisation, 
which also included a considerable amount of suppression and the intensified use of force 
(Rathbone 102ff, Botwe-Asamoah 2005: 124f): 
- It created very powerful regional commissioners as representatives of the government 
and political commissioners in each district as political ‘eyes’ for the regional 
commissioners.   
- It began to openly fight against oppositional movements by virtue of a Preventive 
Detention Act, which allowed for the establishment of powers to remove or detain 
those who indulged in unconstitutional and subversive actions against the government, 
bypassing ordinary courts. 
-  And it started a long series of deportations, based on the right to deport anyone who 
was not of African descent or married to a Ghanaian, although he or she held a 
Ghanaian passport. This was implemented in accord with pan-Africanist aspirations 
and permitted racist violence against minorities like the Muslim Association Party or 
the Libanese community, which often were allies of the NLM.  
 
Naturally, these deportations mostly affected people without passports. Already in 1958 it was 
openly admitted that there had been orders for opposition members without passports to be 
deported. Particularly in the Volta Region, these strategies of illegalisation were successful 
because the Togoland Congress had many contacts with Togolese. But Nkrumah also adopted 
classic strategies like the uncovering of ‘conspiracies’: in 1958, for instance, 43 people were 
alleged to have plotted the assassination of Kwame Nkrumah, Krobo Edusei and Kofi Baako. 
According to Rathbone, this incident was also used to ‘nail’ Modesto Apaloo, a prominent 
Anlo Ewe member of the NLM (Rathbone 2000: 138).  
 
Within less then two decades, overt chiefly influence on national politics had been virtually 
extinguished in Ghana. According to Rathbone, these changes made by Nkrumah were 
unprecedented in Ghanaian history. The whole legal basis of the neotraditional states had been 
eroded and substituted by a governmental system of command. Nugent, in contrast, who 
focuses on the Volta Region, criticizes Nkrumah for not having implemented his radical plans 
concerning chieftaincy. Nkrumah only tinkered on the colonial heritage of chieftaincy and 
carried out modifications only for his own (the CPP’s) purposes. As will be seen in the 
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following chapters, many of the powerful chiefs who had been deposed under him were to 
resurrect during the following regimes (Nugent 1996a: 213).  
These antipodal conclusions become less confusing if one takes into consideration the 
different focus of the two scholars. Nugent focuses on the Volta Region, where chieftaincy is 
traditionally weaker than in the Akan-speaking areas. The amalgamation policies of the 
British in the interwar period were not successful and thus created a rather artificial caste of 
paramount chiefs in the Volta Region. In the Ashanti Region, on the contrary, the 
neotraditional states were probably as powerful as in pre-colonialist times and based on well-
established laws and customs. Especially in these regions, the take-over of power by the 
government was set to run counter to the interests of a mighty elite. Given the political 
landscape after the departure of the British, something like a revolution had to take place.  
However, the new situation of the NTAs of the Volta Region was totally different, too, 
because officially the position of a chief was no longer a political one. The old functions had 
to be replaced by something new, also on the local level. By 1959, the previous mandatory 
reservation of one-third of the seats of Local Councils for nominees of traditional councils 
had been statutorily removed. On the national and regional levels an even stronger erosion 
took place: in 1964 the Eastern House of Chiefs literally fell down and lay in ruins for nearly 
two years (Rathbone 2000:155f).  
 
 2.2 After 1966 
 
The fall of Nkrumah in 1966 naturally led to a big turnaround, and also the chiefs had to turn 
around again if they didn’t want to be deposed. The newly established National Liberation 
Council consisted mainly of NLM and UP members and proscribed the CPP.   
With the NLC Decree No. 112, the first attempt was made to remove all those chiefs who had 
come to power only because of the CPP. Also the sub-chiefs, who had been made paramounts 
before, were degraded again. Well over 100 chiefs were destooled. Of course, the new 
Okyenhene was among them and the former one, who had resisted the CPP regime for quite a 
long time, was enstooled again. 
However, in spite of the huge support of the former neotraditional elites for the new regime, 
their political functions were not restored. This is particularly interesting because one of the 
most prominent figures of pro-chief academia in Ghana, the sociologist K.A. Busia, already 
had a say in the new government and was to become president for more than two years later 
on. He wrote one of the most influential books on chieftaincy in Ghana (‘The Position of the 
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Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti’), for which he was still cherished in 2001 by 
the former Ghanaian president John A. Kufuor. During his opening address at the 
'International Conference on Chieftaincy in Africa. Culture, Governance and Development' in 
Accra in January 2003, Kufuor described the relationship between Busia and most of the 
chieftaincy scholars from Ghana:  
 
‘Fifty years ago in 1953, one of the founding fathers of our nation and an eminent 
academician in his own right, Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia, published an important work [...]. 
This work generated considerable discussion and encouraged African academics to 
examine native institutions and make recommendations towards strengthening them. 
This conference is part of that distinguished record of contributions.’ (Conference 
Papers) 
 
Kufuor is totally right insofar as until now there is hardly any keenly pro-chief scholar who 
publishes without referring to Busia - which often leads to idealised and anachronistic 
portrayals of chieftaincy. 
Additionally, the neotraditional leaders of Akyem Abuakwa were back in government. 
Edward Akufo-Addo, one of the six founding fathers of the UGCC, was appointed chief 
justice from 1966-70 as well as Chairman of the Constitutional Commission for the Second 
Republican Constitution of 1969. From 1969 to 1972, he even became Ceremonial President 
of Ghana, alongside Busia, who held all the executive powers as Prime Minister.  
This means that the very clan who had fought fiercely against Nkrumah and for an 
independent Akyem Abuakwa under the Okyenhene Nana Ofori Atta II now ruled the country. 
Nana Ofori Atta II was back as the leader of the Akyem, whereas Edward Akufo-Addo, the 
son-in-law of the former Okyenhene Nana Ofori Atta I, became President and Chairman of 
the Constitutional Commission. 
But even this constellation didn’t lead to a reassertion of chieftaincy in national politics. The 
idea of a second chamber of parliament for the chiefs, which had been demanded by the NLM 
in the years before independence, was rejected again and substituted by the so-called Council 
of State. This Council exists until today and is claimed to be the ‘modern’ version of the 
‘Council of Elders’, which served as a ‘cabinet’ in pre-colonial societies like the Ashanti 
Federacy. The Council of State is portrayed as an example of the inclusion of ‘traditional’ 
ideas in ‘modern’ government. However, this council hardly bears any resemblance with 
‘traditional councils’ because the president is not forced to obey any advice given by the 
Council of State. In contrary, the traditional councils of elders are said to wield as much 
power as the chief, if not more (s. Busia 1951: 14; Kludze 2000: 54). Until today the 
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government describes the Council of State as a substitution for the idea of a Second Chamber 
for Chiefs.3
The Constitutional Assembly also decided to create a National House of Chiefs, which hasn’t 
changed its functions until today. It was to consist of five members from each of the Regional 
Houses of Chiefs; it should advise the competent authorities on matters relating to chieftaincy 
and undertake a progressive study, interpretation and codification of customary law. 
Interestingly enough, the right to withdraw recognition from a chief, which Nkrumah had 
used to crush the chiefs, wasn’t abolished by the NLC regime and the following government 
under Busia. According to Brempong, the following military government, the NRC-SMC 
junta (National Redemption Council/Supreme Military Council), which wasn’t interested too 
much in chieftaincy, changed this important point in the 1979 constitution: 
 
 
‘Parliament shall have no power to enact legislation which confers on any person or authority 
the right to accord or withdraw recognition to or from a chief; and which in any way detracts 
or derogates from the honor and dignity of the institution of chieftaincy.’ (Art. 172 (6) q.i. 
Brempong 2006: 33). 
 
Generally, Nkrumah’s harsh actions against chieftaincy were slowly attenuated. With the 
Chieftaincy Act of 1971, which introduced the National House of Chiefs, Busia and Akufo-
Addo already significantly reduced government intervention in chieftaincy affairs, but they 
also disallowed the former chiefly influence on the national level (Boafo-Arthur 2006: 156).  
 The new political structure was to be more regionalist and chiefs got back their third-part 
share in Local Councils, but they still had no direct access to stool revenues. The idea of an 
upper house for chiefs was quietly sidelined and there was no restoration of real access to 
power and wealth (Rathbone 2000: 163). 
Especially in the Volta Region, the following decade was marked by a decay of political 
institutions and corruption. The developmentalist vision of Nkrumah failed, the financial 
crisis became severe and local development ceased to be of primary concern. In the 1960ies it 
was still widely believed that everyone would have access to running water, electricity and 
roads within a few years. With projects like the deepwater harbour in Tema, the Black Star 
line, a merchant shipping fleet, the Akosombo Dam and the foundation of Ghana Airways, 
Nkrumah set the bar too high and left the level of liquidity too low for the following regimes.4
                                                 
3
 
 http://www.ghana.gov.gh/council_of_state (0109) 
4 e.g. Time magazine, 10 November 1961. Online: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,938253-
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Despite continuing developmentalist rhetoric in the 1970ies, the local administration became 
ineffective and the police became more and more corrupt. Rural communities were 
increasingly forced to establish their own institutions. This led to the reactivation of the local 
government structure of the Nkrumah regime, but without the control of the state. Particularly 
in the Volta Region, the former Village Development Committees (VDC; or TDC, for town 
committees), which had formerly been appointed by the District Councils, now consisted 
mostly of representatives of the different clans of one village. These committees organised 
much of the communal labour, like cleaning the streets, maintaining the markets, repairing 
public buildings like schools, but also more ambitious development projects. Here the chiefs 
played a significant role, also in the management of these bigger projects. They had to beat 
the gong-gong to summon the people on communal labour days and they also fined people 
who didn’t come to work (Nugent 1996a: 214). In the Keta District, many of these 
committees still exist and now are to be replaced by the ‘new’ decentralised structure, which 
was officially introduced in 1992 (interview Dagbui). 
For Nugent it is ‘tempting to interpret these developments in terms of a reassertion of 
traditional authority in the face of state paralysis’, but he also alludes to the fact that this was 
not a conscious turning away from the state and that there is no proof of a ‘neat’ comeback of 
traditional practices. It was on the contrary rather a ‘reconstituted role for chiefs, departing in 
significant respects from pre-colonial, colonial and early post-colonial precedents’ (ibid.). 
Nugent also points out that the description of the relation between the state and the chiefs as a 
zero sum game can be misleading. In this regard Rouveroy van Nieuvaal also provides 
examples of a loss of influence in both spheres at the same time (Rouveroy van Nieuvaal/Dijk 
1999: 8-9).  
The dependence of NTAs on the government in crucial matters like enstoolment and 
destoolment led to a conscious and systematic distortion of facts because the government 
didn’t and couldn’t oversee all the local allegiances in Ghana. Chieftaincy disputes were still 
solved by the government, mainly because the rural communities had no accepted 
mechanisms for settling claims, but the government wasn’t able to be objective. This situation 
prevails until now. Contestants in chieftaincy disputes are fully aware of the fact that the 
arbitrators don’t know enough about the history of their village or town and normally cannot 
refer to any significant information. The outcome is the permanent attempt of NTAs ‘to 
conjure with history in order to improve their standing within an existing hierarchy’ (Nugent 
1996a: 214). 
                                                                                                                                                        
3,00.html (1108). 
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At this point it is probably useful to question the basis of this analysis. Nugent records a 
comeback of actors who designate themselves as traditional actors but he denies the rise of 
traditional authority. According to him, these actors didn’t reject interference by the 
government but rather tried to improve their standing with the government by twisting history. 
A ‘neat’ comeback would have consequently been a reassertion of traditional authorities who 
derive their power solely from pre-colonial times. But especially in the Volta Region, 
allegiances have changed continuously, also in pre-colonial times. The tiny word ‘neat’ 
already shows that even a brilliant scholar like Paul Nugent has some problems with the term 
‘tradition’. If ‘traditional’ concepts and institutions didn’t come back neatly, there should also 
be a neat, if not to say a ‘true’ (and unchangeable?), past out there that could have come back. 
This inevitably points to an essentialist understanding of tradition, which is said to be 
obsolete. 
However, the revitalisation of chieftaincy took place mainly on the village level. Probably the 
most important contribution of the higher tiers assembled in the Regional House of Chiefs 
was the commitment of its members to fight the secessionist movement. Here again, the 
instrumentalist character of chieftaincy is quite evident: the Togoland Congress was a former 
ally of the NLM and had been put under serious pressure by Nkrumah. The chiefs, who had 
been in power already before the Nkrumah era, mostly supported the Togoland Congress. 
With Nana Kwadjo Darko, a chief and prominent figure of the Togoland Congress was 
already condemned in 1959 for his open support of the party (Rathbone 2000: 152). After 
rising to power, the former NLM stalwarts were no longer interested in secession and 
supported (and enstooled) those chiefs who were against a united Togoland.  
This means that the role of the higher-ranking chiefs remained the same as under Nkrumah: 
those who were stubborn had to go and the turncoats could stay. While the paramount chiefs 
of the South-West became very powerful again because of their relatively tight relations with 
the national elite and also because of continuous popular support of chieftaincy in these 
regions, the posts of their counterparts in the Volta Region remained rather ornamental offices.  
On the village level, in contrast, the reassertion of chieftaincy was apparent, simply because 
there was a lack of other actors. The chiefs supported the self-sufficient T/VDCs by enforcing 
taxes and communal labour, they served as mediators or judges and they provided a police 
force and jails for minor offences like theft. If they were educated, they already served as 
development brokers. If they were business men, they often launched ‘community projects’ 
on their own (Nugent 1996a: 215). 
Nugent describes this development as a ‘reassertion of village sovereignty’. According to him, 
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a revival of chieftaincy as a whole didn’t take place in the 1970ies because the higher tiers of 
chieftaincy did not rule over sovereign territories in the Volta Region. The state controlled 
enstoolment and destoolment and served as a mediator in chieftaincy conflicts (Nugent 1996a: 
217). This judgement strongly depends on the definition of chieftaincy that is applied and, as I 
have pointed out above, on the definition of tradition as such. If there had hardly been any 
offices in the Volta Region similar to the colonial term ‘paramount chief’, how could there be 
a reassertion? If traditional rule is something which changes all the time, why should it be less 
‘neat’ if it is linked more strongly to modern political institutions than to other traditional 
systems, for instance, like the Arabic cultures in the north of Ghana?       
 
 2.3 Ghana under Rawlings 
 
Rawlings came into power in times of severe economic crisis. Like Nkrumah and contrary to 
the other rulers in between and before them, he was a ‘small boy’ and a spokesman of the 
youth and the poor. As a consequence, his speeches were quite radical, as were his measures 
in the beginning. Both this revolutionary rhetoric and the radical actions, however, remained 
superficial. Rawlings’ main enemy was corruption, or ‘Kalabule’, as it is called until now in 
Ghana. This word is still linked to the challenging of authority and excessive wealth and it 
created an effective climate for change in combination with the proclamation of a revolution 
from below. 
Apart from these comparatively populist policies, Rawlings had much in common with 
Nkrumah, particularly his disaffection of chieftaincy. Rawlings found most of his supporters 
in the Volta Region, where he himself had grown up. Until now, more than 80% of Voltarians 
are continuously voting NDC, the party he founded in 1992. Based on the low status of 
chieftaincy in the Volta Region, Rawlings’ agitation against chieftaincy was at the same time a 
regionalist strategy against the powerful elites in the Ashanti Region. He portrayed them quite 
burlesquely as feudal rulers, which was particularly not true for chieftaincy in the Volta 
Region. But also in the rest of Ghana, the ‘royal’ families probably accounted for half of the 
population and thus differed considerably from their European counterparts (Survey 2005).    
According to Ray, the radical rhetoric of Rawlings was contradictive, insofar as the 
Constitution of the Third Republic (1979-81) marked a significant shift in the relation 
between the state and the chieftaincies. Since Nkrumah, the government had a final say in 
who was to become a chief. This was neither changed by the anti-Nkrumah military 
government of the National Liberation Council nor by the Constitution of the Second 
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Republic (1969-72). In 1979, this power was constitutionally removed from the control of the 
government and handed over to the chiefs, who controlled the House of Chiefs. Only in 
certain legal matters the Ghanaian Courts and finally the Supreme Court could be consulted 
(Ray 1996: 189). Brempong credits the NRC-SMC junta with the amendment of this law. To 
him, this regime was responsible for the 1979 Constitution, and not Rawlings (2006: 33). 
Rawlings also created a new system of local governance, with the Peoples Defence Councils 
(PDCs) as a core institution. These small units on the grassroots level should replace the 
T/VDCs of Nkrumah and the chiefly institutions at the same time. When it became 
foreseeable that the strategy would fail, he called to account the chiefs (Nugent 1996a: 217), 
although there was no proof of them behaving counter-revolutionarily. In many areas, the 
chiefs actually helped in the construction of the PDCs, partly because of the strong regionalist 
component of Rawlings policies and partly because many of the youth groups in the Volta 
Region were very actively involved in ‘economic crimes’ like smuggling. Since the fight 
against such crimes was one important reason for creating the PDCs, many of the youth 
leaders were excluded from them. Additionally, people in the countryside tended to consider 
the formation of PDCs as a task prescribed by the government. As a consequence, PDC 
members were often selected even in the chief’s palace. The chiefs were then accused of 
trying to hijack the PDCs, even though most of them just tried to avoid the accusation of 
obstructionism (Nugent 1996a: 218). 
In the urban centres, the PDCs were much more intellectually oriented. Various fragmented 
left-wing movements contributed to a vibrant revolutionary atmosphere. But soon these 
movements became too radical for the government and in various cases their actions were 
even called infantile. The radical PDCs attacked everything that had the slightest touch of 
bourgeoisie, such as public institutions (the military, the police and the courts), private 
companies, shops and religious bodies. Chieftaincy also figured among the attacked 
institutions. Ninsin even described the PDCs as a parallel government, which was to be 
deposed quickly by Rawlings (Ninsin 1993: 103). 
The Marxist rhetoric of the PNDC also accented the difference between commoners and 
royals, because the conventional differentiation into classes didn’t make sense in Ghana, 
particularly on the countryside. Nugent criticises the simple equation of the neotraditional 
hierarchy with classes: ‘Big men’ often became chiefs because they were ‘big’ and not 
inversely. There are numerous examples where chiefly assets were used to accumulate of 
wealth, but on the whole ‘there is no evidence to suggest that most chiefs were substantially 
wealthier as a rule than their subjects’ (Nugent 1996: 75). My own empirical data collected in 
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2005 suggests the same conclusion. About half of the interviewees in the statistical population 
of Greater Accra depicted themselves as royals, but there was no significant difference in the 
reported income levels. Only their educational background was slightly higher. However, 
these differences are certainly higher if we take a look at the small elite of the around 190 
paramount chiefs. Here lies one of the big differences to European feudal systems. Royals 
exist even in the smallest and most remote villages in Ghana. Hence, the difference between 
chiefs and commoners mostly manifests itself in terms of status, but not wealth (see chapter 
3.2). 
The prevailing Marxist ideology nevertheless led to the substitution of the class conflict with 
the far older conflict between royals and commoners. The PDCs mainly consisted of teachers, 
traders and unemployed persons. But in spite of this obvious line of conflict, there were many 
instances where PDCs cooperated closely with NTAs (Nugent 1996: 76). 
One reason for these contested alliances was the new place of chieftaincy in the political 
system. Chiefs had already been officially out of the political business before independence, 
and as I have pointed out above, Nkrumah also tried to make sure that they didn’t meddle 
with national politics anymore. The phase after Nkrumah, however, was characterised by state 
decay, which resulted in the restoration of the power of smaller chiefs, particularly in the 
Volta Region. By then, chieftaincy was a more variegated and a more legitimate institution 
compared to the colonial situation (ibid, Nugent 1996a: 214). 
But the PDCs also had to contest against the T/VDCs, which were introduced by Nkrumah 
and revitalised during the crisis of the 1970ies (s. Nugent 1996a: 214f). They were true 
institutions of community self-help, as they were reintroduced by the people themselves and 
they almost had the same relationship with chieftaincy as the PDCs. Where NTAs and 
T/VDCs were at odds with one another, the PDCs put their foot in the door by supporting the 
NTAs. Only in very few cases where the chiefs were very unpopular, the PDCs and the 
T/VDCs established effective alliances. Most of the time, the PDCs were confronted with 
existing local institutions and brought little change to the situation of the rural population 
(Nugent 1996: 77). By the mid-1980ies, the CDRs (Committees for the Defence of the 
Revolution), the successors of the PDCs, already were empty shells without members or even 
leaders on the local level (Nugent 1996a: 218). 
Consequently, the PNDC regime changed its policy concerning chieftaincy in the second half 
of the 1980ies. Neotraditional institutions should contribute their part to achieving the aspired 
egalitarian social order. The intellectuals involved harked back to the ideology of colonial rule 
(see e.g. Gyekye 1988) and called for Ghanaian tradition to become the basis especially of 
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local political systems instead of importing foreign models of government. Both the 
minimalist state and the insistence on hatching organic political institutions out of  indigenous 
traditions was reminiscent of speeches made by many a colonial governor and even made it 
necessary for PNDC members to openly draw a distinction between indirect rule and current 
policy  (Nugent 1996a: 219). 
That is to say, the leftist movement, the party of the non-royals, suddenly set out to find 
tradition and it had to use former arguments of both the colonial elite and the colonial 
administration. The reason for this change as well as for the turnaround in economic policy at 
the same time can be found in the severe economic crisis and the following intervention of the 
World Bank. Already the change from PDCs to CDRs was the result of a coup attempt by 
military exiles from Ghana in 1983, the third coup attempt in 1983. The military was as 
desperate as the whole population because of a famine crisis, which was aggravated by the 
expulsion of one million Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1983 (Ninsin 1993: 103).  
The leading exponent of this new neotraditional outlook was the National Commission on 
Democracy (NCD) and the name of the new paradigm was ‘true democracy’. Democracy also 
was to become the hobby of the World Bank this time around, which makes it tempting to 
interpret the neotraditional turnaround as anticipatory obedience. This impression is backed 
by the fact that Rawlings still tried to exclude the chiefs from politics. Only two chiefs played 
a visible public role and on the district level they were only one of the groups to be covered 
by the clause permitting the government to appoint one-third of the assemblymen (Nugent 
1996a: 220). 
The National Commission on Democracy also served as a discussion forum for the 
establishment of a second chamber of parliament for traditional rulers. Once again the 
outcome was rather blurry, and once again Nugent detected a ‘certain ambivalence across the 
political spectrum towards an enhanced political role for the chiefs’ (ibid.).  
This discussion is alive until today and most of the participants mention two reasons for their 
indifference. First of all, NTAs have since independence profited from their role beyond the 
sphere of the state and would attract more of the blame for the malfunctioning of the state if 
they were to be officially incorporated. Secondly, the contest for chiefly offices is already 
quite tough and would lead to more serious conflicts if the chiefly offices would import even 
more power. During my field work in 2008, I encountered another striking argument against a 
second parliament: the paramount chiefs of the South are almost as educated as members of 
parliament, while about 51% of the paramount chiefs of the North have no formal education 
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(all uneducated paramount chiefs in Ghana live in the Northern Regions).5
On Independence Day in 1984 Rawlings formulated his new policy: 
 A stronger 
inclusion of paramount chiefs in national politics would therefore again penalise the North, 
which is already lagging behind in terms of development. 
 
Our government believes that this is the time to start formulating and discussing the 
basic outlines of the new political system that we aim to build. Such a system must 
drive its validity and strength from our own historical process, the realities of our own 
situation and the intellectual values of our own traditions and cultural heritage[...]. 
(Ninsin 1993: 104) 
 
The consequences of this change of mind were not all too visible. Instead, it became clear, 
that the regime erected a quasi-colonial system of administration. Like Nkrumah’s District 
Commissioner, the PNDC District Secretary wielded almost exclusive executive authority in 
his area. The CDRs, instead of getting closer to the people, increasingly served as political 
instruments of the District Secretaries. They became the eyes and ears of the administration 
by passing on information through the District Secretaries to the government (Nugent 1996: 
154f). Because certain chieftaincy disputes seemed to be irresolvable within the liberal 
framework of the Constitution of the Second Republic, the PNDC again cancelled the 
nomination rights of the House of Chiefs in 1985 (PNDCL 107) by prohibiting treating any 
person as a chief without recognition by the PNDC Secretary responsible for Chieftaincy 
Matters (Ray 1996: 188). To Boafo-Arthur this amendment was an expression of the world-
view of the PNDC. ‘In its attempts to tame the chiefs,’ Boafo-Arthur notes, the PNDC regime 
amended the Chieftaincy Act of 1971, Act 370, which guaranteed the independence of 
enstoolment and destoolment processes from party politics. Thereby the PNDC regime re-
introduced the gazetting of the chiefs, which was started by the CPP government through the 
Chieftaincy Act of 1961 (Act 81) and abolished by the NRC-SMC junta in 1979. PNDCL 107 
amended section 48 of the Chieftaincy Act of 1971, Act 370, by noting in subsection 2: ‘no 
person shall be deemed to be a chief [...] under this Act or any other enactment unless he has 
been recognised as such for the existence of that function by the Secretary responsible for 
Chieftaincy Matters by notice published in the Local Government Bulletin’ (q.i. Boafo-Arthur 
2006: 157).   
In any case, the PNDC really involved the NTAs in the district assemblies (DAs). In contrast 
to the situation today, the PNDC resisted the temptation of packing the one-third of the DAs 
                                                 
5 Source: National House of Chiefs 2008, African Trade Project 2007. 
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reserved for appointment with party stalwarts. One fifth of the appointees were chiefs (Ayee 
1994: 122, q.i. Nugent 1996: 177). The DAs sometimes even worked together with traditional 
councils, especially when it came to the ‘threat of moral degeneration’, as Nugent puts it. At 
the same time, Rawlings attended chiefly durbars throughout the country and identified 
publicly with the concerns of the chiefs (Nugent 1996: 205).  
Another instrument of the District Secretary was the ‘People’s Militia’, which was mainly 
created to fight smuggling. Here again, the new traditionalist rhetoric was applied. Brigadier 
Tehn-Addy, the head of the Civil Defence Organisation (CDO), was fond of likening the 
People’s Militias to ‘Asafo Companies’, the most important traditional institution for 
commoners (non-royals) in Akan societies. But still, the militias were not very popular in 
rural communities, particularly because of their aim of fighting smuggling (Nugent 1996: 
155). 
Through these structures the PNDC did establish contact with the countryside, but it never 
achieved as much participation as the CPP. The T/VDCs of the CPP era were still active, 
cooperated sporadically with the district and were often geared with the NTAs. Whereas the 
CPP maintained a strong presence at the countryside through countless party branches, the 
PNDC much more resembled the colonial regime by focusing on the district (Nugent 1996: 
156).  
 2.4 ‘Democratisation’ 
 
Since 1992, elections have continuously taken place in Ghana. The decision to hold elections, 
however, wasn’t solely made by the PNDC. As Boafo-Arthur points out, the shift of the World 
Bank to ‘Good Governance’ in 1989, just in time with the downfall of communism, became a 
showcase for the power of the international financial institutions (Boafo-Arthur 2003: 247). 
Between 1983 and 1993, the total amount of foreign aid quadrupled from US$130 million to 
US$510 million. The share of multilateral aid to Ghana doubled from 1983 to 1984 to 79,1% 
and hasn’t fallen under 71% ever since (s. Tsikata 1999: 3, 38, 43). Additionally, the other 
major donors followed the lead of the World Bank and tied foreign assistance to the practice 
of good governance too. Thus, a departure from this narrow, predetermined path to 
‘democracy’ would have been disastrous both for the regime and the whole population of 
Ghana. 
The new constitution of 1992 brought two major changes for NTAs. First of all, the chiefs 
were banned from active party politics, and secondly, the gazetting of the chiefs by the 
government, which had been re-introduced by the PNDC, was re-abolished again. Article 270 
33 
 
(2) (a) of the 1992 constitution amends PNDCL 107 by stating that Parliament shall have no 
power to enact any law which ‘confers on any person or authority the right to accord or 
withdraw recognition to or from a chief for any purpose whatsoever.’ (Republic of Ghana 
1992) Instead, the National House of Chiefs, the Regional Houses of Chiefs and the local 
Traditional Councils had to determine the validity of chiefly status and succession from then 
on. The gazetting of the chiefs (the publishing of official recognition) and the register of 
chiefs were taken over by the National House of Chiefs. The decisions of the judicial 
committees of the NHC, however, could still be appealed to the Supreme Court of Ghana. The 
Consultative Assembly, which drew up this constitution, was selected by the PNDC and 
contained a considerable number of NTAs, who seemed to have pushed for this amendment 
(Ray 1996: 190). 
The on-and-off control concerning this law is a good illustration of chiefly influence on the 
different parties in power in Ghanaian history. Nkrumah switched the light off by introducing 
the gazetting, the NRC-SMC (1975-79) junta turned it on again (Akufo-Addo and Busia 
needed it to reverse the situation created by Nkrumah), Rawlings switched it off again in 1985 
and turned it on again in 1992 to meet the good governance requirements. The end result 
(until now) was a recovery of power on the part of the NTAs in national politics, which was 
partly counterbalanced by the exclusion of chiefs from party politics.     
I have used the word ‘partly’, as the chiefs didn’t just stop to influence party politics because 
of a new law. Without the support of the chiefs, as the former presidential candidate G.P. 
Hagan pointed out in an interview in 2005, it is hard to win elections (see chapter 3.1.4). 
In addition, there is no official control of whether the chiefs really abstain from holding 
offices in political parties and all the other neotraditional actors, like queenmothers, elders, 
‘linguists’, etc. can legally take part in party politics (interview Odotei 2008).  Particularly on 
the countryside, the population is still very attentive to the political preferences of the chiefs. 
Kwesi Jonah studied this chiefly interference in politics and found different strategies, ranging 
from intimidation of possible opponents of the favoured candidate to the instrumentalisation 
of ethnic differences. However, according to Jonah, chiefly interference, being a matter of fact 
for the bulk of the Ghanaian scholars, is not strongly felt by the population. From a total of 
1806 people questioned, only about 20 percent thought that NTAs were influencing the 
outcome of 2002 DA/UC elections. Jonah explains this discrepancy with the feeling of the 
interviewees that they themselves thought that they decided freely and that many of them tried 
to protect the integrity of their chiefs (Jonah 2003: 220f).  
Although they were banned from party politics, the chiefs were accorded diverse political 
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functions. They were represented in the Council of State (the highest advisory body to the 
Ghanaian President), the Lands Commission (i.a. responsible for the allocation of public lands 
for private use)6
The representation of chiefs in the DAs worsened, although the pertinent law (Article 242, 
ibid.) remained almost unchanged. The president can appoint thirty percent of all the members 
of the district assembly in consultation with ‘traditional authorities’ and other interest groups. 
According to Brempong, the ‘other interest groups’ consist mainly of the party in power and 
virtually all appointed assembly members are party stalwarts. Thus, the clause meant no 
consultations with chiefs or at most only with chiefs of the appropriate affiliation (ibid.).  
, the Regional Co-coordinating Council and the Prison Commission 
(Brempong 2006: 33).    
 
Since 1992, the legal situation of NTAs has not changed anymore and it is not likely to 
change significantly in the near future. Article 270, providing for the official separation of 
chieftaincy and formal politics, could only be amended after consultations with the Council of 
State, the NHC and an approval by a national referendum with voter turnout of forty percent 
and an approval rate of seventy-five percent (Ray 1996: 190). But as I have already suggested, 
the factual political influence of NTAs doesn’t seem to cease. After a short abstract of the 
history of NTAs as facilitators of development, I will therefore focus on the actual relation 
between the NTAs and formal political actors. After all, local politics is (or should be) 
concerned mainly with local development.  
 
 2.5 History of chieftaincy in Ghana: from intermediary power to 
interest group 
 
All of the regimes covered had one thing in common concerning chieftaincy: after a phase of 
power struggle, the regimes used NTAs for their own purposes. Naturally, this had to be 
accompanied by an adequate rhetoric. Nkrumah, Rawlings and the colonial regime all started 
a very critical discourse on chieftaincy and only began to cherish chieftaincy after they had 
incorporated it in their political system. The NLM came the other way round, but with the 
same outcome: politically stubborn chiefs had to go, turncoats could stay.   
The term ‘development’ has shaped this relationship thoroughly right from the beginning. 
When Nkrumah came into power in 1951, the Bretton Wood Institutions already began to 
focus on so-called ‘underdeveloped’ countries, thereby creating the new paradigm of 
                                                 
6 http://www.ghana.gov.gh/ghana/lands_commission.jsp (0109) 
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development in these regions. After WW II, the British colonial power also changed its course 
from the support of minimalist states led by chiefs to the emphasis of economic development, 
which could be more easily accomplished with the help of the educated elite (s. Rathbone 
2000: 19f). The NTAs didn’t yet have a place in this notion of development. Particularly with  
the rise of Marxism, development was equated with economic, social and cultural progress. 
Marxist developmentalism was a teleological ideology which derived its power from the pre-
paved path of European history. Despite Nkrumah’s initial belief in the continuity between 
African ‘communalism’ and modern communism, the chiefs were mainly seen as obstacles to 
development. Because of their low level of education, most of the chiefs at that time were 
merely spectators of development. They could not compete with huge construction projects 
like the Akusombo Dam, the Tema deepwater harbour and the promise of running water and 
electricity for all Ghanaians.  
This picture changed in the 1970ies, when the failure of the ideology of development became 
apparent. Because the state virtually ceased to exist on the countryside, the population had to 
reactivate various institutions of the past. Many villages reintroduced the local structures that 
had been created under Nkrumah. The majority of the Ghanaians however saw a revival of 
neotraditional structures. 
If we exclude the short revolutionary phase under Rawlings, lasting from 1979 (1981) to 
1983, during which NTAs were again demonised as the ambassadors of the bourgeoisie, the 
history of the chiefs of development could start in the phase of state decay. That time also 
marked the birth of many an NGO, which created state-like structures, sometimes whole 
states within the state, which are now hindering meaningful processes of decentralisation (see 
e.g. Reijne 1999, quoted in Trotha 2001).  Being often opponents of the state, the 
neotraditional actors sometimes use these zones to erect their own local systems of 
governance. Trutz von Trotha calls this closing of ranks ‘parastatism’ (‘Parastaatlichkeit’, s. 
Trotha 2000). Until now, no scholar has applied this concept to Ghana, and because of 
insufficient data, I will only be able to make a few points.   
The phase of ‘democratisation’ was again marked by the overwhelming influence of the 
World Bank. As ‘Good Governance’ became en vogue in the 1990ies, the NTAs became en 
vogue, too. Already in 1985, the late Asantehene7
                                                 
7    ‘Hene’ normally means ‘chief’, and the prefix usually refers to the location.  
, Otomfuo Opoku Ware II, discerned this 
trend and created the title ‘development chief’ (Nkosuohene), which could also be used for 
non-royals and foreigners (Steegstra: 2006: 603). This title has been in heavy use ever since 
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and has provoked countless calls against the ‘misuse’ of the term ‘tradition’.8
  
 At the same 
time, there is a discernible shift in the role of chiefs from purely political figures to private 
persons with enhanced social status. A big part of the Ghanaian population is still hardly 
connected to ‘modern’ political life and thus still relates strongly to the chiefs. In urban areas, 
however, NTAs had to find ways of compensating their loss of influence in politics. These 
NTAs often turned into ‘courtiers en développement’ or ‘development brokers’ (for the 
concept s. Bierschenk et al. 2000).     
 3. Overview: chieftaincy and development in Ghana 
 3.1 The roles of the NTAs  
 
To find out more about the different roles of chiefs, their relationship with the ‘modern’ 
political sphere and their sources of power, I applied various empirical approaches. In 2005, I 
conducted a survey with over 1000 participants, with the aim of comparing paramount chiefs 
with MPs. The results thus obtained will be enriched with statistical data on all paramount 
chiefs (level of education, profession, links with NGOs, age), gathered in 2008. The aim of 
the analysis of these figures will be a more precise picture of chiefs as political actors. Since 
the Nkrumah era, chiefs have not been part of the formal political system anymore, but the 
interviewed population of Accra still considered them to be more powerful than MPs. This 
outcome will be the starting point of an inquiry into the different sources power of the chiefs. 
In the research project of 2005, I also asked a representative sample of the Accra population to 
describe the functions of chiefs. The results of these interviews will be compared to the 
picture of chieftaincy conveyed in the media by means of a media analysis which I conducted 
in 2008/9.        
To get a better picture of the practical side, I also conducted field studies in the Keta District 
in the southern part of the Volta Region. Because I doubted the level of engagement of NTAs 
in development as depicted in the media and in the scientific literature, I didn’t ask directly 
about the contribution of the NTAs. I asked my interview partners to list the main actors of 
development on the different levels and to describe their role in development.  
 
 
                                                 
8 cf. Ghanaweb 17 February 2009 Online: 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=157818 (0509) 
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 3.1.1 Brokers, patrons and the great hunt for projects 
 
There is a considerable number of concepts for describing local actors at the interface 
between donors and the recipients. I will use the terms ‘development broker’ (also ‘courtiers 
en développement’ or ‘Entwicklungsmakler’, s. Bierschenk 1998), ‘gate keeper’ (Long 2001), 
‘entrepreneur’ (Boissevain) and ‘patron’ (Bierschenk et al. 2000) to describe and distinguish 
this position from others and to draw attention to certain attributes of these actors. 
Bierschenk defines the local development broker as an intermediary who contributes to the 
influx of external resources from the development sector to a locality, where he plays a 
significant political role or where he is trying to establish a political standing. The ideal type 
is running ‘projects’ at the interface between the donor (public, private, multilateral and 
bilateral) and the ‘target group’. Brokers act as legitimate representatives of the ‘target 
groups’ and are said to be able to articulate their needs (Bierschenk/Olivier de Sardan 2002: 
2). This picture of an interface between the outside world and the villagers is certainly 
simplified. As Norman Long points out, social interface situations are complex and multiple 
in nature, although they may convey the image of some kind of two-sided confrontation 
(Long 2001: 243). In addition, the practice of development projects consists of a multitude of 
social actors, many of whom can be described as development brokers. Normally, there are 
chains of agencies and agents involved in the transfer of resources, for instance from bi- or 
multinational donors over national governments to local services of project administration to 
‘target groups’ (Bierschenk/Olivier de Sardan 2002: 2). This list could be extended and 
complicated ad libitum, for example at the level of the ‘target group’. Most of the time, it is 
not one person who attracts investment, but a group of people with contacts to different 
milieus. The same issues have to be considered with respect to the dissemination of the funds, 
the recruitment of free labour force and so on. The mobilisation of people is normally still 
done with the help of the chief. But he often doesn’t speak the colonial language and has to be 
approached traditionally by a ‘linguist’ (Tsiami), who normally acts as a mouthpiece of the 
chief. This could therefore create a chain that already involves many actors in the local field: 
the local representative of the NGO on the district level, the broker between the district and 
the village, the linguist, the chief, and finally the gong-gong beater, who will assemble the 
people. Whether an actor is a broker, a gate keeper or just a messenger mainly depends on the 
cultural, social and informational distance he has to bridge.   
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Thus, the required competences of a ‘broker’ vary with the particular position in the 
development arena.9 Particularly vis-à-vis official actors, the broker depends heavily on 
capacities like the use of certain voguish key words of the dominant discourse and the 
knowledge of programme foci and procedures of allocation (Bierschenk 1998: 322ff).  But 
these requirements multiply if we define the term ‘discourse’ as openly as Norman Long, 
namely as ‘a set of meanings embodied in metaphors, representations, images, narratives and 
statements that advance a particular version of the ‘truth’ about objects, persons, events and 
the relations between them’ (Long 2001: 51f). The qualification of a broker then no longer 
depends only on his or her technical knowledge, but also on his or her behaviour, world-view, 
appearance and so on.  Brokers must be able to speak at least three ‘languages’: the one of 
NGOs, the one of African government officials and the one of the rural communities. This 
does not only literally mean to speak different languages, but also to use the appropriate 
words, cadence etc. Additionally, brokers need to have their feet in the doors of most of the 
important organisations in all social fields10
Bierschenk differentiates between three main positions for brokers: firstly, the patron or big 
man himself (who is often an NTA) can act as a broker to protect his position. According to 
Blundo and Edja, the village chiefs normally don’t possess the required competences and 
need ‘brokers’ clubs’ often brought into existence by themselves (Blundo 2000, Edja 2000; 
q.i. Bierschenk/Olivier de Sardan 2002). Secondly, outsiders often try to establish a position 
in a particular community and ‘pay their entrance fee’ in the local arena through their activity 
as brokers. These can be missionaries, researchers, regional or national political leaders or 
migrants (Bierschenk 1998: 322ff).  In this context, the title Nkosuohene (development chief) 
will become important in the case study. Nkosuohenes are often politicians or tourists and 
they don’t have to belong to the royal family. The fluidity of the neotraditional system also 
allows outsiders to become part of the family, for instance by declaring the outsider to be the 
 where they operate, and they need to be sociable 
and eager to play to the gallery (Bierschenk et al. 2000: 26). In short, this means that they 
have to possess social and cultural capital that is convertible in all social fields. 
                                                 
9 ‘Arenas are spaces in which contests over issues, claims, resources, values, meanings and representations 
take place; that is they are sites of struggle within and across domains.” (Long 2001: 242) 
10 According to Long ‘social fields constitute ‚open spaces’ composed of distributions of heterogeneous 
elements (material resources, information, technologies, institutional components, discourses and sets of 
social relationships of various kinds) wherein no single ordering principle prevails … any order that does 
emerge is the result of struggles, negotiations and accommodations that take place between competing 
parties” (Long 2001:241). I will also draw on the definition of Bourdieu, who depicts social fields as 
‘systems of social positions organised around power relations where agents seek to achieve and claim 
different forms of capital (Bourdieu 1971).    
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grandsons and –daughters of a chief or queenmother, but this case involves more discursive 
activity and often leads to conflicts (cf. Steegstra 2006).   
In most of the cases the broker already belongs to the local political arena, but he holds a 
marginal position. He thus uses his capacity as a development broker to climb the local social 
ladder. In this regard Bierschenk brings up the case of many school and university drop-outs, 
who return to their village and try to establish NGOs and thereby become small 
‘entrepreneurs of development’ (Bierschenk 1998: 322ff). This group often has travelled a lot, 
sometimes to the US and Europe.  
All three types of brokers – the big man, the outsider and the social climber – hold positions 
that overlap with those of established local politicians. This inevitably often leads to 
configurations where the broker acts against the interest of local politics (Bierschenk et al. 
2000: 31). The same applies to the relationship between the broker and the neotraditional 
system.    
Interestingly, both the concept of ‘social interfaces’ and that of ‘development brokers’ have 
evolved from the description of the chiefly position in the colonial (and also in the pre-
colonial) state (Long 2001: 66; Bierschenk et al. 2000: 15ff). Bierschenk describes the 
‘bearers of local positions of power’ (who also encompass NTAs) as middlemen who are able 
to benefit from their position but who are mostly excluded from the profit gained from 
development projects (Bierschenk 1998: 322ff). As the overview and the case study will 
show, this exclusion of NTAs from the development arena is not true for Ghana. More and 
more NTAs have started to act as development brokers since the 1970ies, due to various 
reasons.11
Already in colonial times, the chief was a perfect example of an intrapersonal role conflict 
(for this concept s. Merton 1973). As a representative of his community to the government 
and vice versa, he was both a victim and a beneficiary of both systems. As shown in the 
historical overview, his relation with the government stayed almost the same after 
independence. In this sense, the neotraditional development broker is one of the roles that 
evolved from the neotraditional intermediary of colonial times.  
  
Another role is the ‘political entrepreneur’, who competes for the favour of the population 
(see Bierschenk et al 2000: 17f). On both sides, in the political arena as well as in the 
development arena, the number of actors, and thus of competitors, has augmented.  This 
increasing competition leads to a situation where many brokers are at the same time 
                                                 
11  Bierschenk belongs to APAD (Association euro-Africaine pour l'anthropologie du changement sociale et du 
développement) and focuses mainly on the francophone countries. 
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‘entrepreneurs’ who manipulate persons and information for profit. To Boissevain, the maxim 
of such an ‘entrepreneurs’ goes: ‘Communicate now and pay later!’ (Boissevain 1974; q.i. 
Bierschenk et al 2000: 20) The remuneration for the manipulative services of the entrepreneur 
is not fixed; it is not clear when and how he or she will receive a remuneration. In fact, this 
uncertainty is part of the system because it perpetuates the relationship. The outstanding debts 
and credits of a broker create and perpetuate his social network and his service normally 
depends on his access to this very network. Boissevain thinks, in other words, that the 
successful broker also tries to accumulate social capital composed of subprime credits, 
because for him, transforming social capital into economic capital is easier than it is for other 
actors. He thus accumulates relevant information and contacts and has to protect them by 
keeping partners in the dark concerning the actual extent of his network (cf. 
Bourdieu/Steinrücke 2005: 63).  
However, this argument is problematic insofar as it assumes that all social relationships of 
brokers are results of rational choices. The broker is not a profit-maximizing machine, but a 
human being with friends and relatives to whom he or she rather relates according to the 
concept of generalised reciprocity. Thus, the actor sometimes does not expect to get any 
compensation at all.  
The primary asset of the broker is certainly his position at the interface. Compared to the 
intermediary of colonial times, he is able to make more use of this position because he is not 
bound to this role as a middleman due to his office. He can withdraw at any time with less 
‘social costs’ than a colonial chief. Such an interface normally lies between different social 
fields or levels of social organisation, where ‘social discontinuities, based upon discrepancies 
in values, interests, knowledge and power, are most likely to be located’ (Long 2001: 243). 
The broker is thereby also a ‘gate keeper’ who always controls two gates at the same time: the 
government (or donor) believes that the population listens to the broker and the population 
believes that the government (or donor) listens to him. This means that both sides only listen 
to him because they think that the other one listens (Bierschenk et al. 2000: 19).  
One of the most important differentiations for neotraditional brokers is the one between 
patrons and courtiers/brokers (Boissevain 1974, q.i. Bierschenk et al 2000: 12). Boissevain 
suggests to call actors ‘patrons’ if they control resources of ‘first degree’ (land, money, labour 
force etc.), and ‘courtiers’ if they control resources of ‘second degree’, which are strategic 
contacts with patrons (ibid.). This differentiation will help a lot in defining the specific role of 
Ghanaian NTAs in the development arena. NTAs normally have much influence on resources 
like land and manpower, but they actually don’t control them (interview Odotei). Compared to 
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the government, the NGO sector and the churches, they do not control a lot of resources in 
terms of money either. To shed some light on their particular condition in this respect, I will 
try to make use of the concepts of economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital as 
formulated by Pierre Bourdieu (see chapter 3.2).    
With the concept of the ‘development broker’, Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan allowed for 
a prolific perception of the relations between NTAs and local development and politics. Its 
focus on actors enables a detailed view of social relations. The specification of actors – like 
the outsider, the patron and the social climber – as well as the specification of functions and 
characteristics – like the gate keeper, the entrepreneur and the patron – provide an elaborate 
framework which can be of great use in the assessment of field work such as the research I 
carried out.  However, the great usefulness of this approach could also be criticised because of 
its strongly classifying nature. Norman Long, for instance, also uses the idea of the interface, 
but he applies it very prudently. He tries to avoid the codification of social reality and a 
predeterminative view on human agency, and thus his definitions are quite blurry (see e.g. 
Long 2001: 18). Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan rather focus on the usefulness of 
classifications by sharpening the terms. From my point of view, the resulting exaggeration is 
quite helpful to get a better understanding of the social relations concerned.  
Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan can also be criticised for having a rationalist understanding 
of human agency. Development brokers are portrayed as egoist individuals, permanently busy 
optimising and corrupting information. Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan themselves have 
also taken notice of this side-effect and try to reduce this ‘normative confusion’ by stressing 
the difference between scientific analysis and the consciousness of the persons concerned. 
According to them, most of the actors described do not see themselves as brokers, even 
though they can be de facto described as such (Bierschenk/Olivier de Sardan 2002: 19f).  
  
 3.1.2 NTAs in public: what the people think of the chiefs 
 
As the historical overview has shown, Ghanaian society is still in search of a new place for 
NTAs. Their importance in politics and administration has been reduced significantly since 
independence, but a lot of the functions ascribed to them can still be considered political. 
Brempong tries to reduce this ambiguity by differentiating between statutory and non-
statutory functions. Non-statutory functions are those that are carried over from the past, 
mostly in modified forms, and thus they are not easy to define (Brempong 2006: 36). The 
statutory functions can be found in the 1992 constitution: the paramount chiefs are there to 
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advise the government on chieftaincy issues, to create a standardised customary law and to 
eliminate ‘customs and usages that are outmoded or socially harmful’ (Article 272). 
Additionally, the chiefs act as ‘caretakers’ of the land (interview Odotei). About 80% of 
Ghanaian land is administered by the NTAs on behalf of the population. Almost anyone who 
needs land therefore has to bargain with the NTAs concerned (see Republic of Ghana 1992, 
Articles 36 (8) and 267 (1)). Perhaps with the exception of their role as facilitators of 
development, all the other roles that are currently assigned to them are non-statutory:  
 
Table 1: 
 
  
What are the functions of a chief? Number Percent 
Settles disputes, cares for law and order, peace and discipline 377 0,38 
Brings development 251 0,26 
Cares for well-being of the people and provides jobs 196 0,2 
Mobilises, gathers and organises 138 0,14 
Rules 120 0,12 
Custodian of the land 65 0,07 
Maintains tradition 41 0,04 
Don't know 34 0,03 
Total 982 1,24 
 
The answers to the question in table 1 were not already mentioned in the form. The 
interviewees were able to give up to three answers (normally they just mentioned one 
function) and I tried to group the answers together afterwards. All in all, the interviewees 
didn’t mention more than 20 terms.12
As can be seen, the above-mentioned statutory functions are only reflected in the group 
‘custodian of the land’ and partly in the group ‘settles disputes etc.’, the rest could be 
classified as non-statutory. All the other functions interfere with one official body or another. 
In this configuration, the most important role of chiefs (‘settle disputes etc.’) clearly overlaps 
with the judiciary and the executive, although the role of chiefs as arbitrators is mentioned in 
the constitution. Their role as social agents and as agents of development (‘brings 
development’ and ‘cares for well-being etc.’) could again be aggregated and equalised with 
the diverse social activities of the government. Lines four and five (‘mobilizes etc.’ and 
‘rules’), finally, are functions that are normally ascribed to politicians. According to the 
representatively selected informants, NTAs would therefore mainly be judges, administrators 
  
                                                 
12 Additionally, I sorted out very rare answers. 
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and politicians if they weren’t part of the neotraditional system. A glance on the private jobs 
of paramount chiefs confirms this assumption: 17% are lecturers or teachers, 18% are other 
civil servants, 5% (9 persons out of 185) are lawyers and 35% are farmers, the majority of 
whom are again to be found in the Northern Region (National House of Chiefs 2008; African 
Trade Project 2007). As the paramount chiefs constitute the highest tier of chieftaincy, the 
formal job situation of the majority of the chiefs (divisional chiefs and sub-chiefs) is certainly 
different.  
This considerable amount of informal judges, administrators and politicians draws attention to 
the formal actors in these fields. It can be assumed that the services of these actors are either 
not available to most of the respondents or that the formal actors are competing with chiefs 
over ‘clients’. Particularly concerning politics and social welfare, the responses could be 
considered alarming. It could be argued that the transformation of chieftaincy since 
independence has been accompanied by a process of ‘informal decentralisation’, which in turn 
has led to an ‘informal dispossession’ of the state. Trotha mentions this process as one of the 
most important components of ‘parastatism’. However, another important feature of parastatal 
groups is their capability to dismantle governmental authority, sovereignty and jurisdiction in 
their area of control (Trotha 2000: 269). Contrary to this situation of conflict between the state 
and neotraditional systems, the chiefly elites in Ghana are integral parts of the national elite 
(s. chapter 3.2). Additionally, the chiefs are fairly dependent on the state. Besides the fact that 
chiefs depend on small stipends from the state and on the different governmental development 
funds, roughly 35% of paramount chiefs are civil servants and thus directly depend on the 
state for their livelihood.  
In a similar survey (conducted almost at the same time) with 242 participants in peri-urban 
Kumasi, Ubink came to similar results. She also asked, ‘What are the main functions of a 
chief?’ to be able to compare the opinion of the population to the statements of experts. The 
function of ‘dispute settlement’ was mentioned most frequently, followed by ‘ensuring 
community participation in development’, ‘ensuring peace in the community’ and ‘looking 
after the physical development of the town’ (Ubink 2008: 141ff). 
As I will point out in detail later, most of the development activities come directly from the 
state or are controlled by the state. Most of the chiefs don’t posses the required liquid funds to 
carry out development projects on their own and therefore act as development brokers if they 
are involved in the development business. This is also a function that should normally be 
carried out by area council members and unit committee members. In the area studied by 
Ubink, this often led to tensions between chiefs and local politicians, particularly when the 
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chiefs didn’t spend the resources of the community on development (ibid. 148). As the chiefs 
normally don’t hold stool land in the Volta Region, the situation was different in the area I 
studied.  
 3.1.3 Role attribution to NTAs in the media 
 
The outcomes of an analysis of 275 articles in the Daily Graphic, published on the homepage 
of the Ghanaian government (www.ghana.gov.gh) and on Ghanaweb (www.ghanaweb.com), 
are coherent with the findings from the 2005 survey. NTAs are mainly mentioned in 
connection with development, land, politics, conflict (both as sources of conflict and as 
mediators) and tradition. The articles on development constitute about two fifth parts of all the 
275 articles on NTAs, two further fifths deal with chieftaincy conflicts and with the role of 
chiefs as rulers. 
I again grouped the articles on development into 51 stories about NTAs as development 
brokers, 20 stories about development patrons and 51 articles describing the result or the start 
of development efforts (like the building of a school or the donation of materials) where 
chiefs were not visibly involved in the project cycle but acted as passive representatives of the 
beneficiaries or as caretakers of the land. Ubink also refers to this last category by stressing 
the passivity of NTAs in a considerable number of development projects. Because of their role 
as representatives of the community and as administrators of the land, they are often invited to 
attend project events, even if they hardly participate in the project at all. The headlines in 
Figure 1:
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newspapers can thus be fairly misleading concerning the actual role of NTAs in development 
(Ubink 2008: 148).  This group of articles was often accompanied by photos that showed the 
NTAs taking part in an inauguration or a charity event. In about half of the articles in the 
Daily Graphic with photos (64), the NTAs were depicted in such a way. In general, NTAs 
seem to be very popular motives for pictures in Ghanaian newspapers.  
One fifth of the articles showed NTAs solely as representatives of the population, who express 
their concerns, hopes and wishes concerning the development of their community, political 
stability, educational, hygienic and moral standards, etc. Sometimes they side with particular 
groups, like fishermen, galamsey (the ‘illegal’ gold miners), companies or political parties. 
They mostly do this at durbars, festivals and political rallies. In the 54 articles, NTAs are 
therefore more or less clearly depicted as local politicians. 
The biggest difference between the articles of the Daily Graphic and the role attributions of 
the city dwellers lies in the judicial function of NTAs. Only 11 of the 275 articles describe 
NTAs as arbitrators, mediators or judges. In contrast, about 400 of the 1000 polled city 
dwellers saw them as arbitrators who settle disputes, bring peace and care for ‘law and order’. 
Until now, I have no explanation for this outcome, as the chiefly function as a dispute settler 
would involve a lot of catchy stories about conflicts. Maybe this function is too ‘localised’ to 
get much attention nationwide. In any case, it is clear that the agents of neotraditional 
mediation compete with conventional forms of advocacy.  In this regard, Ubink mentions an 
appeal by the Asantehene at his inaugural meeting with the Kumasi Traditional Council in 
1999 to the chiefs to withdraw cases pending in the state courts and in the Houses of Chiefs 
and bring them to his court for settlement (Ubink 2008: 153). 
The remaining articles portray NTAs as custodians of tradition and of land, and as (potential) 
troublemakers in the course of destoolments, enstoolments and land issues. Surprisingly, the 
ornamental function of NTAs as representatives of tradition is rather unimportant both in the 
survey and in the media analysis. In the Daily Graphic, NTAs are associated with tradition (no 
other discernible role) in articles about funerals, durbars and festivals. Their useful function in 
tourism as well as the chance of the government to push them softly into an apolitical corner 
by declaring them custodians of tradition would suggest a stronger emphasis on this role (see 
Rouveroy van Nieuvaal 1996). 
In the total of 275 articles, I was able to identify 23 courtiers and 12 development patrons. 
Most of the patrons have set up or co-founded NGOs or foundations, which include the 
Asantehene Educational Fund, the Ga Educational Endowment Fund, the Kwahu Educational 
Fund, the Tema Education Fund, the Ogyeman Environment Foundation, the Forest 
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Plantations Development Fund, the Cyber Sister-Cities Project (between Agogo in the Ashanti 
Region and Fort Lauderdale, Florida) and Life for Africa (education and health). This list is 
by no means complete but it shows the areas in which neotraditional development patrons are 
involved: education, environment and, to a lesser extent, health and IT. All development 
patrons come from the southern part of Ghana (Greater Accra, Eastern, Western and Ashanti 
Regions) and only seven of these NTAs are registered paramount chiefs, the others either 
describe themselves as paramount chiefs but can’t be found in the register of the National 
House of Chiefs or they are queenmothers and development chiefs (Nkosuohene). The lowest 
academic degree among the seven registered paramount chiefs is a bachelor’s degree. The 
development patrons are therefore well educated and come exclusively from the southern part 
of Ghana. 
From the 23 development brokers, only two come from the Northern Regions of Ghana. They 
meet patrons in Ghana and abroad, set up conferences and durbars to attract public and private 
investment, help to construct and maintain libraries, school buildings, internet facilities, 
police stations and mobilize people for reforestation, health issues and development projects. 
The mobilisation of people could also be seen as the task of a patron, but in most cases NTAs 
don’t actually control labour forces (for discussion see 3.2). 
This attempt to single out highly active NTAs showed that the media focus on paramount 
chiefs as development brokers and patrons and neglect the village level, due to the smaller 
readership on the countryside and the bigger impact of the measures of high-ranking NTAs. 
The same can be said of the Ghanaian north-south-divide concerning neotraditional 
development brokers and patrons. Because of their lower level of education, it is likely for 
lower-ranking chiefs and chiefs of the North to be less involved in development projects; their 
rare appearances in the media, however, don’t suggest that they are not involved at all. It can 
be assumed, on the contrary, that their political importance is even higher in the deprived 
areas. 
The strong connection drawn between NTAs and development in the media can partly be 
explained with normative strategies pursued by pro-chief newspapers like the Daily Graphic 
and the NPP government from 2000-2008. Many articles about NTAs are actually calls of 
politicians, intellectuals and powerful chiefs (mostly the Asantehene or the Okyenhene) upon 
NTAs to participate more in development. In turn, a considerable number of chiefs also pick 
up the rhetoric and use durbars or other public meetings to call upon politicians to build roads, 
hospitals etc. or ‘instruct’ the population on certain issues, for instance health issues. The 
discourse of chiefly development thereby created, however, seems to be larger than the actual 
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‘contribution’ of NTAs to development projects. The 23 neotraditional development brokers 
(courtiers) not only talked about development during events but also initiated projects 
together with politicians and NGOs and brought in their knowledge, particularly on the local 
arena.  
This discrepancy between the target scenario and the actual situation of neotraditional 
development brokerage also became apparent in the 2005 survey, where 251 of 982 valid 
respondents in Greater Accra stated that the chiefs were there to ‘bring development’. 196 
respondents additionally were of the opinion that chiefs ‘care for the well-being of the people 
and provide jobs’. These outcomes should rather be seen as expectations and not as 
perceptions of the population. 
The diverse newspapers of Ghana draw different pictures of the chiefs. The Daily Graphic is 
considered to be close to the NPP. I chose this newspaper as the only ‘material’ source, 
because it was the most comprehensive paper and the easiest to be acquired. With the 
exception of one category, the outcome was the same for the Daily Graphic, Ghana web and 
the website of the Government of Ghana. This exception was the category of ‘chieftaincy 
conflict”, which could be found about twice as often on Ghana web than in the Daily Graphic. 
This can be attributed to the different political positions of the two newspapers. 
  
 3.1.4 NTAs as politicians 
 
From an actor-centred perspective, NTAs are involved in Ghanaian politics (1) trough their 
non-statutory function as leaders of communities, paramountcies or, in the case of the 
Asantehene, even regions, (2) through their involvement in party politics and (3) because 
development and politics are overlapping arenas and thus chiefs who facilitate development 
also do politics.  
Systemic discussions about the relation between chieftaincy and the state gravitate around the 
question of whether chieftaincy should be considered a separate sphere in the political system 
or not.  Conservative media like the Daily Graphic often use the expression ‘the chiefs and 
people of...’ when they mention the population of a certain area. This expression was already 
used by the UGCC, the rival of the CPP before independence (Rathbone 2000: 22). Similarly, 
chiefs are often referred to as ‘the embodiment of the people’s culture’ or as the ‘fathers of the 
nation’. This perception of an embeddedness of chieftaincy in Ghanaian culture is shared 
almost across all political currents – the differences mostly emerge in discussions about the 
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future of chieftaincy – which  makes it very hard to describe the general relation between 
chieftaincy and politics. This situation is additionally complicated by the fact that the powers 
and the embeddedness of NTAs vary largely from region to region. Ray nevertheless applies a 
very specific concept, called ‘divided sovereignty’, to the whole nation: due to the different 
bases of legitimisation of the neotraditional and the modern political systems, the postcolonial 
state could be considered as divided. He argues that ‘traditional authorities’ draw their roots 
from the pre-colonial period, while the postcolonial state is mainly ‘a creation of, and a 
successor to, the imposed colonial state.’ (Ray 1996: 181-184) Odotei underscores this thesis 
by stressing that a huge part of Ghanaian society still perceives the government as an ‘external 
body’, with whom the representatives of the neotraditional system have had to deal since the 
advent of the Portuguese in the fifteenth century. This ‘external body’ is called ‘aban’ in Twi, 
which means ‘fort’ or ‘castle’ in English: 
 
Aban is the external body the institution of chieftaincy has been relating to for more 
than five centuries; it is represented by a slave trader, a colonial governor, a president, 
a head of a military regime – all of them ironically ruling the affairs of the country 
from the same structure, the fort and the castle. (Odotei 2001: 324) 
 
Twi is the language of the Akan, the biggest ethnic group of Ghana, and the second most 
important language after English. The current president still resides in an old European fort, 
Osu Castle, built in the 17th
This continuity both in language and the use of colonial buildings is striking, but it doesn’t 
mean that the chieftaincy systems are still seen as the most important political systems or that 
the population opposes the formal system of government. Stressing the strong deformation of 
chieftaincy in colonial times, one can even argue that chieftaincy is an integral part of the 
post-colonial regime (s. Rathbone 2000). Trotha fine-tunes this view with the concept of 
‘administrative chieftaincy’. The processes of succession and the hierarchical relations 
between the chiefs were actually controlled by the colonial state. Additionally, the colonialists 
successfully introduced the territorial principle. These three main features (succession, 
hierarchical relations, and territorial principle) of administrative chieftaincy were again 
boosted under the post-colonial regimes (Trotha 1996; cf. Rathbone 2000: 100-160) and led to 
an indispensable combination of neotraditional and modern politics. A direct result of the 
concrete presence of administrative chieftaincy is the perception of chiefs as intermediaries. 
This function has in turn led to numerous discussions about chiefs as representatives of ‘civil 
 century by the Danes, which since 1920 has been the official seat 
of government. 
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society’, particularly with the beginning of ‘democratisation’ in the 1990ies. Scholarly interest 
in chieftaincy began to grow significantly with the new conditionalities of ‘good governance’, 
often with overly optimistic conclusions, however (Rouveroy van Nieuvaal 1996: 58; see also 
Nugent 1996; Lentz 2006: 918).  
The concept of ‘divided sovereignty’ and the notion of the chief as a representative of civil 
society, both problematic, were taken up by the World Bank in 2003 on the occasion of the 
‘Promoting Partnership
The idea of using neotraditional ideas and institutions in nation-building already started to 
gain momentum before independence and is indispensable in some respects. The Ghanaian 
government needs some sort of vague pre-colonial legitimacy to create a national identity 
both to the exterior and on the interior. Chiefs are at the same time the remaining 
representatives (the living fossils) of a mythically charged history and colourful tourist 
attractions. Rouveroy van Nieuvaal called the latter process folklorisation and also identifies a 
tendency of the state to use it for reducing the direct political influence of NTAs (Rouveroy 
van Nieuvaal 1996). Nkrumah, for instance, used the chiefly regalia during public speeches, 
while at the same time announcing the end of chieftaincy as it was known (Adjaye/Misawa 
2003). But this instrumentalisation of ‘tradition’ was also turned into outspoken strategies for 
the construction of identity and the reconstruction of westernised political systems (cf. Eze 
1997; Gyekye 1988: 27; Nugent 1996: 205; Wiredu 1995).    
 with Traditional Authorities Project’, the first big project of the World 
Bank with NTAs (World Bank 2007; s. chapter five). 
NTAs are also active cultural brokers between different world-views and between different 
political practices. Hagan shows the power of this discursive function by describing the 
prevailing political concepts in the rural areas of Africa:       
 
Throughout Africa, large numbers of people who are active actors in the political 
struggle, in the political institutions and so forth, are illiterate or barely educated. They 
continue to live within the domain of their traditional social and political institutions. 
They continue to use symbols of authority, ideas about power, ideas about the sharing 
of power, about consultation, participation, many of which are found in traditional 
sayings and proverbs. Now it is this populace that political life is for. The educated, 
who appear to be very competent, confident in their knowledge of Western institutions, 
form a minority and in any case the mandate that they exercise derives form the 
majority, who are not as educated as they are. (Interview Hagan 2005) 
 
These ‘ideas about the sharing of power, about consultation, participation’ etc. are praised in 
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many recent works (cf. polylog vol. 2, 2000)13
The political landscape of Ghana is therefore mainly officially separated in two spheres. The 
metaphor of a ‘sedimentation’ of political institutions of various epochs –  Bierschenk and 
Olivier de Sardan also call it ‘institutional addition’ (1999: 52) – gives a better understanding 
of the actual situation. This sedimentation has led to a situation of polycephaly and thereby 
generated a degree of ‘flexibility and malleability in these institutions …, leaving ample room 
for negotiation, usually informal, for the different actors who must define required 
competences and rules of the game’ (Bierschenk/Olivier de Sardan 2002: 4). This involves a 
permanent process of reactivation of institutions, ideas and agreements from different epochs 
and of rearrangement according to prevailing power configurations. In Ghana, this also led to 
the re-emergence of T/VDCs from the Nkrumah era in the late 1970ies. From this point of 
view, the neotraditional institutions can thus be regarded like any other political institution 
that is not promoted by the actual government in power anymore. Thus, one of the most 
important reasons for the resilience of chieftaincy is its practicability on the local level. 
, but these often refer to the idealised accounts 
of chieftaincy given by K.A. Busia (1951) and J.B. Danquah (1928). The portrayal of the pre-
colonial condition of chieftaincy is thus overlaid by diverse political and philosophical 
currents and should be interpreted cautiously (for discussion see Ubink 2008: 90). At the 
interface of these two political spheres, chiefs not only transfer values and ideas, they also 
connect two fundamentally different modes of politics: on the one hand a strongly person-
centred way of ruling that often ignores formal rules and laws or is involved in a permanent 
negation about these laws – Trotha/Klute referred to this personalistic model as ‘concentric 
order’ (2001) – and, on the other hand, a universalistic attitude concerning political life that 
was introduced by the colonialists (Rouveroy van Nieuvaal 1996: 63).  In this respect it is 
quite revealing that virtually all actors who are confronted with neotraditional rule opt for a 
stronger codification. But the constitution of 1992 is the best example of this diffidence 
concerning chieftaincy. Besides the fact that the codification of customary law is an enormous 
task because of the multiplicity of neotraditional systems in Ghana, this could as well be 
linked to the ‘personalistic’ character of chieftaincy (see Trotha/Klute 2001). Another sign for 
an overall immunity of chieftaincy to the Western type of legislation are the ample 
discrepancies between constitutional provisions and the actual conditions of chieftaincy. This 
is evidenced by party politics, the tasks of the National House of Chiefs, the involvement of 
chiefs in the DAs, and chieftaincy conflicts. ‘In other words, things are not quite what they 
seem,’ as Nugent pointed out (1996: 204). 
                                                 
13 Online:  http://them.polylog.org/2/index-en.htm (0209) 
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Rouveroy van Nieuvaal ties in here by quoting Mbembe: contrary to dichotomic models (e.g. 
urban-rural), the postcolony is made up of different interacting spheres that are of importance 
only in particular situations. For specific needs, specific social purposes and specific moments 
of identification, the postcolonial subject therefore seeks ‘chiefing’. ‘For other facets of life, 
the current fractured state of African societies and identities provides the subject with a wide 
array of opportunities to ‘opt out’ and turn to other models of power brokerage.’ (Rouveroy 
van Nieuvaal/Dijk 1999: 8-9; Mbembe 2000). According to Mbembe, chieftaincy is an 
integral component of the post-colonial regime, as this regime can be considered a legal 
successor to the colonial regime (cf. Mbembe 2000; Trotha 1996). 
Chieftaincy and formal politics are not ‘divided’ insofar as the two spheres are interwoven to 
a considerable extent through personal union and kinship. The current tendency to fill 
chieftaincy positions with highly educated professionals blurs the traditional distinction 
between the state elite and chiefs additionally, and creates new alliances between these two 
groups (Ray 1992: 109-113, q.i. Ubink 2008; interview Odotei 2008; interview Adotey 2008). 
Furthermore, in the 2005 survey, the education level of NTAs was shown to be significantly 
higher than that of non-royals, while differences in income were not significant. 
At the same time, leftist movements as well as conservative parties derive much of their 
legitimacy from pre-colonial times and the chiefly systems were formed – and above all 
standardised – to a large extent in the colonial period.  
 
NTAs as political leaders 
 
The involvement of NTAs in development projects and their participation in the development 
discourse make them important stakeholders in politics. The mobilisation of development aid 
is one of the most important tasks of politicians in Africa, especially in highly aid-dependent 
countries like Ghana. Politicians, in this respect, are actually colleges of neotraditional 
development brokers on the national level (Bierschenk/Olivier de Sardan 2002: 6). This 
closeness and overlapping of the two arenas also shows in the history of chieftaincy. Chiefs 
assumed their role as agents of development partly because of their reduced influence in 
formal politics since the 1950ies. As we have seen in chapter two, it was mainly the view on 
and the rhetoric concerning chieftaincy that have changed and not the measures themselves. 
Even the NLM movement, which was headed by the Asantehene himself, didn’t allow too 
strong an involvement of other chiefs in politics. The same applies to the New Patriotic Party 
(NPP), which ruled from 2000 to 2008. It stands in the tradition of the UGCC, which sided 
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with the chiefs against Nkrumah’s CPP. The traditional stronghold of the NPP is the Ashanti 
Region, which is also the region with the most powerful chiefs. In spite of losing the last 
elections in December 2008, the NPP won 31 of 36 seats in the Ashanti Region. Yet, plans to 
lift the ban on the chiefs’ participation in party politics have never gained considerable 
support. This mixture of traditionalist make-up and the official separation of the two spheres 
is not likely to change significantly with the NDC being in power since 2009. This party won 
21 of 22 seats in the Volta Region while altogether it got only 111 out of 230 and has created 
the formal separation of chieftaincy and politics with the constitution of 1992. However, the 
run-up to the elections also showed the need of the NDC to pay attention to chiefly interests. 
In January 2009, Togbui14 Mawufeame Fugah, the head of the Ewe community in the Ashanti 
Region, was made ‘life patron’ of the newly founded Atta Mills Foundation. In one of his first 
speeches, he demanded that the government consider chiefs for ministerial posts.15
As shown above, NTAs lost their place in direct decision-making processes, which led them 
to assume positions that should normally be occupied by civil servants. In spite of this 
situation of ‘informal dispossession’ of the state (Trotha 2000: 269), the governmental actors 
and the media perceive the chiefs merely as substitutes (as the minimalist colonial state did) 
and not as a threat to governmental authority in particular fields. This attribution is discernible 
everywhere in Ghana, and particularly on the countryside. My field work in the Keta District 
clearly showed that many political functions performed by NTAs arise out of an ongoing lack 
of capacity on the part of local governments. The outcome of a comparison of chiefs and MPs 
in 2005 was nevertheless surprising: 
  
 
Table 2:  
    
Comparison Chiefs - MPs Chief MP Equal 
Who takes more care of your well-being? 42,39 28,46 29,15 
Who encourages more participation in public affairs? 44,71 45,30 9,99 
Who is more important in your everyday life? 49,06 31,52 19,43 
Who needs the consent of the people more often? 54,53 38,31 7,16 
Who is more trustworthy? 53,55 21,99 24,46 
Who is more powerful? 59,35 36,80 3,86 
    
(Survey 2005, valid cases: 1005)    
 
The representatively selected respondents in Greater Accra (1005 valid cases) are 
predominantly of the opinion that chiefs are more trustworthy, more caring and more 
                                                 
14    Togbui (also Togbe or Torgbui) is a chiefly title in the Ewe-speaking areas. 
15  http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=157384 (0409) 
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powerful than MPs. I asked the respondents to give the answers with respect to their chief as 
well as their MP, and failed to ask them to specify the rank of the chief they were thinking of 
when filling in the forms. Particularly concerning the power of the chiefs, this outcome was 
questioned by consulted Ghanaian experts. But the responses to the other questions also 
challenge the sovereignty of formal politics and can clearly be linked to the term ‘informal 
dispossession of the state’, mentioned by Trotha as one of the main elements of ‘parastatism’ 
(Trotha 2000: 269). The sample seems to attach greater political capacity to the chiefs than to 
the MPs in the domains concerned. This can be explained (1) with the inertia of cultural 
values, as can be seen everywhere in the world, (2) with the economic structure and the 
infrastructure of Ghana as important fundaments for the structure of politics, (3) with 
deficiencies of the political system and (4) with amenities of the neotraditional system.  
Without any coordination, Ubink again formulated comparable questions in Kumasi at the 
same time. The outcomes of this survey clearly show that the relatively good results of chiefs 
in comparison to MPs should rather be seen as relatively bad results of the MPs. In a 
comparison with the assembly members and the unit committee members (for a specification 
of their tasks see chapter 4), the surveyed population in peri-urban Kumasi assigned both 
greater importance and better performance to the local politicians. The facilitation of 
development projects, being described as one of the major tasks of the chiefs in both of the 
surveyed areas, was ascribed thrice as often to the local politicians. Assembly members were 
mainly mentioned when the mobilisation of material resources was concerned, while the unit 
committee members seemed to supersede the chiefs totally in the mobilisation of communal 
labour:   
 
Table 3: 
   
Which actor(s) should perform certain tasks? UC Assemblyman Chief  
Ensuring community participation 59.1 36.0 15.7 
Physical development of the town 24.8 58.3 16.9 
Organisation of communal labour 87.6 18.6 7.0 
Promotion of economic development 27.3 43.0 20.7 
    
(Ubink 2008: 150)    
    
The importance of unit committee members in the mobilisation of communal labour is 
especially surprising. Ubink noted that unit committee members still use the gong-gong to 
summon people, but without involving the chief (Ubink 2008: 151). This means that the 
surveyed people do regard chiefs as agents of development, but not as the most appropriate 
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ones. Accordingly, the neotraditional system cannot be described as a substitute for local 
politics in this area. The outcomes of my field work in the Volta Region are different insofar 
as chiefs traditionally don’t hold stool lands in this area and have thus acquired other 
functions. Additionally, my experiences don’t indicate such a good performance on the part of 
the unit committee members (s. chapter four). 
It could thus be argued that chiefs are strongly involved in politics and are perceived as 
powerful players. Their actual performance on the local level seems to be strongly linked to 
the availability and performance of formal political actors and, to a lesser extent, to the 
regionally variable importance of neotraditional systems as a whole. Ubink made her 
comparisons in Kumasi, in the stronghold of chieftaincy in Ghana, and came to a more critical 
evaluation of the chiefly position in politics than I did in Accra and the Volta Region, where 
chieftaincy is traditionally weak. While Ubink seems to have researched areas in peri-urban 
Kumasi, where local politics is functioning, I compared the NTAs to MPs, who don’t seem to 
have a lot of credit in the population, and also to local political institutions in the Volta Region 
that where not yet working. The results are consistent with Nugent’s observation that 
chieftaincy was used in the 1970ies to fill political gaps in the Volta Region, but never became 
self-reliant in such a way that it would have been a rival system to formal politics (Nugent 
1996a: 215).   
 
Chiefs as party stalwarts 
 
The complicated relationship between the state and NTAs described above also shows in the 
strong involvement of chiefs in party politics and, vice versa, of party politics in chieftaincy 
matters like destoolment and enstoolment. George P. Hagan, presidential candidate in 2000, 
described this relationship quite bluntly: 
 
You cannot win an election in Ghana if the chiefs do not support you, because while 
you are asleep, they are with the people. A chief said to me you cannot win, you have 
no money to give to the chiefs. If you give me money I can go from village to village 
in my domain and tell people to vote. At times the voting is done even in the chief’s 
palace. And people go to the chief’s house to greet him in the morning and ask him 
how they should vote. He would not open up his mouth; he would give them a sign. 
[...] So let’s be realistic: The theory is that they should not participate, and that is the 
idea. (Interview Hagan 2005) 
 
The character of Ghanaian election campaigns also makes it very hard for NTAs not to 
meddle with party politics. Many of the campaign events take place in neotraditional settings, 
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at traditional festivals and at chiefly durbars, where the chiefs often declare their preferences 
openly.16
Beside these circumventions of constitutional provisions, there is also a considerable number 
of chiefs who bluntly ignore the ban on participation in party politics. In a recent article in the 
Daily Graphic, the political scientist Kumi Ansah-Koi singled out the Omanhene of Agogo 
Traditional Area, Nana Akuoku Sarpong, the late former Speaker of Parliament, Peter Ala 
Adjetey, who also was the Akyempimhene of Abiriw, and the former Chief Director of the 
Ministry of Health, Lepowura M. N. D. Jawula, as chiefs ‘who defied the constitutional 
injunction to openly engage in politics’.
  
17 In a reply to this article, the chief of Akyem 
Nkwantanang in the Eastern Region, Barima Adanse-Akyem Omane, again called for the 
amendment of article 276 of the Ghanaian constitution, which prohibits chiefs from actively 
engaging partisan politics.18
 
 Boafo–Arthur conducted interviews with chiefs about article 276 
and found that they were divided on this constitutional provision. The most important reason 
in favour of article 276 was their fear that they would compromise their role as ‘father of 
everybody’ in their respective communities (Boafo-Arthur 2001; q.i. Odotei 2003: 339). This 
role of the chiefs as ‘fathers of the people’ emerges very often in connection with discussions 
about the involvement of chiefs in politics and is mostly regarded as an imperative. Ayee, for 
instance, demands that NTAs ‘see themselves as fathers [accentuation by Ayee] of all their 
people to whom they are ultimately accountable. Without these, the appeal by traditional 
authorities to be directly represented in Ghana’s local government structure will not receive 
any sympathetic hearing.’ (Ayee 2007) The patronizing character of this role description is not 
criticised in these papers, nor do they mention the fact, that chiefs are almost exclusively 
‘fathers’ of their own ethnic groups. In multi-ethnic settings, e.g. in bigger towns, this 
‘fatherhood’ is far from all-embracing. 
The chieftaincy conflict in Anloga 
 
But also on the countryside, the strong linkages between NTAs and political parties turn out to 
be utterly destructive in chieftaincy conflicts over land and over succession. In all of the three 
bigger recent conflicts in Ghana, in Bawku, Yendi and Anloga, party politics played an 
                                                 
16 e.g. A. Kofoya-Teteh: Mrs. Akofo-Addo tours Okere, Tarkwa. In: Daily Graphic, 17 September 2008. 
17  Kumi Ansah-Koi: Take Firm Decision on Chiefs Involved in Politics. In: Daily Graphic, 27 August 2008.  
18  Samuel Kye-Boateng: Amend law banning chiefs from active politics. In: Daily Graphic, 19 September 
2008. 
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important role.19
With the death of the paramount chief of the Anlo Traditional Area (locally referred to as the 
Awomefia), a lengthy dispute over the enstoolment of a new paramount chief started that 
resulted in claims by Francis Nyonyo Agboada, aka Regent Togbui Sri III, over the stool. This 
claim was opposed, however, by clans in the community who insisted that the Regent didn’t 
belong to the appropriate clan (interview Boateng). This dispute also resulted in court cases 
where an injunction, pending suit, against any enstoolment of a chief before a final ruling on 
the matter was made (CHRI 2008).  
 Particularly Anloga is a showcase of these interrelations because a huge 
majority of the population supports the NDC, which was in opposition until 2009. Even the 
founder of the NDC, J.J. Rawlings, was born in this area, more precisely in Atiavi, not far 
from Hagodzi.  
In spite of this ruling, the Regent attempted to approach the traditional shrine to perform the 
cultural rituals for his installation on November 1, 2007, accompanied by a police force. As a 
consequence, a violent clash was sparked off in the course of which three civilians and a 
policeman were killed and 20 other victims, including three police officers where brought to 
hospital (CHRI 2008). Following the death of the policeman, the police started a house-to-
house arrest in an attempt to track down the people responsible for the police officer's death 
and to recover a missing weapon. On the same day, a curfew was declared by the Minister of 
Interior and an Executive Instrument issued restricting the carrying of arms to authorised 
persons only. In a random raid, the police went from house to house, breaking into people’s 
homes, vandalising property and arresting any male youth in sight, brutally beating them up 
(ibid.). 74 out of 94 arrested people were then sent to the Ho police station, the very station 
where the deceased police officer had been attached. According to the District Chief 
Executive Mr Edward Kofi Ahiabor, the transfer of the suspects was necessary for security 
reasons. It was reported, however, that the suspects were mistreated and detained under 
inhuman conditions at the Ho police station (ibid.). 
The importance of party politics in the conflict became clear with the partisan behaviour of 
the police force and the DCE. At the same time, Kwabena Bartels, Minister of the Interior, 
explained the rejection of Agboada with his party affiliation: ‘Intelligence indicated that 
Togbui Sri III and his followers/supporters are true followers of the NPP in the Anlo 
Constituency and that is the reason why he is hated.’20
                                                 
19 e.g. 
  
http://www.theghanaianjournal.com/2008/03/17/dont-meddle-in-bawku-conflict-nayiri/ (0409) and 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/politics/artikel.php?ID=69326 (0409) 
20    Kobla Kwawukume: Petition to Parliament by the Clan Heads & Chief of Anlo. Online:        
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=134192 (0409) 
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 3.2 The power of NTAs  
 
This chapter was triggered by an outcome of the survey conducted in Greater Accra in 2005, 
with about 600 people out of 1005 (valid cases) stating that chiefs were more powerful than 
MPs (about 370 were convinced of the opposite, the rest thought they are equally powerful). 
A glance at the constitution would have suggested a totally different outcome: as we have 
seen in the previous chapters, chiefs are banned from party politics and can’t actively take 
part in national politics. Also, their political involvement on the local level is weak if we focus 
on the modern political sector. To clarify this disparity, I will take a closer look at the different 
sources of power of NTAs.  
Particularly concerning chieftaincy, it would be too simplistic to define power in Weber’s 
terms as any chance to enforce one’s will in a social relation, even against the will of other 
actors (see Weber 1985: 28). In contrast to coercion or force, power also goes along with a 
certain amount of liberty. Power is more effective if the ‘subject’ of power decides, or 
believes to decide, freely (Han 16-23).  Long therefore uses the concept of ‘power 
configurations’ meant as interlocking actors’ projects made up of heterogeneous sets of social 
relations. In such power configurations, power is not a zero-sum game: having power does not 
entail that others are without it (Long 2001: 242). This concept of power is based on Foucault, 
who argues that, although power seems to be far away of the arena of social interaction, it 
actually reproduces or transforms itself in workplaces, families and other organisational 
settings of everyday life (Foucault 1981: 94; q.i. Long 2001: 64).  
The power of the neotraditional system is thus both a consequence of the good relations of 
certain NTAs with people in positions that reach far into the political establishment as well as 
its availability and influence even in the smallest village.  
 
 3.2.1 Bourdieu: social, cultural and economic capital 
 
Before we dwell on the different forms of power of the NTAs, I would like to tie in with the 
theoretical section on development brokers by introducing Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of 
social, cultural and economic capital. These concepts will be able to bridge the theoretical gap 
between the actor-oriented models of Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan and general 
reflections on the power of NTAs. Bourdieu himself stresses the point that the transformations 
of capital can at the same time also be described as transformations of power 
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(Bourdieu/Steinrücke 2005: 52). Similarly, the act of transformation from one form of capital 
into another can also be linked to the Long’s interface theory (2001). The role of NTAs as 
‘converters’ (from one social field to another) is similar to their ‘mutational work’, the 
transformation of one form of capital into another (s. Rouveroy van Nieuvaal, E. A. B. van/ 
Dijk, Rijk van 1999: 5).   
Bourdieu’s definition of the different forms of capital is quite simple and seems to be 
perfectly adaptable for the study of the social fields of NTAs. Economic capital is directly 
convertible into money, whereas social and cultural capital are convertible only under distinct 
conditions. For all the three forms of capital, Bourdieu mentions prototypical forms of 
institutionalisation: for economic capital these are property rights, cultural capital can be 
institutionalised through academic degrees and social capital can be institutionalised in the 
form of titles of nobility (Bourdieu/Steinrücke 2005: 52). The term ‘symbolic capital’, also 
coined by Bourdieu, has an special position insofar as it is not convertible into other types of 
capital. Instead, the other three forms of capital can also have symbolic value. A tractor, for 
example, may have both economic and symbolic value. Symbolic capital is always defined by 
the system in which it is valued. For some, a tractor as economic capital has less symbolic 
value than for others (Calhoun 2002).21
 
 Given the assets of NTAs, I will focus on cultural and 
social capital.  
Cultural capital 
 
Bourdieu modelled the concept of cultural capital out of his thoughts on the structure of the 
French educational system. Contrary to the institutionalised cultural capital already 
mentioned, he stresses the importance of incorporated cultural capital for academic (and 
economic) careers. A big proportion of cultural capital is not easily transferable from one 
person to another because it involves unconscious, complex forms of behaviour, whose 
transfer is very time consuming or even confined to early childhood. This incorporated 
cultural capital encompasses the personal manner of speaking, posture, opinions, etc. Contrary 
to the theories of human capital, Bourdieu stresses socialisation as a phase of informal 
learning that predetermines success in school even in subjects like mathematics.  
Because it is as such very often closely attached to persons, cultural capital often has scarcity 
                                                 
21 Rouveroy van Nieuvaal/Dijk also give examples of conversions from symbolic capital into other capital 
types. The examples of symbolic capital given could also be described as social capital (s. Rouveroy van 
Nieuvaal, E. A. B. van/Dijk, Rijk van 1999: 5).   
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value. An enterprise or a public institution that wants to acquire such values often has to share 
power with actors who possess these values because they can’t teach them and as such can’t 
transfer them (Bourdieu/Steinrücke 2005: 53-58).      
Cultural capital can also exist in the form of objects, like paintings or machines, but the use of 
these objects again requires know-how, thus incorporated and institutionalised cultural capital. 
According to Bourdieu, this gives the possessors of cultural capital a distinct position. On the 
one hand they do not necessarily possess the productive forces and are thus part of the 
working class, on the other hand they draw profit out of the productive forces, which makes 
them members of the ruling class (ibid: 58-60).  
In comparison to other actors, the cultural capital of NTAs is certainly higher than their 
economic capital, both in terms of institutionalised (e.g. academic degrees) and incorporated 
(e.g. behaviour) cultural capital, which means that they are again caught between two stools 
when it comes to their position in society. They are not the owners of the productive forces, 
but the high accumulation of incorporated cultural capital also makes them profiteers of the 
productive forces.   
Because of the strong intersection between institutionalised and incorporated cultural capital, 
NTAs were able to preserve their dominant position in society even in times when their 
political and economic power was cut back, as was the case under Nkrumah and later under 
Rawlings. When looking at those times, one could even talk of ‘capital flight’ from economic 
to cultural and social capital because these forms allowed camouflaged modes of heritage 
(ibid: 58). NTAs were not only among the first people to recognise the growing importance of 
academic education; they also held ‘pole positions’ because they possessed high amounts of 
incorporated cultural capital.  
This ‘pole position’ also led to an advantageous ‘rate of exchange’, another term coined by 
Bourdieu (ibid: 62f). The number of African academics was very low in early postcolonial 
times and has been rising steadily until today. Only in 1958, for instance, the University of 
Ghana established the first law faculty (Rathbone 2000: 52ff). If the costs of academic 
education from the 1950ies until now haven’t changed too much, it can be assumed that the 
rate of exchange between economic and cultural capital has worsened for the holders of 
academic degrees. Thus, the earlier a particular group was able to secure academic degrees, 
the higher was their pay-off, because cultural capital in Africa was subject to a high rate of 
‘inflation’22
 
.  
                                                 
22 Bourdieu didn’t use this term. 
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Social capital 
 
In the words of Bourdieu ‘the social capital is the totality of the actual and potential resources 
that are connected with the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised 
relations of mutual acquaintance and acceptance’ (ibid: 63). The size of the social capital 
depends on the extent of the social network and of the cultural, economic and symbolic 
capital of this network. No social network is naturally given – it has to be created through 
rites of institutionalisation. This involves conscious or unconscious strategies of investment 
that will be of use sooner or later. Accidental relations like neighbourhood or even family 
relations are thereby transformed into special and essential relations, which result in 
permanent obligations, based on emotions (acceptance, respect, friendship) or institutional 
guarantees (entitlements). This relationship is to be maintained by permanent exchange of 
words, presents etc.  
Incorporating new members is dangerous for the group because it can change the entrance 
criteria and thus also the borders of the groups, which in turn define group identity  This is 
why marriage in most societies is a matter of the whole family. 
The reproduction of social capital requires work on relationships, which also involves the use 
of economic capital. To carry out this work, one needs the knowledge of genealogical 
interrelations and real relationships as well as the competence needed for making use of them. 
The competence, the knowledge and the readiness to use both of these factors constitute social 
capital and are distributed quite unequally in society. Additionally, the profit from social 
capital rises proportionally to its size. One could talk of increasing returns to scale23
In virtually all groups that reach a certain size, social capital can also be accumulated through 
delegation. This allows for the concentration of the social capital of a group in one person or 
group, to represent the group to the exterior. This often leads to misuse, sometimes even to the 
detriment of the group concerned. Here again, the example cited by Bourdieu is nobility. 
NTAs can correspondingly be described as model cases of holders of social capital. As will be 
shown in detail in the case study, the bestowment of titles of nobility is not yet bureaucratised 
in Ghana, particularly in the local arena. In Hagodzi, a mechanic based in Accra, who is (or 
was) not related to any other royal, became the village chief ‘only’ because he acted as a 
 in this 
respect: a famous person has to work less on the expansion of his or her relationships because 
he or she already is attractive due to her bigger social network (ibid: Bourdieu/Steinrücke 
2005). 
                                                 
23 Bourdieu didn’t use this term. 
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development broker. In this case, it was not the status of nobility that generated the social and 
cultural capital needed to become a development broker, but vice versa. The title of nobility 
was clearly a product of the institutionalisation of social capital. 
On the national level, the best example for a chiefly holder of social capital is certainly the 
Asantehene. Besides his good relation with the president of the World Bank (s. chapter 5.2), 
he also seemed to act as if he was some sort of a constitutional monarch since his enstoolment 
in 1999. Both the state visits of John A. Kufuor (NPP) as well as the arrivals of foreign 
representatives seemed to be coordinated with the Asantehene.24
J.A. Kufuor, Ghanaian president from 2000 to 2008, is also connected to the royal family of 
the Asantehene through marriage. His sister was married to Prempreh II, the Asantehene from 
1933-1970 (Agyeman-Duah 2003: 8). In matrilineal societies like the one of Asante, the 
children of the sister are traditionally more important to men than their own children. Many 
other members of Kufuor’s government, up to high levels, were royal family members in their 
hometown (Ubink 2008: 98). 
 The non-Akan societies in 
the North and in the East of Ghana were of course displeased with these developments, the 
strong linkages between the NPP and chiefly clans in the South-West however already 
indicated these developments when Kufuor came into power in 2000. Already John B. 
Danquah, the most important figure of UGCC (the precursor of the NPP), was a chief himself 
and belonged to the royal family of Akyem Abuakwa (Rathbone 2000: 79). Under the 
Okyenhene Nana Ofori Atta II, this family was the fiercest domestic adversary of the regime 
of Kwame Nkrumah (s. chapter 2.1.3.). The nomination of Nana Akufo-Addo as the 
presidential candidate of the NPP for the 2008 elections proved that the influence of this 
family has remained the same until today. Nana Akufo-Addo is a son of Edward Akufo-Addo, 
who in turn was the son-in-law of Nana Ofori Atta I. 
  
 3.2.2 The ‘capitalisation’ of NTAs 
 
The economic capital of NTAs is considerable, too: traditionally, chiefs are in charge of the 
land and of communal labour. But a considerable number of paramounts, particularly in the 
South, are also rich in terms of monetary wealth and are highly educated. As such, they are 
theoretically in charge of all the classic factors of production. This situation already was 
                                                 
24 see http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=152331 ;  
http://www.ghana.gov.gh/ghana/asantehene_holds_durbar_malian_president.jsp ;  
 http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=79234&comment=1406064#com  
(0409) 
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similar in colonial times, with the difference that chiefs were mostly uneducated.25
In addition, in most of the societies – and particularly in those where chieftaincy is still very 
important today – chiefs are not able to inherit at all or only on matrilineal lines (interview 
Odotei). Naturally, the prefix ‘neo’ is also valid concerning the communalist character of 
African societies: especially the societies in the current territory of Ghana have been in 
contact with Europe since the beginning of the modern age and have participated strongly in 
triangular trade, which made them integral parts of the capitalist world system already at that 
time. The capitalist deformation of the ‘traditional’ systems, as it is bemoaned today, has 
therefore already been taking place for about 500 years. Today, this deformation is bemoaned 
mainly in connection with the countless succession conflicts, the multiple instances of stool 
land being sold for personal gain (chiefs often sell their land twice or thrice) and the personal 
enrichment of ‘royals’ through royalties. Odotei estimates that the government pays about 5-
10% of the revenue it receives from mining companies (and the exploitation of other natural 
resources like timber) to traditional councils. However, these payments are not accounted for, 
no-one knows how much the traditional councils actually get and how the money is divided 
within the councils. Constitutionally, stool land revenues, which also comprise rents, dues, 
revenues or other payments, are to be disbursed as follows (q.i. Boafo-Arthur 2006: 151): 
 In spite of 
this, the chiefs were not able to meet the increased demands of the British in the Second 
World War (Rathbone 2000: 17f). As a consequence, they missed the train of ‘development’, 
which was born out of the demands of the colonialists. Today, most of the high-ranking chiefs 
of the South are highly educated – the special character of chiefly control over land and 
labour, however, is still a hindrance to most of the chiefs becoming entrepreneurs in the 
Western sense of the word. Chiefs are not the owners of land and labour in a capitalist sense, 
but rather caretakers (interview Odotei). The neotraditional fabric is communalist or pre-
capitalist insofar as it doesn’t allow for individual ownership of land and the exploitation of 
labour to obtain surplus value. Land and labour cannot be considered as economic capital if 
they are only convertible into money under distinct conditions, e.g. corrupt elders in the 
traditional councils who allow the selling of land for personal gain (cf. Bourdieu/Steinrücke 
2005: 52).   
- Ten per cent shall be paid to the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands to cover 
administrative expenses (Republic of Ghana 1992, Article 267 (6))  
- Twenty-five percent to the stool through the traditional authority for the maintenance 
                                                 
25 According to Odotei, chiefs were even openly referred to as ‘dummies’ by the educated elite (Odotei 2003: 
335). 
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of the stool in keeping with its status (ibid., Article 267 (6) (a)) 
- Twenty percent to the traditional authority and (ibid., Article 267 (6) (b)) 
- Fifty-five per cent to the district assembly, within the area of authority in which the 
stool lands are situated (ibid., Article 267 (6) (c))  
  
The use of these resources is therefore disputed: constitutionally, the royalties are not meant 
for development, but the media and the population often demand that these resources be spent 
on education, infrastructure and health (interview Odotei). Besides several paramountcies of 
the South, which are richly endowed with natural resources, however, the huge majority of 
chiefs are not able to spend significant amounts of money on development (Interview 
Daanaa). 
If anything, the majority of the NTAs therefore possess economic capital because of their role 
as custodians of land (cf. Nugent 1996: 75). Also the summoning of the people is still made 
by beating the gong-gong, which is controlled by NTAs, but the possibility to make profit out 
of this function is rather low. As I will show in the case study, the function of the chief as the 
custodian of the land is also still institutionalised through rituals today. Each time when land 
is given out by the stool, the chief has to perform rituals. Even when someone dies on a 
particular piece of stool land, the chief is to be called to perform rituals (interview Odotei).  
  
 3.2.3 The 'neotraditional veil' 
 
H.S. Daanaa, the Principal Research Officer of the Chieftaincy Ministry also mentions this 
divine or spiritual power – which could be classified as symbolic capital as its validation 
varies considerably – as one of the most important sources of power of NTAs. According to 
him, the fear of ‘divine power’ often brings the wrong persons to power (interview Daanaa). 
This religious protection of chiefly power also affects the value system concerning 
chieftaincy. Chiefs are to be addressed with great respect, even if they rule over small 
communities and are dressed like ordinary citizens. This is a fundamental difference to the 
modern political system, where the status of a politician is constantly measured by his 
performance. Chiefs are dealt with differently insofar as most of the media and even scientists 
try to protect the privacy of the holders of chiefly offices in a complaisant manner.  
In an interview with one of the most influential experts on chieftaincy at the University of 
Ghana, I explained that chieftaincy is often described on the basis of Western concepts of 
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nobility in Europe and even in Africa and that it would therefore be interesting to compare the 
two institutions to identify the differences. The answer was interesting: ‘It looks exciting, but 
keep away, it is dangerous. If you go and compare chieftaincy with the royals in Europe, you 
are going to get in big time trouble. Don’t even dare!’ Concerning the personal wealth of 
paramounts the expert referred to the traditional concept of not showing the private 
background of a chief because he could be ‘of humble origin’ when asked about the economic 
assets of the paramount chiefs. Many chiefs are traditionally ‘big’, but in terms of money and 
education they are not. This leads to problems within the chiefly hierarchy, for instance when 
a divisional chief like the late chancellor of the University of Ghana is in fact more powerful 
than his paramount chief.  
When I asked about the personal wealth of chiefs as compared to MPs, the answer was 
similar. In spite of my insistence on material wealth, the respondent started a long digression 
concerning the traditional concept of wealth. In contrast to chiefs, MPs have to disclose their 
personal wealth every year (interview Adotey). This special treatment of NTAs creates a 
highly attractive veil of unaccountability and invulnerability and makes it nearly impossible to 
assess the volume of their personal wealth.   
This general masking of the private persons behind the neotraditional offices and values 
makes chieftaincy a perfect instrument for elite formation. But in spite of the official picture 
of chieftaincy as an exclusive club of royals, the system is at the same time easily accessible 
to non-royals. This is on the one hand criticised by arguing that succession lines are 
undermined through the growing importance of education and (reportedly) of wealth 
(interviews; Boafo-Arthur 2006:150), as has already been mentioned, but it is also officially 
encouraged through newly created titles for non-royals. The most important title in this 
respect is called ‘Nkosuohene’ in Twi (development chief) and has already more than 100 
foreign holders (Steegstra 2006). Steegstra also highlights the fact that such titles for 
foreigners already existed in colonial times. The number of these enstoolments, however, has 
increased tremendously (ibid.) and NTAs seem to be quite creative in continuously inventing 
new titles: in Tamale, the leader of a sister-city team from Lousville, Kentucky, was recently 
named ‘chief of companionship’ (Zo Simli-Na), and in Apam (Central Region) an American 
visitor was recently made Apowmudzenhen, which means ‘health-promoting chief’ (Daily 
Graphic, 17.08.08; Daily Graphic 18.09.08).  
The neotraditional system is thus very open to non-royals if they can compensate their lack of 
institutionalised social capital with cultural and economic capital, that is to say, with money, 
academic degrees or brokerage. In return, the neotraditional system beckons with some sort of 
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immunity. This impression of chiefly offices as neotraditional veils that cover the past of their 
holders is again amplified by the importance of cultural capital for NTAs. One of the reasons 
why NTAs were able to ride out the attacks of Nkrumah and Rawlings was their combination 
of institutionalised and incorporated cultural capital (s. chapter 3.2.1.).  
 This combination of the openness of the traditional system and its tendency to form and 
sustain social elites would also allow for an application of Bierschenk’s concepts of the social 
climber and the outsider (1998: 322ff). These actors use development brokerage as a means to 
ascend the social ladder or to ‘pay their entrance fee’ to a particular community. Besides its 
obscuring character, membership in the neotraditional system also enhances social status, 
facilitates contact to politicians and foreigners, increases the possibility of going abroad, etc. 
Obtaining of a neotraditional office is therefore a rational and frequently envisaged stage in 
economic as well as political careers.   
From this point of view, chieftaincies in Ghana can be described as relatively open power 
configurations that are protected by cultural values and based mostly on cultural capital 
(academic degrees; special knowledge and know-how; (unconscious) behaviour; stool regalia) 
and social capital (titles of nobility, achieved through delegation or negotiation; big circle of 
acquaintances with high capital; knowledge about genealogy and social networks).  
 
 4.  Neotraditional development brokers: the case of Hagodzi 
 
In this chapter, I will move from the general to the specific level by applying the concepts 
outlined above to a case study. Together with my girlfriend Lucile Dreidemy, I stayed in 
Hagodzi, a deprived village on a river island in the Volta Region, for about three weeks to 
record all development activities and especially the functions of NTAs in these projects.  
 
The Water Project 
 
When we visited the island in August 2008, the three villages of the island had just received 
pipe-borne water. Every village already had at least one water tap. Some people still fetched 
water from the river, because they couldn’t afford the small fees. Additionally, the dangers 
connected with the water from the river were not clear to the majority of the population. The 
Catholic catechist, Dan Lawson, for instance, stated that there were no problems with the 
quality of the river water before pipe-borne water had been extended to the island. It is thus 
very likely that Participatory Rural Appraisals would have resulted in other development 
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measures. The same can be said of a KVIP latrine in Lawshime, which hasn’t been completed 
until now.  
To the majority of the small English-speaking elite of the three villages, the water project 
nonetheless constituted a feasible and desirable objective.  The first endeavours to achieve 
this goal were already made in the mid-1990ies by a group led by then-Assemblyman Kwame 
Layisi. Layisi reported to the district assembly and wrote a letter to the District Water and 
Sanitation Team in Keta. These demands were not met until water was extended to Devenu, a 
village near the island. Kwame Layisi then again wrote a letter to the district assembly and one 
to the regional manager of the Ghana Water Company in Ho. The administrators in Ho 
referred Layisi and his team to the office in charge of the District, which is situated in 
Sogakope. After another letter to the district assembly, Francis Bedzra , the head of the 
District Water and Sanitation Team in Keta, was sent to survey the area. In both cases where 
the request was successful – in the letter to the DA and to Ho after the extension to Devenu 
and in the letter to the DA to start the survey – Layisi managed to get assistance from outside 
for formulating the letter: firstly from one Mr. Kata Djegbo and secondly from Mr. Koshi, the 
sanitary inspector for the Shime Area, an area adjacent to Atiavi. Funding by the Ghana Water 
Company was then approved under the condition that additional sources of funding had to be 
found. These resources were provided by the Dan Abodakpi, at the time MP of this area, and 
by the Catholic Church. Dan Abodakpi had been incarcerated in 2007 because of the misuse 
of funds as minister of trade and industry under the NDC government in the 1990ies and was 
still in custody when the project was he was asked for a contribution. In spite of being in jail, 
Dan Abodakpi was able to release his proportion of the so-called Common Fund for the water 
project. The release of this fund also had to be approved by the District Chief Executive.  
Other actors from the village involved in the project were the new AM Ben Makulay26
Our experiences on the island suggest that the role of the stool father was very limited, but 
nevertheless crucial. Although we never revealed our focus on NTAs in our field studies, we 
were sent to the stool father’s house almost every day to greet him. Because of his inability to 
, the so-
called chief of this area, George Benyefia , the stool father Baako Tamoafo and several elders 
from all of the villages. The stool father was important for the mobilisation of communal 
labour. He holds the highest neotraditional office on the island – George Benyefia  lives in 
Accra – and had to authorize the beating of the gong-gong for summoning the people for the 
organisation of communal labour. A preliminary trench for the water pipes had to be digged 
by the villagers themselves. 
                                                 
26 He became AM in 2006. Between 1996 and 2006 the AM of this area didn’t come from the island. 
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speak English, these ‘courtesy calls’ were either translated by others or they took place in 
relative silence. The observations of Blundo and Edja concerning the relations of NTAs to 
development brokerage can therefore also be confirmed in the case of Hagodzi: particularly 
old chiefs continue to be the centre of the political system in the village, but they have to 
acquire various assets such as language skills or bureaucratic knowledge and contacts by 
sharing power with a so-called ‘brokers’ club’ (Blundo 2000; Edja 2000; q.i. 
Bierschenk/Olivier de Sardan 2002). Such a brokers’ club also existed in Hagodzi. It centred 
around Kwame Layisi and George Benyefia . In the Ewe-speaking areas, the stool father 
(Zikpuito) is regarded as the owner of the stool (the symbol of neotraditional power in the 
Southern parts of Ghana) who has the right to nominate a new chief and to represent the chief 
in case of his absence (Kludze 2000: 58f). Baako Tamoafo’s link to the brokers’ club of 
Kwame Layisi is Oswald Ndo, who holds the office of neotraditional linguist (in Ewe: 
Tsiami). Almost all ethnic groups in Ghana know this position and usually describe it as the 
office of the speaker of the chief. Particularly high-ranking chiefs are traditionally not 
supposed to speak directly to the population. The Tsiami (in Twi: Okyeame) has to embellish 
the chiefly words and to enrich them with metaphors and sayings (Simensen 1975: 11; Kludze 
2000: 64-68). In Hagodzi, the position of the Tsiami additionally comprises the tasks of the 
so-called Secreto. This office can also be found in the neotraditional setting of the Ga of 
Accra and is similar to a shorthand secretary. Ndo is the only ‘royal’ in the brokers’ club of 
Layisi.     
The preparatory digging of the trench took about one week and only involved communal 
labour mobilised with the help of the stool father and the elders. Afterwards, the workers from 
the Water Company took over and had to be fed by the community. Since the island’s 
agriculture is far from self-sufficient, the required food had to be bought outside. The money 
needed came from so-called ‘volunteers’, the youth of the island, who mostly live in Accra, 
Kumasi and Takoradi, and from George Benyefia .   
He was probably the second most important person for the water project, because he was 
regarded as the chief of the island by most of the stakeholders. We came to the island with the 
help of Theophilus Boateng, the manager of an important radio station based in Keta, who had 
rallied support for this project on the radio and had also tried to involve more NGOs by 
creating a website. Boteng called Benyefia ‘Togbe’, which means chief in Ewe. During our 
two-week stay on the island, everybody referred to Benyefia as the chief of the village. Only 
in one interview, the new AM Ben Makulay used the term ‘development chief’. This title is 
quite new and is usually given to non-royals who are engaged in development. When we 
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confronted him with this contradiction, he stated, that Benyefia was both the chief and the 
development chief of the island, which was later confirmed by other villagers. Benyefia came 
to the island when Francis Bedzra , the head of the District Water and Sanitation Team in 
Keta, was sent to survey the area and he established contact with the radio station. From this 
time on, if not earlier, he was the central contact person for the project and thus acted as a 
development broker.   
For this project, we can therefore identify at least three brokers: Layisi, who started the project 
by appealing to the DA and who involved specialised stakeholders in these appeals; Benyefia, 
who established and maintained contact to the radio and the District Water and Sanitation 
Team; and Oswald Ndo, who served as a link to the stool father and the elders. Additionally, 
one could also add Theophilus Boateng, who had been on the island four times, although it is 
rather difficult to reach. Most of the time, the paths to the villages are so muddy that one has 
to go barefooted. Therefore priests, nurses and teachers are often reluctant to come in times of 
rain. It is very likely that we were not the only foreigners who were brought to the island by 
Boateng. 
As I have pointed out, two out of the three main actors in this project were neotraditional 
actors. In other projects, like the construction and maintenance of the school, the 
neotraditional actors were less involved because the assemblymen in this area are quite active 
and the neotraditional system on the island as a whole is very weak. Officially, the island is 
under the jurisdiction of the paramountcy of Anloga, the most powerful federation of the Ewe 
in Ghana, extending far beyond the borders of the Keta District. The Traditional Council of 
Anloga is currently mired in a severe chieftaincy conflict involving several deaths in the last 
few years. According to the stool father of Anloga, the lack of a paramount chief has led to a 
huge chaos in the region’s neotraditional system. Since it is traditionally very fluid, the 
neotraditional structure now has become totally unclear because disputes about enstoolments, 
destoolments and allegiances cannot be solved by the paramount chief in the last instance. 
The situation on the island is additionally complicated by the fact that the family of the 
legitimate chief does not live on the island.  
 
George Benyefia: The case of a social climber 
 
After our sojourn on the island, we finally met George Benyefia  in Accra and heard that the 
legitimate chief lived in Ho and didn’t know much about the island. Benyefia was declared 
development chief, chief and, as I will point out later, the ‘owner’ of the island without the 
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consent of the higher ranks in Anloga and other authorities (divisional chiefs) in between. 
Only the stool father, Baako Tamoafo, and the Tsiami, Oswald Ndo, seem to be accepted by 
the higher ranks, and they also maintain contact to the formal chief. Because of his 
engagement in development, both as a broker and as a patron, they accepted the swindle and 
protected Benyefia. Also the majority of the other villagers is likely to have accepted him 
when he became development chief in the early 1990ies as no stakeholder from outside knew 
about the ‘complot’. 
The case of the ‘enstoolment’ of Benyefia as development chief is particularly interesting, as it 
is a good illustration of the concept of the ‘gate keeper’, who always controls two gates at the 
same time: the donor believes that the population listens to the broker and the population 
believes that donor listens to him (Bierschenk et al. 2000: 19). Benyefia made use of this 
information gap by telling the story of his enstoolment in two different versions that were 
designed for the two sides of the interface he controlled. One version was for the people in the 
village and one was for outsiders. In the story for his people, Hildegard Thielmann, the vice 
chairperson of a German NGO, invented this title (he called it in Ewe: Ngor Gbe Yiyi Fia) for 
him and gave it to him in consultation with the ‘stool fathers’ of the area because of his 
support of her NGO. In the story for outsiders, the ‘stool fathers’ of the island had to confirm 
his title before Ms. Thielmann accepted him as an adviser for the establishment of a clinic at 
Tregui, a village not far from the island. Benyefia used the term ‘stool fathers’ instead of the 
appropriate term ‘elders’, probably to enhance the status of the elders and of himself. I don’t 
think that he would have used this term face to face with other neotraditional actors. The 
island only has one stool and can therefore only have one stool father. Additionally, it was not 
clear who was to be called an elder in the village and who not. 
Ms. Thielmann has been working for the Ghanaian Ministry of Health and for the German 
‘Kinderhilfswerk’ for many years and became ‘queen mother’ of Abomusso (close to 
Nkawkaw in the Eastern Region) in 1992. She was also told by Benyefia that he had been 
enstooled by his ‘stool fathers’ and she believed him. The queen mother is very powerful in 
Akan societies and normally has to be a member of the ‘royal’ family.  
Benyefia was brought up in Hagodzi and is likely to have started his neotraditional career as a 
‘volunteer’27
                                                 
27 This term has been used by many interviewees on the island. 
, someone who lives outside the island and sends money from time to time. As 
the owner of a car repair shop in Accra, called ‘Bavaria City Motors’, he is without doubt the 
richest person from the island that still maintains contact with the people on the island. 
Together with other, wealthier volunteers and with the group around Layisi he formed the 
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HALAM Association (Hagodzi – Lawshime – Mamime), a club for development activities 
and for the contribution to burials, which meets on a monthly basis. There are several other 
associations or ‘societies’ on the island that also collect money, usually in connection with 
traditional drumming, but this money is used almost exclusively for burials. 
As a mechanical engineer, Benyefia also is the person with the highest educational level that is 
still in contact with the island. Consequently, Benyefia used his position as a patron to convert 
economic capital into social capital and his position as a broker to convert cultural capital into 
social capital, which was then institutionalised in the form of his different neotraditional titles. 
The transformation of money or other economic resources into neotraditional titles was 
definitely normal at all times, even if many experts in Ghana bemoan growing corruption in 
this regard. The conversion of education into neotraditional titles is relatively new, but 
education already seems to be more important than money. In this regard, Odotei described 
the current situation of the chiefdom in Legon, the locality where the University of Ghana was 
constructed in 1948. The former divisional chief of this area was at the same time the 
chancellor of the university (the new chancellor is Kofi Annan). Based on lineage, a bus 
driver from the United States should now become divisional chief, but the population 
concerned rejects him (interview Odotei).  
Broker careers usually are at the expense of established actors like local politicians and chiefs, 
who can be seen as informal politicians (Bierschenk et al. 2000: 31). As can be seen in the 
case of Benyefia, the neotraditional offices in Hagodzi seem to be contested more fiercely 
than the political ones. This can be attributed to the relatively low standard of living in the 
area. Assemblymen have to stay permanently in one of the concerned villages, chiefs can also 
live in town or even abroad. Because of his rather blunt coup without any rituals or 
discussions about descent and with very loose interpretations of customs (e.g.: his use of the 
term ‘stool father’), Benyefia could be described as a ‘secular’ development broker who 
disintegrates the neotraditional system for his own profit. However, bearing in mind my 
(limited) experience and knowledge about the flexibility of chieftaincy, I rather prefer to refer 
to Benyefia as a (typical) neotraditional actor.    
 
The ‘real’ chief 
 
After the interview with George Benyefia , we also tried to find the formal chief, which turned 
out to be difficult because Benyefia refused to give us his name and his telephone number. In 
the end we got the number and the name from Kwame Layisi and eventually met the formal 
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chief. His name is Richard Gekem and he is a quantity surveyor in Ho. Gekem already knew 
that Benyefia decorated himself with his own title, ‘Togbe Aklorbor II’. He had even attended 
a neotraditional meeting in 2002 where this fraud was discussed and had written a letter to the 
DCE, calling upon the DCE not to recognise Benyefia as a chief. At the time of our 
interviews, however, he already seemed to have accepted the role of Benyefia. Gekem has 
never lived on the island and has no relatives and no house there. He visits Hagodzi very 
rarely and only for ritual purposes. He is convinced that these rituals are very important for 
the well-being of the villagers. With a percentage of traditionalists of at least 50%, this is in 
all likelihood coherent with the perception of the villagers themselves. Gekem grew up in 
Anloga and began a nomadic life after completing senior secondary school: between 1985 and 
2001, he lived in Cape Coast, Takoradi, Accra, Atiavi and Kumasi. From 2001 until now, he 
has been living in Ho and working as a municipal engineer with the Public Works Department 
of the district. 
Despite his educational background and his good connections to the neotraditional elite, 
Gekem is not engaged in any brokerage activity for the island. He hardly knows any of the 
names of the villagers and told me in the interview that he wanted to construct boreholes and 
bring potable water to the village, even though potable water already was accessible and the 
digging of boreholes is not possible in the area because of the salt water of the Keta Lagoon. 
According to August Niadzi, a catechist in the Atiavi Area, the Catholic Church had 
experimented with boreholes in the area already in the 1980ies. This was also the reason why 
pipe-bourne water has been extended to the island – boreholes would have been much cheaper 
(Interview Niadzi). 
Gekem is nevertheless vividly engaged in quarrels about allegiance that had evolved already 
before the death of the late paramount chief of Anloga, Togbui Adzaladza, in 1998.  In 1979, 
as a young boy, he was made the chief of the island, but his stool remained in Atiavi, a market 
town on the coast of the Keta Lagoon. When his stool was transferred to the island in 1990, 
Gekem claimed to have become a Dufia (divisional chief) and to be directly subordinate to the 
paramountcy of Anloga in this capacity, but he didn’t succeed to assert this claim in the 
traditional council of Anloga. In the first interview, Gekem nevertheless stated that he was a 
Dufia and that the traditional council in Anloga had made him a Dufia. Only when I called the 
stool father of Anloga – or rather a man who is regarded as the stool father of Anloga by a part 
of the population of this paramountcy – to confirm this information he admitted that this was 
not true. I only mention this episode because white lies have been part of every interview with 
NTAs until now. The supposed stool father of Anloga, Benjamin Tunyo, is one of the most 
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powerful NTAs in Anloga and stated that Richard Gekem was his nephew. 
 
The French NGO 
 
The career of Benyefia as a neotraditional development broker reached its peak when a French 
NGO grew interested in the island as a potential place for cash crop farming and fish farming. 
Benyefia showed me documents about the leasing of 116 acres of land on the island to this 
NGO, signed by the District Chief Executive and by the High Court Registrar of Lands. Due 
to unclear reasons, the NGO never started its work after it had paid a considerable amount of 
money for the land. It is possible that the bad accessibility (no road) forced the NGO to stop 
the project. Other reasons may be the foul play of the elite of the village, who declared 
Benyefia also the owner of the land. Gekem didn’t know that the land was to be sold and 
stated that he was the lawful the owner of the land, which should even have been gazetted by 
the Regional House of Chiefs in 2000. It is therefore possible that the French NGO got wind 
of this trouble and backed out. Although I made copies of all official documents and was 
provided with the name of the NGO and a French telephone number, I have not been able to 
verify the existence of this NGO.  
 
 
Other tasks of NTAs 
 
Apart from Ndo and Benyefia, NTAs only played their traditional roles in development 
projects as custodians of the land and as community mobilizers. The actual involvement in 
these tasks can vary, depending largely on to the abilities and the commitment of the NTA 
concerned. When asked about the important actors of development in the village, the group of 
brokers headed by Layisi (mainly Oswald Ndo, Ben Makulay and Hormeku Bandua, whose 
position on the island will be discussed later) nevertheless mentioned the elders at first – even 
though the group then discussed about who was to be called an elder and who not. The 
mobilisation of labour mainly happens through the beating of the gong-gong, which is still 
very common. Just three days before the interview, the group went from village to village to 
impregnate mosquito nets. To summon the people they had to involve the gong-gong beater, 
who is authorised by the stool father and the elders.    
The group also stated that land issues on the island were normally decided by all elders 
together, which is unusual for the Volta Region because the land in the Ewe-speaking areas is 
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usually owned by families. This statement would thus surely be contested by Gekem and his 
family. 
The third important task of the elders is dispute settlement and mediation in minor cases. This 
task is also performed regularly. The group stated that the last case had been settled three 
months before the interview. 
 
The brokers’ club28
 
 
In connection with other projects, a considerable variety of other private and (semi-)political 
actors were mentioned: opinion leaders, youth organizers, volunteers, community-based 
volunteers, teachers and catechists. These roles were connected to the following institutions: 
the Catholic Church, the Evangelic community, the Charismatic community, the Africania 
Mission, the ‘societies’ (drumming groups for burials), the HALAM Association, the unit 
committees, the area council, the kindergarten, the primary school and the JSS.   
The group of brokers headed by Layisi had its foot in the door of each of these institutions. 
Kwame Layisi himself had been Assemblyman, member of the Executive Council in Keta, 
Head Christian or Christian Father and teacher at the kindergarten. Ben Makulay was 
Assemblyman and had been teacher at the primary school. Hormeku Bandua was the leader 
(Osofo) of the Africania Mission on the island, opinion leader and area council member. 
Interestingly, Oswald Ndo was occupied only with his neotraditional job as a Tsiami, besides 
farming and fishing, like the others. Additionally, the brokers have since 2002 been working 
as ‘Community Based Volunteers’, for which the district assembly pays small allowances. It is 
their task to record births, deaths and sicknesses and to carry out certain measures against 
diseases like polio or malaria.  
The posts of the youth organizers were not directly occupied by the brokers themselves, but 
they were awarded to close friends and relatives. The youth organizer for Lawshime is Dan 
Lawson, the catechist of the island. He also teaches at the kindergarten and is a close friend of 
Layisi. The youth organizer of Hagodzi is Kwame Layisi, a son of Kwame Layisi. Just as the 
term youth as a whole, the actual function of the youth organizer is quite unclear because the 
term is both used in the field of party politics and in the neotraditional setting. According to 
Ben Makulay, the assemblyman and the elders of the village are involved in the formation of 
youth groups and select the youth leader or organizer in consultation with the population. 
These groups, consisting both of women and men, would gather 2-4 times a year to contribute 
                                                 
28 This term was not used by the population of Hagodzi, it was coined by Blundo (2000) and Edja (2000). 
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to development. This meaning of youth is certainly related to the neotraditional division of the 
community into ‘royals’ and commoners or youth. In this setting the youth organizer is also 
called ‘Asafo atse’ and represents the non-royals in the community (s. Wilson 2000; 
Oakley/Clegg 1999: 75-77). According to Kludze he also has the right to destool the chief and 
is thus a symbol of the ‘supremacy of the people’ (s. Kludze 2000: 52-81). In Hagodzi the 
youth organizers are thus on the one hand representatives of political parties who disseminate 
messages and have to mobilize the population for the unit committees. On the other hand, 
they are often at the same time the gong-gong-beaters of the village, who also spread 
messages from the elders and the stool father.  
Opinion leaders are the heads of the unit committees, which are supposed to be the units of 
local government on the village level, but they are largely inoperative (Ubink 2008: 149). 
According to Norman Layisi, another son of Kwame Layisi,29
 
 the last elections for the unit 
committee didn’t take place in Hagodzi. As a consequence, the current unit committee only 
consists of 5 appointed members, all of which seem to be NPP members, although the NPP 
only gets about 10% of the votes in this constituency. Norman Layisi is one of these 
appointees – but he neither knew that he would be nominated before the official proclamation 
nor who had nominated him. De jure, the DCE has to appoint one third of the members of the 
unit committees on behalf of the President and in consultation with the opinion leader and any 
traditional authorities and organised productive economic groupings in the unit 
(Ayee/Amponsah: 2003: 69). It was in all likelihood the AM who listed the names after (short) 
consultations with the elders and the stool father. Various important stakeholders on the island 
thought that the constitution prescribed the appointment of NPP members, while others 
stressed the need to cooperate with the DCE, who also belonged to the NPP. 
Religion 
 
Besides its leading role in development, politics and in the neotraditional system, the ‘brokers’ 
club’ also occupies leading positions in the fields of religion and education. Except from Ben 
Makulay, who is younger, all members of the ‘brokers’ club’ (K. Layisi, O. Ndo and  H. 
Bandua) went to school together. Norman Layisi stated that only 5 persons on the island were 
able to speak English as well as these three persons. 
Religion is a particularly interesting topic in Hagodzi because Christianity did not come to the 
island until the 1980ies. The majority of the population still believes in traditional religion and 
                                                 
29 All in all the Layisi family consists of four generations comprising about 100 people in Hagodzi (interviews). 
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opposes Christianity. This is also important for politics and medicine because these areas of 
life are dominated by Christianity in Southern Ghana. Almost all of the hospitals and clinics 
in the area were built by Christians and remain Christian institutions until now, and everyone 
who is familiar with the public devoutness of politicians will admit that traditionalists are 
seriously underprivileged in Ghana. 
Besides the traditional priest and the traditional healer on the island, this discrimination is 
keenly criticised by the Africania Mission in Lawshime, a relatively new movement, also 
called Sankofa, which means ‘go back and and take’. When we arrived in Hagodzi we were 
seen as Christians, and therefore traditional religion was hidden from us. Only at the end of 
our stay we discovered that one of the brokers, Hormeku Bandua, was the leader of the 3-
year-old Sankofa movement with about 100 active members. The Africania Mission itself was 
founded in Accra in the 1980ies. Bandua is an Osofo, a ‘pastor of tradition’, as we were told 
by Norman  Layisi. The congregation was founded as a project for the preservation of 
traditional beliefs. The meetings are mixtures of traditional drummings, the ‘societies’ or 
‘Bobobo’, and Christian worship (see Witte 2005).  After our stay on the island, we also 
visited the headquarters of the Africania Mission in Accra and met the head of the 
congregation, who wasn’t very cooperative because he was also convinced that we were 
Christians. The books we were allowed to acquire conveyed the picture of a new type of 
syncretism rather than a ‘resistance project’ against Christian hegemony as it was portrayed in 
the community.  .The second biggest religious group is the Catholic Church with more than 
150 members, as we were told. Only ten people attended a mass we visited, however, and we 
heard that most of the Christians from the island lived outside. The amount of economic 
capital controlled by the Catholics is nonetheless by far the highest of all 'non-political' 
organisations. Catholicism was introduced in the 1980ies by Italian Comboni missionaries, 
who constructed a church in Lawshime in 1984. In the dry seasons, a Comboni missionary 
also brought a car to the island, the only one that has entered the island until now. The Church 
was soon used as a kindergarten. Until now, the Catholic Church pays the wages of the 
teachers (150 GHC for 20h a week) and feeds the pupils of the kindergarten. It was only in 
2002 that the parish was taken over by Africans. 
 
Other projects: school, KVIP latrine and bridges 
 
The first teacher was already sent to Hagodzi in 1962, long before Christian missionaries 
started to come to the island regularly, but the government only provided material for sheds 
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and pavilions. In this context, Benyefia assisted, probably for the first time, by winning a 
raffle for the inland. He was awarded 250 bags of cement and provided them for the 
construction of walls for the school. The cladding was then financed by MP Dan Abodakpi. 
Abodakpi had been coming to the island every three months for 16 years until he was 
incarcerated in 2007. On these occasions, the gong-gong was beaten, the whole population 
gathered in the school compound and he reported on the national assembly. Afterwards, the 
representatives of the village were able to ask him for assistance. The MP also used his 
Common Fund to pay part of the wages of the teachers on the island.  
Abodakpi was also involved in the construction of a KVIP latrine in Lawshime in 2000. This 
project can be seen as a model case for the lack of involvement of local actors. The local 
representative for the project was the then Assemblyman, who didn’t come from the island. 
Communal labour was organised to dig a hole and to carry the material from Hartogodo (the 
next village that is connected to the road) to the island. When construction was almost 
finished – only a shed was missing – it was suddenly stopped. Even the Planning Officer of 
the Keta District could not give any reasons for this abrupt stop of the funding, but many 
other projects in the District were affected too. Although the construction was almost finished 
the population has never used the KVIP latrine. A similar case is the construction of a 
footbridge between Lawshime and Mamime, which was started in 2006. Only the pillars were 
erected, then the contractor stopped.  
Until now, the only project which has been fully financed by the (former) residents of the 
island is a wooden footbridge to Hartogodo, which is flooded about 4 months of the year and 
won’t resist the drift for a long time. It was constructed at Easter 2008 with the financial 
assistance (about 200 GHC) of Benyefia, the ‘societies’ and the youth from outside. The next 
aim of the group of brokers is upgrading this footbridge to a fixed bridge. 
 
 
Résumé:  
 
In the interviews we always asked the interviewees to list the five most important actors in the 
field of development. Baako Tamoafo (the stool father) and George Benyefia  were mentioned 
by almost everyone, Ndo (the linguist) and some elders were mentioned by two thirds, and 
Bandua, Layisi and Makulay were mentioned by one third. This was quite surprising because 
from my point of view the participation of the stool father and the elders in development 
projects was marginal. This outcome could thus be explained with the high status of the NTAs 
or with my inability to speak Ewe, which made interviews with the NTAs impossible. When 
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we asked them to mention the roles of the stool father and the elders, however, the 
interviewees only listed their neotraditional functions as custodians of the land and as leaders 
of the community. Due to their inability to speak English, the stool father and the elders were 
hardly involved in the coordination of the development projects with actors from outside the 
village.  
As can be seen in the case of Benyefia, involvement in the neotraditional system can 
nonetheless boost the bargaining power of a development broker. This is caused (1) by the 
quasi-automatic loyalty of the population discussed above, but (2) also by the fact that the 
formal political institutions like DAs and other developmental institutions de facto treat 
neotraditional heads in the villages as political leaders. This can be attributed to a folklorist 
understanding of the countryside both by Ghanaian city dwellers and by foreigners, but also 
to defunct formal political institutions in the villages and to the factual functions of NTAs in 
the fields of customary law and land rights.  
In addition, the case of Hagodzi once again shows the importance of ‘royal’ networks in the 
development arena. Both Dan Abodakpi, the former MP, and Theophilus Boateng, the 
manager of Jubilee Radio, claim to be part of ‘royal’ families in Anloga. Their assistance 
could therefore also have evolved out of discussions in neotraditional settings (like the 
‘traditional council’ in Anloga) or of interests of the neotraditional elite in Anloga. But these 
are mere speculations. 
The egoist and calculating smack of the concept of development brokers as a whole (cf. 
Bierschenk/Olivier de Sardan 2002: 19f) could also be confirmed in Hagodzi, hadn’t the 
population of the island been part of the ‘invention’ or ‘imagination of tradition’.30
- Free interpretation of descent or invention of descent: once a chief is installed – which 
could be seriously challenged in the case of Benyefia – it is against tradition to look 
into his past (interviews). 
 In spite of 
the whole village knowing that the lawful chief of the island was Richard Gekem, all political 
stakeholders from outside, to whom I have been talking, have believed Benyefia for more than 
15 years now. The fluidity of the neotraditional system of Hagodzi comprised the following 
areas: 
                                                 
30    Ranger modified the concept of the ‘invention of tradition’: ‘Some traditions in colonial Africa really 
were invented, by a single colonial officer for a single occasion. But customary law and ethnicity and religion 
and language were imagined, by many different people and over a long time. These multiple imaginations were 
in tension with each other and in constant contestation to define the meaning of what had been imagined – to 
imagine it further. Traditions imagined by whites were re-imagined by blacks: traditions imagined by particular 
black interest groups were re-imagined by others. The history of modern tradition has been much more complex 
than we have supposed.’ (Ranger 1993:81-82) 
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- Invention/imagination of new neotraditional positions (‘stool fathers’)  
- Reinterpretation of competences: in the Volta Region, the chiefs normally don’t 
administer the land, it belongs to families.  
By confirming Benyefia as development chief, land owner and chief, the villagers probably 
made the best out of their situation. The flexibility of the system made it possible to bypass 
the formal chief. Without Benyefia becoming the chief, the village probably wouldn’t have 
received pipe-borne water and brick school buildings. 
     
 
 5.  Institutionalised cooperation 
 
 
Despite their increasing role in development, it is in fact totally unclear why chiefs should be 
officially entrusted with development activities. The colonial position of the chief as 
development facilitator has been replaced by three public offices: the District (or Municipal) 
Chief Executive (DCE or MCE), the assemblyman and the unit committee member (cf. Ayesu 
2006: 500). While the former two offices have successfully replaced the neotraditional system 
on the district level, the sub-district level is still inactive due to shortages of resources and 
capacities. The systematic entrustment of chiefs with development funds would therefore 
secure their position on the sub-district level and re-establish their authority on the district 
level, where it would inevitably come into conflict with the locally elected DAs.  
In 2003, the World Bank, the Asanteman Council and the Akyem Abuakwa Traditional 
Council launched a pilot project that ignored this problem and assigned tasks to NTAs that 
were normally carried out by local government personnel. As a result, parts of the new 
government initially refused to approve the project. After a short aside about aid dependence 
and the role of private aid in Ghana for assessing the possible influence of private actors (like 
NTAs) in the Ghanaian development arena, I will focus on this project.  
 
 5.1 Aid dependence 
 
According to Withfield/Jones (2007), foreign assistance in Ghana was marginal before the 
beginning of the structural adjustment programme (SAP) under the ‘revolutionary’ regime of 
J.J. Rawlings in 1983. The transformation of this regime into the ‘darling’ of the World Bank 
is a startling example of the power of the international financial institutions: between 1983 
and 1993, official development assistance (ODA) quadrupled from US$130 million to about 
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US$510 million (cf. Tsikata 1999: 38, 43). Lindauer et al., however, also give striking 
examples of the compulsion to act. In 1983, for instance, senior civil servants in real terms 
only earned 11% of the money they had earned in 1975 (Lindauer et al. 1988). Osei shows 
that the GDP per capita for Ghana fell from roughly US$300 in the mid 1970ies to less than 
US$200 in 1983 (2000 prices). Since then is has steadily grown and is currently about to 
reach the levels of the 1970ies again (Osei 2008: 12). 
With the beginning of the democratic reforms in 1989 and the debt relief in 2002, the cash 
flow increased additionally. Only in 1992, assistance was slightly reduced, according to 
Whitfield/Jones because of ‘donor fatigue’ and excessive expenses in the run-up to the first 
democratic elections since 1969 (Withfield/Jones 2007: 7).   
This means that aid dependence began to be important for Ghana with the beginning of the 
structural adjustment programmes. According to Osei (2008), aid to GNI ratios for the period 
between 1989 and 2003 are about twice as high as the average for sub-Saharan Africa. 
Additionally, this rise of ODA was accompanied by a brain drain from the public 
administration to the private sector, which was to be compensated by outsourcing policy 
making to think-tanks. These think-tanks were extremely dependent on the ruling parties and 
were mostly fired when the government changed. The result were incoherent policies, 
reinforcing the power of the foreign donors (Withfield/Jones 2007: 7). Despite the stagnation 
of ODA inflows in the 1990ies, the influence of the donors has been growing continuously on 
various institutional levels. Already in 1996, a World Bank report cautioned against so-called 
‘donor-driven agendas’ concerning aid dependence in Ghana (Armstrong 1996: 53, q.i. 
Withfield/Jones 2007: 8). 
In 2004, Ghanaian aid dependence reached its numeric peak with 73 percent ‘Aid as % of 
central government expenditure’ (Banque Mondiale 2006: 348). Although the term aid is to be 
understood as ODA in this regard, the phrasing ‘aid as % of’ only suggests a comparison of 
two numeric values (ODA and central government expenditure). Figures about the actual 
share of ODA in the national budget are not available in most developing countries due to 
shortcomings in budget management, particularly in the field of information management 
(Leiderer 2004: 21). Nevertheless, other estimates by the World Bank about the actual share 
of ODA in the national budget of 2002 come to similar results. 2004 saw the highest numeric 
aid dependence in Ghana because of the tremendous debt relief granted in this year. 
According to Withfield/Jones, the aid to GNI ratio was about 22% in 2004, but without debt 
relief it only amounted to 8%. A combination of the two figures given by the World Bank and 
that provided by Withfield/Jones would therefore suggest a share of ODA in the Ghanaian 
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budget ranging between 30-40% in 2004 without debt relief (Withfield/Jones 2007: 7,25; 
Banque Mondiale 2006: 348-50; World Bank 2003).    
The amount of private development assistance is hard to assess, a glance on the overall 
composition of development aid of the donor countries concerned suggests, however, that 
apart from the USA private money flows are comparatively low (s. Adelman 2003). Important 
donor countries are Japan, Great Britain, the USA, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, 
France, Canada, Italy and Spain (Tsikata 1999: 3). Sometimes, remittances are also included 
in these figures.  
In Ghana, the amount of remittances has already exceeded the value of official ODA. 
According to the Bank of Ghana, remittances31
 
 have increased from US$200 million or 3.3% 
of the GDP in 1990 to over US$1 billion or about 11% in 2003 (Addison 2004). If remittances 
are considered as private development aid, these figures would therefore be even higher than 
the official inflows. It would be of great interest to find out how much of these resources 
could be attributed to the neotraditional system. However, from my current point of view, 
such an undertaking is hardly feasible.  
Other private aid flows, like those of churches and charity organisations, are significantly 
lower than ODA and remittances. In Germany, for instance, the overall equity capital of 
NGOs added up to 0.9 billion euro in 2005, which is approximately a quarter of the total 
spending of the BMZ (Ministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung). If 
the sponsorship of the BMZ is added, private capital already accounts for one third of the total 
amount of development aid (BMZ 2006: 78). Of course, the borders between the public and 
the private are blurry in such calculations. 
It is not clear whether the stunning rise of remittances since the 1990ies has been 
accompanied by a steady increase in private development aid as compared to official 
development aid. The rise of Southern NGOs in the 1990ies certainly came along with the 
contrapuntal growth of budget support and administrative capacity building. 2003 budget 
support already accounted for 39% of ODA to Ghana; in 2005 it was down to 27% again 
(Lawson et al. 2007, q.i. Withfield/Jones 2007: 12). The most important actors in the 
development arena since the 1980ies are certainly the World Bank and the IMF.  With the start 
of the SAPs, in 1984 the share of multilateral aid doubled in the course of only one year to 
79.1% of total ODA, and since then it has never fallen under 71%. In 1996, it even reached 
                                                 
31 There are various definitions of remittances. With ‘private unrequited transfers’, Addison used one of the 
narrowest definitions. 
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85% (Tsikata 1999: 3). This means that more than US$1 billion is controlled by these two 
organisations alone. 
In summary, it can be stated that the rise of neotraditional development brokers and patrons 
was certainly fuelled by growing remittances and institutionalised private aid flows. After the 
state and religious organisations, NTAs in all probability constitute the third richest group of 
development actors. Compared to their social and cultural capital, their economic capital is 
nevertheless relatively small. 
 
 5.2 Development agencies and NTAs: relations and perceptions 
 
Despite strong media coverage concerning neotraditional development brokerage, foreign 
development agencies and NGOs approach NTAs with caution (interviews with Vera 
Kotrschal, Nikolas Beckmann and Hildegard Thielmann). This has to do with a lack of 
knowledge about the neotraditional systems – most of the foreign representatives of NGOs 
don’t stay in Ghana for a long time – but also with disappointing experiences with NTAs. 
Fluidity, flexibility and non-formalisation as general features of the neotraditional system 
often impede fruitful co-operation on the interface between local government, foreign 
development assistance and NTAs. NGOs don’t know how to address NTAs in the local arena 
because the relation between the formal political and neotraditional systems is unclear. This 
also applies to the attitude of the government: in spite of the factual power of NTAs on the 
village level, the only constitutionally regulated instance of co-operation between NTAs and 
the DAs is the appointment of 30% of the assemblymen by the president in consultation with 
NTAs (Article 242 (d)). But even this consultation is done only very rarely.  As a 
consequence, the success of co-operation depends enormously on the individual level of 
commitment and capacity of the NTAs concerned and is based only on confidence. The 
experiences of foreign NGOs and development agencies are therefore rather negative. NTAs 
are still rather seen as obstacles to development than development brokers. According to 
Nicolas Beckmann of the German GTZ (Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit), the 
permanent demands of chiefs for more public resources and influence don’t match their actual 
contributions to development (interview Beckmann). Both in the USAID Ghana Strategy 
Paper and in the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy, NTAs are only mentioned in connection 
with chieftaincy conflicts (GTZ 2007; USAID 2006). At the same time, pro-chief think-tanks 
like the Ghanaian CIKOD (Center for Indigenous Knowledge and Organisational 
Development) have turned out to comprise also quite radical proponents of the public 
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involvement of NTAs, with demands ranging from for the abolishment of elections (see 
Wiredu 1995) to a return to colonial systems. Officially however, CIKOD focuses mainly on 
the mobilisation of chiefly resources and a transformation of chieftaincy on the grassroots 
level32 and is actually engaged in addressing the challenges of transparency and 
accountability in local governance, particularly concerning the relation between DAs and 
NTAs.33 CIKOD is partly financed by the German KAF (Konrad Adenauer Foundation)34
 
, 
whose representative Johannes D. Rey is very hesitant to take sides, for instance concerning 
the banning of the chiefs from party politics: ‘Frankly, up to now I have not found a clear 
position about the 1992 Constitution’s attempt to free the chieftaincy institution from the 
gridlock of partisan politics.’ (KAF 2004: 11) 
The Promoting Partnership
 
 with Traditional Authorities Project 
The first big project since independence that involved neotraditional authorities in 
development activities only began in 2003. Its somewhat curious starting point was a 
conversation between the Asantehene and the President of the World Bank (World Bank 2007: 
42) – that is to say, between one of the most powerful representatives of the development 
arena worldwide and, to put it bluntly, a private person. The outcome of this high-level 
meeting was the ‘Promoting Partnership
This gradual exclusion of the state is mentioned as one of the reasons for an overall 
‘moderately satisfactory’ (ibid.) outcome of the project. The argument of the critics was that 
the government should not take a loan that was mainly set to benefit one single NTA (the 
 with Traditional Authorities Project’ (PPTAP), 
running from 2003 to 2007, which was officially awarded to the Republic of Ghana. In reality, 
the grant (US$5.05 million) was given directly to the Asantehene and the second most 
powerful chief in Ghana, the Okyenhene. Initially, a standard loan was scheduled, but because 
of resistance from parts of the new government and an intensive public debate, the project 
was re-modelled into a Learning and Innovation Loan, a cheaper form of credit. In the final 
project report the authors noted: ‘The initial debate affected the government's level of 
commitment in project design, which led to a less than optimal level of interaction between 
local government and TAs [traditional authorities] during project implementation.’ (World 
Bank 2007: 4) 
                                                 
32 see www.cikodgh.org/about.html (0409) 
33 Nana Kokroko: Traditional rulers lack human and material resources. In: Ghanaweb, 14 February 2009. 
Online: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=157707 (0409). 
34 The KAF depicts itself as a ‘society for Christian-democratic education’, has close relations to the German 
CDU (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands) party and is thus a typical supporter of NTAs. 
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Asantehene) while the burden of debt service would be on the whole nation.       
The Asanteman Council, the neotraditional council of ‘elders’ of the Asantehene, was 
awarded US$4.5 million and the Akyem Abuakwa Traditional Council of the Okyenhene got 
US$0.5 million.. The bulk of this money was spent in the education sector (US$3 million), on 
infrastructure, scholarships, the elevation of the enrolment rate and incentives for teachers; the 
rest was spent on capacity building, an HIV/AIDS campaign and on cultural heritage 
activities, like the training of artisans and studies on opportunities in ecotourism (World Bank 
2007: 10). Particularly in the health and cultural sectors, the involvement of minor chiefs and 
other NTAs was planned, but the outcome was rather modest because the neotraditional 
capacities were overestimated (World Bank 2007: 17). According to the report, capacity 
building was therefore given too little attention. The weak management capacities of the 
NTAs led to the formation of PIUs, Project Implementation Units, ‘to strengthen the AC 
secretariat and set-up the AATC one while implementing the project on behalf and under the 
oversight of the TAs.’ (ibid.: 5) This means that the implementation of the project didn't differ 
too much from conventional health or educational projects, where NTAs are included because 
of their position as authorities, but don’t get too involved because of their lack of capacities. 
Capacity building included workshops on conflict management, partnerships with local 
government, development planning, partnerships with the private sector in the field of 
ecotourism, sustainable rural development and land management. Given the fact that most of 
the tasks that should have been done by the NTAs themselves were carried out by 
professionals, a focus on administrative capacity building (institution building) would have 
been more promising (cf. ibid.: 8, 17).  The use of PIUs limited the ownership of NTAs and 
impeded a structural change through the decentralisation of development activity (ibid: 12-
14). This change was also made impossible by the comprehensible dissatisfaction of most of 
the formal political actors with the PPTAP. While the project aimed at testing ‘approaches to 
strengthening decentralisation through sustainable partnership between government and TAs 
in the delivery of selected social services’ (ibid.: 5), most local government officials still felt 
that they did not have sufficient comprehension of the project, nor were they sufficiently 
involved in the preparations, particularly the award and the supervision contract (ibid.: 6). On 
the other hand, the Asanteman Council declared to have prepared development plans for 
communities and paramountcies (ibid.: 10). Each of the 35 paramountcies and each of the 
communities involved was told to draw up its own development plan (ibid.: 23). It can be 
doubted that these plans really existed, but already the intention behind them suggests a 
clouded inter-relation with the DAs. The area councils, the first political subdivisions under 
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the DAs, are currently about to draw up development plans too. In the Keta District, for 
instance, four out of fourteen Area Councils have already developed such plans – with poor 
results, as was noted by the Planning Officer M. P. Dagbui. Additionally, the neotraditional 
areas don’t match with the formal administrative divisions. Therefore, the paramountcy of 
Anloga is much bigger than the Keta District and the neotraditional sub-district of Hagodzi 
neither matches with the formal political area council nor with the unit committees. That is to 
say, the establishment of such chiefly development plans has created both rivalry and 
confusion in the DAs.  
The report therefore urged to study the mechanisms of decentralisation more closely, 
particularly concerning the coordination between NTAs and DAs before similar projects are to 
be implemented: ‘[If] this project was to be replicated, the development of a relevant platform 
for mainstreaming TAs governance systems in [sic!] local government framework should be 
adopted as a specific, principal target. ’ (ibid.: 16) 
In the light of the modest outcomes, it is interesting how the World Bank justifies a project 
that aims at institutionalizing the influence of NTAs in local development. Besides the key 
factor for implementation, namely the high level of social and customary influence of the 
Asantehene and the Okyenhene (ibid.: 6), the project could also have been legitimised by 
attempts to minimise overlapping responsibilities and by the inclusion of chiefly resources 
and neotraditional social structures into participatory projects. This could have been 
accompanied by the attempt of a smooth transformation of hierarchical structures and male 
dominance in the neotraditional system. The outcome of the project, however, suggests that 
the institutionalisation of neotraditional brokerage rather led to the replacement of public 
organs in the PPTAP. Because of a lack of capacities in other areas, most of the NTAs were 
only able to act as leading figures, and as such were ‘direct competitors’ of formal political 
actors. This may also be a reason why the DAs have been bypassed in the process. 
Instead of such a rather transformative approach, however, the World Bank described the 
neotraditional systems as ‘active civil society organisations’ (ibid.: 1) in the context of ‘dual 
governance systems’ (ibid.: 2). On the one hand, the NTAs were thus referred to as 
governmental representatives who were to ‘support decentralised social and economic 
development initiatives in remote areas’ (ibid.: 2), while on the other hand, they were 
described as members of civil society. The strict hierarchy of the neotraditional system and 
the paternalist attitude of most NTAs were never mentioned in the report. 
The planning of the PPTAP thus had three shortcomings: (1) the management capacities of 
traditional councils were overestimated, (2) their paternalist structure was not even mentioned 
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and (3) no vision concerning the place of NTAs in the local development arena was 
developed. Given the current situation in the local development arena, the strongest emphasis 
of such a project should be put on the integration of the formal political and the neotraditional 
structures and not on the training of, after all, private actors in fields that are or should be 
under public control.  
Apart from this project of the World Bank, the contacts of foreign development institutions 
and NGOs with NTAs are mostly informal in nature and often lead to misunderstandings 
because of the lack of established procedures and institutionalised relations, but also due to 
ignorance on the side of the NGOs. An analysis of the developmental resource inflow showed 
that the government and the World Bank control most of the resources. The startling rise of 
remittances in the last few years suggests, however, that private actors will become more 
important in the near future. Not least because of their privileged access to visas, the share of 
NTAs in private aid is only exceeded by that of the churches. NTAs will therefore be able to 
profit from this kind of globalisation and this will also affect their engagement in 
development aid. 
 
 
 6.  Summary 
 
The goal of this thesis was to provide an overview over the role of neotraditional actors 
(NTAs) in the development arena of Ghana. The guiding questions have circled around the 
power, the resilience and the malleability of neotraditional institutions and the consequences 
of these attributes for the structure of the political system and the development arena. I 
tackled this project by carrying out a comparison of NTAs and politicians as the major agents 
of development, a study of the roles of NTAs, both by means of a survey and a media 
analysis, reflections on the different sources of power of NTAs on the basis of a short history 
of chieftaincy and development in Ghana, and a detailed study of the development arena in 
Hagodzi, a small village in the Volta Region. The guiding theories were the concepts of social, 
cultural and economic capital of Pierre Bourdieu and concepts around the term development 
broker, or courtier, which was coined by Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan in the 1990ies. 
Apart from these actor-centred concepts I also discussed political concepts of Trutz von 
Trotha and Donald I. Ray (among others).  
From an actor-centred point of view, NTAs are involved in development mainly as 
development brokers (also cultural brokers) and as development patrons (s. chapter 3.1.1). 
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Apart from the rather small elite of development patrons of the South-West, which is in 
possession of a considerable amount of material wealth, indirect political power and elite 
education, the majority of NTAs mainly rely on customary assets, namely the administration 
of land and manpower. The educational north-south divide concerning chieftaincy has 51% of 
northern paramount chiefs lacking formal education (all uneducated paramount chiefs in 
Ghana come from the three northern regions), while the majority of the paramount chiefs in 
the South can compete with MPs in terms of education. This education gap is a good indicator 
of the profoundly asymmetric distribution of chiefly assets (s. chapters 2.3 and 3.1.3).35
The fluidity of chieftaincy enables other development brokers like politicians, social climbers 
and 'outsiders' (Bierschenk et al. 2000: 31) to upgrade their status by becoming neotraditional 
development brokers. George Benyefia is just one example of countless cases where descent 
is renegotiated because of other assets. These actors use development brokerage as a means to 
ascend the social ladder or to ‘pay their entrance fee’ to a particular community. Besides the 
'neotraditional veil' (see chapter 3.2.3) that endows new chiefs with some sort of immunity, 
membership in the neotraditional system also enhances social status, facilitates contact to 
politicians and foreigners, increases the possibility of going abroad, etc. The obtaining of a 
neotraditional office is therefore a rational and frequently envisaged stage in economic as well 
as political careers (ibid). 
 On 
the village level, NTAs are political and spiritual leaders, mediators, custodians of the land 
and organisers of communal labour (s. chapter 3.1.2). Because of their socialisation and their 
experience as representatives and mediators, they already possess considerable amounts of 
cultural and social capital, which facilitates their entry into the development business. In 
comparison with urban actors, however, both the economic capital and the level of education 
of neotraditional development brokers on the countryside are rather low. At the same time, 
NTAs are confronted with increasing demands and appeals by the media, by politicians and 
by the chiefly elite to participate in and to spend on development. My experiences in the Keta 
District suggest that particularly the older, less educated generation of NTAs can’t meet these 
demands. The outcome of this pressure is primarily excessive development rhetoric at chiefly 
durbars and traditional festivals, and to a lesser extent an increase in concrete development 
projects led by NTAs (s. chapter 3.1.3).  
As a form of institutionalized social capital, chieftaincy has always been an instrument of elite 
formation. The current situation of comparatively easy accessibility of ‘royal’ offices, 
however, is (not yet) met by a complementary movement of de-mystification. Even a 
                                                 
35    Source: National House of Chiefs 2008, African Trade Project 2007.  
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considerable number of Ghanaian social scientists don’t dare to question chiefly power in 
terms of material wealth and biographical background of chiefly elites, while formal 
politicians are continuously confronted with these questions. The population seems to actively 
protect the status and the integrity of chiefs, as two disagreements mentioned in this thesis 
strongly suggest: First, the difference between the perceptions of experts and the population 
concerning the power of the chiefs. According to the experts, the population overestimates the 
power of the chiefs (cf. chapter 3.2). And second, the different perceptions of these two 
groups concerning the actual power of chiefs during elections - the population is said to 
underestimate the power of the chiefs (Jonah 2003: 220f). When power was perceived 
positively or neutral the population considered the chiefs powerful, when power was seen 
negatively the population rather considered them powerless (cf. chapter 2.4).    
This has to do with the high level of inclusiveness of neotraditional systems. The increasingly 
uncertain modes of succession convey high conflict potential, but they also facilitate 
participation and not least a faster transformation of the neotraditional system. According to 
Nugent this malleability of chieftaincy increased considerably between independence and 
1992 (with a phase of reasonable autonomy in this regard between 1979 and 1985)36
From this point of view, neotraditional systems in Ghana can be described as instruments of 
elite formation protected by cultural values and based mostly on cultural capital (academic 
degrees; special knowledge and know-how; (unconscious) behaviour; stool regalia) and social 
capital (titles of nobility, achieved through delegation or negotiation; big circle of 
acquaintances with high capital; knowledge about genealogy and social networks).  
 when the 
NTAs depended heavily on the government in crucial matters like enstoolment and 
destoolment. Contestants in chieftaincy disputes knew that the arbitrators didn’t know enough 
about the history of their area and thus permanently attempted ‘to conjure with history in 
order to improve their standing within an existing hierarchy’ (Nugent 1996a: 214). By 
inventing new titles that are not hereditary, like the Nkosuohene in 1985 (s. Steegstra: 2006), 
the chiefly elite also catalysed this process.  
The chiefly elite can without doubt be considered as a part of the national elite, both in terms 
of money and in terms of political influence. The predecessors of the two mightiest chiefs 
today, the Asantehene and the Okyenhene, already were the main chiefly actors against the 
‘struggle for independence from within’ (Rathbone 2000: 7-15) and are as such responsible 
for the split that runs across the whole scientific community regarding the question of 
neotraditional involvement in the formal political structure. The pro-chief position of the NPP 
                                                 
36    see Boafo-Arthur 2006: 157; Brempong 2006: 33; Ray 1996:189 
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is highly visible and its current leaders can be linked to the pro-chief UGCC tradition of the 
late 1940ies even genealogically. Nana Akufo-Addo, the presidential candidate of Ghana's 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) for the 2008 elections, is the son of Edward Akufo-Addo, who was 
in turn the son–in-law of the Okyenhene. A sister of J.A. Kufuor, Ghanaian president from 
2000-2008, was married to Prempreh II, Asantehene from 1933-1970 (Agyeman-Duah 2003: 
8). Osei Tutu II, Asantehene since 1999, is closely related to Kufuor and acted almost like a 
constitutional monarch under his presidency. His good relations with the former president of 
the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, additionally backed his superior position in the political 
landscape of Ghana (World Bank 2007: 42). And last but not least, since Kufuor is an Ashanti 
and traditionally no Asante is to stand above the Asantehene, most of the Asante and a 
considerable proportion of the Akan rather considered the Asantehene to be the head of state.  
These power configurations also prevent the mainstream media from addressing the 
hierarchical structure and the paternalist character of chieftaincy in Ghana. And it is 
particularly the lack of democratic legitimacy of the higher tiers of chieftaincy that impedes 
the integration into the local political structure. The growing importance of senior NTAs in 
the field of development at the same time raises the question of the neotraditional 
understanding of development. Given the paternalist attitude of most of the development 
patrons, as well as their involvement in business and banking, this influence should be 
observed critically. 
Development brokerage is quite a recent phenomenon in the neotraditional structure. In other 
arenas, like politics and law, the NTAs have been competing with other actors for much 
longer. The struggle over authority and sovereignty, however, formally came to an end under 
Nkrumah and its repercussions trailed away by the mid-1980ies at the latest, when Rawlings 
changed his course concerning chieftaincy (Nugent 1996a). In the phase of state decay in the 
1970ies, only the local actors of the neotraditional system gained strength (ibid.), which lead 
to 'integrated' neotraditional systems, where NTAs merely act as substitutes and ‘partners’ to 
governmental actors. These NTAs could take advantage of the fact that power in the villages 
is usually divided between different political institutions of various epochs. This 
‘sedimentation’ of political institutions or ‘institutional addition’ (Bierschenk/Olivier de 
Sardan 1999: 52) leads to a situation of polycephaly and catalyses the general feature of 
flexibility and malleability of African institutions (Bierschenk/Olivier de Sardan 2002: 4). The 
NTAs, as well as other actors, were therefore able to reactivate institutions, ideas and 
agreements from different epochs, which had previously been outshined by others, and to 
rearrange them according to their own interests and the interests of their clients. In Ghana this 
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also led to the re-emergence of T/VDCs (Town/ Village Development Committees) from the 
Nkrumah era. Together with the increasing influx of foreign NGOs since the 1970ies, these 
institutions have created ‘parastatal spaces’ (in the sense of Trotha 2001) in cooperation with 
the NTAs, or, as other authors describe it, a ‘realm of civil society’37
The constitution of 1992 and the rising influence of the World Bank even formalized the 
practical experiences of the 1970ies by pushing forward the development discourse also in the 
neotraditional setting. This transformation of NTAs from political leaders to development 
facilitators was therefore rather induced from above and hasn’t fully reached the local level 
yet. The expectations of both of the media and the population still cannot be met by local 
NTAs today. This can be attributed to (1) the slow personal turnover in the neotraditional 
system, (2) structural hindrances like the unregulated relationship between neotraditional and 
political actors on the local level, (3) an inadequate capitalisation of the majority of the NTAs, 
but (4) also to the inherent characteristics of chieftaincy (see chapter 3.2.2). The impressive 
rise of private remittances nevertheless suggests a stronger involvement of NTAs in 
development.  According to the Bank of Ghana, private remittances have increased to over 
US$1 billion in 2003, already exceeding the value of official ODA (see chapter 5.1, Addison 
2004). The proportion of these resources used for development depends mainly on the 
definition of development, but it is clear that this also comprises smaller construction projects 
like the construction of bridges, boreholes etc. In the years to come, the share of NTAs in 
development projects is therefore likely to rise compared to the state. 
 (see chapter 2.1). 
However, the reassertion of governmental authority with the putsch of Rawlings inhibited the 
‘denationalisation’ of aid on the part of the donors and the receptors, as it happened in many 
other African countries - in spite of the neoliberal turnaround in the mid 1980ies. Until today, 
chiefs cannot be seen as competitors to the state in terms of development, because (1) there 
are hardly any enduring relations with Northern NGOs, particularly not with development 
institutions (the PPTAP of the World Bank being an exception, s. chapter 5.2) and (2) NTAs 
mostly act and see themselves as integral parts of the local administration. Until today, about 
80% of the ODA is controlled by the World Bank and the IMF (Tsikata 1999: 3) and therefore 
primarily used for bigger development projects where NTAs only play minor roles 
particularly in comparison with public actors. 
NTAs have profited from their role beyond the state since independence and as long as they 
are not formally integrated in the political system, they will continually improve in their 
                                                 
37    for discussion see Bierschenk/Olivier de Sardan 2002: 5 
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relatively new jobs as development brokers and patrons. This is likely to catalyse the overall 
transformation of the neotraditional system from a parallel political system (s. Bierschenk 
1999: 52) into a network of (more or less) private lobbying groups, strongly based on 
education. NTAs should therefore not be overestimated as building blocks of decentralisation. 
The idea that close cooperation with NTAs guarantees grassroots democracy is naive, as Lentz 
put it (2006: 918). The local level is certainly the most viable and vibrant level of the 
neotraditional system (see e.g. Nugent 1996), but the high political participation it conveys 
goes along with paternalism and uncertainty. A process of annihilation through integration, for 
instance by  making the chiefly office eligible as recommended by Abotchie (2006: 169-183), 
however, would be a pretty bold step, given the fact that the formalized political structures 
still don't seem to work in the villages today.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
 7. Bibliography: 
 
• Adelman, Carol C. (2003): The Privatisation of Foreign Aid. Reassessing National 
Largesse. In: Foreign Affaires November/December 2003, Vol. 82,  Number 6. 
• Addison, E. K.Y. (2004): The Macroeconomic Impact of Remittances. Bank of Ghana. 
Online: http://www.undp-gha.org/Pages/Events%20&%20Conferences/sessions.htm 
(0409). 
• Adjaye, Joseph/ Misawa, Buba (2003): Chieftaincy at the Influence of Tradition and 
Modernity: Transforming African Rulership in Ghana and Nigeria. Paper presented at 
the ‘International Conference on Chieftaincy in Africa: Governance and 
Development’, Accra. 
• Armstrong, Robert (1996): Ghana Country Assistance Review: A Study in 
Development 
• Effectiveness. Washington, D.C: World Bank. 
• Ayee, J.R.A. (1994): Anatomy of Public Policy Implementation: The Case of 
Decentralisation in Ghana. London: Avebury. 
• Ayee, J.R.A. (2007): Traditional Leadership and Local Governance in Africa. The 
Ghanaian Experience. Paper presented at the Fourth National Annual Local 
Government Conference on the theme ‘Traditional Leadership and Local Governance 
in a Democratic South Africa: Quo Vadis’ held from 30-31 July 2007 at the Southern 
Sun – Elangeni, Durban.  
• Ayesu, Ebenezer (2006): Conflict of Institutions: Chieftaincy, Church and the State. 
In: Odotei, Irene K./Awedoba, Albert K.: Chieftaincy in Ghana. Culture, Governance 
and Development. Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers, pp. 493–504. 
• Banque Mondiale (2006): Rapport sur le développement dans le monde 2006: Equité 
et Développement. Edition ESKA: Washington D.C. 
• Bierschenk, Thomas/ Chaveau, Jean-Pierre/Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre (2000): 
Courtiers en développement. Les villages africains en quête de projets. Paris: Karthala. 
• Bierschenk, Thomas (1998): Lokale Entwicklungsmakler. Entwicklungshilfe schafft 
neue Formen des Klientelismus in Afrika. In: E+Z - Entwicklung und 
Zusammenarbeit, Vol. 12, Dezember 1998, pp. 322-324. 
• Bierschenk, Thomas/Olivier de Sardan, Jean Pierre (2002): Local Development 
Brokers in Africa. The rise of a new social category. Department of Anthropology and 
92 
 
African Studies Working Papers Vol.13. Mainz: Johannes Gutenberg University. 
• Bierschenk, Thomas/Sardan, Jean-Pierre Olivier de (1999): Dezentralisierung und 
lokale Demokratie. Macht und Politik im ländlichen Benin in den 1980er Jahren. In: 
Trotha,Trutz von/ Rösel, Jakob (Ed.): Dezentralisierung, Demokratisierung und die 
lokale Repräsentation des Staates. Theoretische Kontroversen und empirische 
Forschungen. Köln, pp. 37–68. 
• Blundo, G. (2000): Élus locaux et courtiers du développement au Sénégal: Trajectoires 
politiques, modes de légitimation et stratégies d'alliance. In: Bierschenk, T.; J.-P. 
Chauveau & J.-P. Olivier de Sardan (Eds.): Courtiers en développement. Les villages 
africaines en quête des projets. Paris: Karthala, pp.71-100. 
• BMZ (2006): Medienhandbuch Entwicklungspolitik 2006/2007. Berlin: BMZ. 
• Boafo-Arthur, Kwame (2006): Chieftaincy in Ghana: Challenges and Prospects in the 
21st
• Boafo-Arthur, Kwame (2001): Chieftaincy and Politics in Ghana since 1982. Paper 
presented at the ‘National Conference on Chieftaincy, Governance and Development’, 
Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon. 
 Century. In: Odotei, Irene K./Awedoba, Albert K.: Chieftaincy in Ghana. Culture, 
Governance and Development. Sub-Saharan Publishers: Accra. pp. 145-168. 
• Boafo-Arthur, Kwame (2003): Prospects for Ghana’s Drive Towards Democratic 
Maturity. In: Amponsah, Nicolas/Boafo-Arthur, Kwame: Local Government in Ghana. 
Accra: Livog Limited, pp. 247-266. 
• Boissevain, Jeremy (1974): Friends of friends. Oxford: Blackwell. 
• Botwe-Asamoah, Kwame (2005): Kwame Nkrumah's Politico-Cultural Thought and 
Politics. An African-Centered Paradigm for the Second Phase of the African 
Revolution. New York: Routledge.   
• Bourdieu, Pierre (1971): Genese et structure du champs religieux. Revue Francaise de 
Soziologie, 12 (3), pp. 295-344. 
• Bourdieu, Pierre; Steinrücke, Margareta (2005): Die verborgenen Mechanismen der 
Macht. Schriften zu Politik und Kultur, 1. Hamburg: VSA-Verlag. 
• Brempong, Nana Arhin (2006): Chieftaincy, an Overview. In: Odotei, Irene K./ 
Awedoba, Albert K. (2006): Chieftaincy in Ghana. Culture, Governance and 
Development. Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers, pp.27- 43. 
• Busia, K.A. (1951): The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of the 
 Ashanti. London: Frank Cass.  
93 
 
• Calhoun, Craig (2002) Dictionary of the Social Sciences. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
• Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) Africa (2008): Ghana Human Rights 
Monthly Update - February 2008. Statement on Factfinding Mission to Anloga 
Following Clashes and Mass Arrests on 1st November 2007. Online: 
http://www.volunteer-human-rights-ghana.org/monthly-update/february2008/ (0409). 
• Danquah, J.B.(1928): Gold Coast: Akan Laws and Customs and the Akim Abuakwa 
 Constitution. London: George Routledge & Sons Ltd. 
• Drah, F. K.(1992): Nkrumah and Constitutional Democracy: 1949-1966 Revisited. In: 
Research Reviews NS Vol.8, Nos.1 & 2. 
• Edja, H. (2000): Médiateurs traditionnels à l'école du courtage en développement. Un 
exemple autour des projets du service allemand de développement à Kalalé au Nord-
Bénin. In: Bierschenk, T.; J.-P. Chauveau & J.-P. Olivier de Sardan (Eds.): Courtiers 
en développement. Les villages africaines en quête des projets. Paris: Karthala, pp. 
125-144. 
• Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi (1997): Democracy or Consensus? A Reply to Wiredu. In: 
Eze, 
Emmanuel Chukwudi (ed.): Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. 
Oxford: Blackwell, p. 313-323. 
• Foucault, Michel (1981): The History of Sexuality. Volume 1: An Introduction. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin.  
• Gocking, Roger S. (2005): The history of Ghana. Westport: Greenwood Press. 
• Gyekye, Kwame (1988): The unexamined life. Philosophy and the African 
Experience. Accra: Ghana University Press.  
• Haarman, Claudia et al.(2008): Towards a Basic Income Grant for All. Basic Income 
Grant Pilot Project. Assessment Report. Online: 
http://www.bignam.org/Publications/BIG_Assessment_report_08a.pdf (0409). 
• Hadjor, Kofi Buenor (1988): Nrkumah and Ghana. The Dilemma of Post-Colonial 
Power. London and New York: Kegan Paul International. 
• Han, Byung-Chul (2005): Was ist Macht? Stuttgart: Reclam.  
• Jonah, Kwesi (2003): The Electoral Response of Ghana’s Traditional Rulers to their 
Subordination and Alienation in Local Governance. In: Amponsah, Nicholas/Boafo-
Arthur, Kwame:  Local Government in Ghana. Accra: Livog Limited. 
94 
 
• Kludze, A. Kodzo Paaku (2000): Chieftaincy in Ghana. Lanham, New York, Oxford: 
Austin & Winfield.  
• Lawson, Andrew et al. (2007): Evaluation of outputs, outcomes & impacts and 
recommendations on future design & management of Ghana MDBS. Final Report, 
April 2007. Report to the Government of Ghana and to the MDBS Partners. 
• Leiderer, Stefan (2004): Öffentliches Budgetmanagement in Entwicklungsländern. 
Bonn: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik. 
• Lentz, Carola (2006): Decentralization, the State and Conflicts over Local Boundaries 
in Northern Ghana. In: Development and Change. Vol. 37 Issue 4, pp. 901-919. 
• Long, Norman (2001): Development sociology. Actor perspectives. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
• Lindauer, D. L. et al. (1988): Government Wage Policy in Africa: Some Findings and 
Policy Issues. In: World Bank Research Observer, vol. 3 (no.1). 
• Mbembe, Achill (2000): De la Postcolonie. Essai sur l'imagination politique dans 
l'Afrique contemporaine. Paris: Karthala. 
• Merton, R.K. (1973): Der Rollen-Set: Probleme der soziologischen Theorie. In: H. 
Hartmann (Ed.): Moderne amerikanische Soziologie. Stuttgart: Enke, pp. 316-333.  
• Ninsin, Kwame A. (1993): Strategies of Mobilization under the PNDC Government. 
In: Gyimah-Boadi, E. (Ed.): Ghana under PNDC Rule. Chippenham, Wiltshire, 
Oxford: Anthony Rowe Ldt, pp.100-114. 
• Nkrumah, Kwame (1957): Autobiography. London: William Heinemann. 
• Nugent, Paul (1996): Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana. Accra: Asempa 
Publishers. 
• Nugent, Paul (1996a): An abandoned Project? The Nuances of Chieftaincy, 
Development and History in Ghana's Volta Region. In: Journal of Legal Pluralism, Nr. 
37-38. 
• Oakley, P./ Clegg, I. (1999): Promotiong Participatory Development as a Strategy of 
Poverty alleviation in Sub-Saharan Africa. A Review of some current Practice. In: 
Journal of Social Development in Africa, H. 14. 
• Odotei, Irene (2003): Chieftaincy Politics in Ghana. In: Vaughan, Olufemi: Indigenous 
Politcal Structures and Governance in Africa. Ibadan: Sefer, pp. 322-346. 
• Osei, Robert Darko (2008): Aid Policy and Accelerated Development. Which 
approach for Ghana? Policy Research Series No. 3 2008. Accra: Institute for 
95 
 
Democratic Governance. 
• Ranger, Terence (1993): The Invention of Tradition Revisited: the Case of Colonial 
Africa. In: Ranger, Terence/Vaughan, O. (Eds.): Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth 
Century Africa. Essays in honour of A.H.M. Kirk-Greene. London: MacMillan.   
• Rathbone, Richard (2000): Nkrumah and the Chiefs. Oxford: James Currey. 
• Ray, Donlad .I. (1992): Contemporary Asante chieftaincy: Characteristics and 
development. In: An African Commitment: Papers in Honour of Peter Lewis Shinnie, 
edited by J. Sterner and N. Davis. Calgary: University of Calgary Press.  
• Ray, Donald I. (1996): Divided Sovereignty. Traditional Authority and the State in 
Ghana. In: Journal of Legal Pluralism 1996 Vol. 37-38, pp.181-202. 
• Reijne, Miriam et al. (1999): Illusion of Power. Actors in Search of Power in a 
Prefectural Arena in Central Togo. In: Trotha, Trutz von; Rösel, Jakob (Ed.): 
Dezentralisierung, Demokratisierung und die lokale Repräsentation des Staates. 
Theoretische Kontroversen und empirische Forschungen. Köln, pp. 167–183. 
• Rouveroy van Nieuvaal, E. A. B. van; Dijk, Rijk van (1999): African Chieftaincy in a 
new Socio-Political Landscape. Leiden: LIT-Verlag. 
• Rouveroy van Nieuvaal, E. Adriaan B. van (1996): States and Chiefs. Are Chiefs mere 
puppets? In: Journal of Legal Pluralism Vol. 37-38,  pp.39-78. 
• Steegstra, Marijke: ‚White’ Chiefs and Queens in Ghana: Personification of 
‘Development’. In: Odotei, Irene K.; Awedoba, Albert K. (2006): Chieftaincy in 
Ghana. Culture, Governance and Development. Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers, pp. 
603-620. 
• Simensen, Jarle (1975): Commoners, Chiefs and Colonial Government. British Policy 
and local Politics in Akim Abuakwa, Ghana, under Colonila Rule. Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Trondheim.  
• Thomi, Walter (1999/2000): Nationalstaatliche Regulation und Dezentralisierung: 
Local Government Reform in Ghana. In: WeltTrends Nr. 25,Winter 1999/2000, pp. 99-
121. 
• Trotha, Trutz von (1996): From Administrative to Civil Chieftaincy. Some Problems 
and Prospects of African Chieftaincy. In: Journal of Legal Pluralism, vol. 37-38, 
pp.79-107. 
• Trotha, Trutz von (2000): Die Zukunft liegt in Afrika. In: Leviathan, vol. 28 H 2, pp. 
253-279. 
96 
 
• Trotha, Trutz von; Klute, Georg (2001): Von der Postkolonie zur Parastaatlichkeit – 
das 
 Beispiel Schwarzafrika. In: Erich Reiter (Ed.), Jahrbuch für internationale 
 Sicherheitspolitik, 
• Hamburg-Berlin-Bonn, pp. 683-707. 
• Tsikata, Yvonne M. (2001): Successful Reformers: Ghana. In: Devarajan, Shanta et al: 
Aid and Reform in Africa: Lessons from Ten Case Studies. World Bank. Online: 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/aid/africa/release/chap2.pdf (0409).  
• Ubink, Janine Marisca (2008): In the Land of the Chiefs. Customary Law, Land 
Conflicts and the Role of the State in Peri-Urban Ghana. Leiden: Leiden University 
Press. 
• Weber, Max (1985): Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - Grundriss der verstehenden 
Soziologie Bd. 2. Tübingen: Mohr.  
• Wilson, Alex Jaques (2000): Exploring the potential of the ASAFO for community 
development. A case study of Dwamba, Dago and Otuam. Thesis. Accra. 
• Wiredu, Kwasi (1995): Democracy and Consensus in African Traditional Politics. In: 
Kwasi 
 Wiredu: Conceptual Decolonization in African Philosophy. 4 Essays. Ibadan: Hope 
 Publications. 
• Withfield, Lindsay/ Jones, Emily (2007): Ghana: The Political Dimensions of Aid 
Dependence. GEG (Global Economic Governance) Working Paper 2007/32. Oxford: 
University College Oxford (Department of Politics and International Relations). 
• Witte, Marleen de (2005): Insight, Secrecy, Beasts, and Beauty: Struggles over the 
Making of a Ghanaian Documentary on ‘African Traditional Religion’. In: Postscripts 
1.2/1.3, pp. 277–300. 
• World Bank (2003): Evaluation of the Comprehensive Development Framework 
(CDF). Ghana Case Study. Online: 
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/InterLandingPagesByUNID/9BE751
F982A2E3E685256E4C0077BEFA
 
 (0409). 
 7.1 Primary Sources: 
 
• Africa Trade Project (2007): Ghana Jubilee Register 2007-2009. Accra. 
97 
 
• GTZ (2007): Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (G-JAS). Online: 
www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-ghana-GJAS.pdf (0409). 
• KAF (2004): Proceedings of Triportite Seminar by the National house of Chiefs on 
strengthening the Chieftaincy Institution to enhance its performance. Accra. 
• Interview with M. P. Dagbui (2008), Planning Officer of Keta District  
• Interview with Nicolas Beckmann, GTZ (Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit) 
• Interview with Togbe Kumasah (2008), Fia (sub-chief) in Keta 
• Interview with Henry Seidu Daanaa (2008), 
• Interview with Prof. George P. Hagan (2005), Head of the National Commission on 
Culture, Presidential Candidate in 2000 (CPP) and former Director of the Institute of 
African Studies at the University of Ghana (Accra) 
Principal. Research Officer, Ministry of 
Chieftaincy and Culture 
• Interview with Prof. Kwame Gyekye (2005), Ghanaian philosopher 
• Interview with Prof. George P. Hagan (2008), Head of the National Commission on 
Culture, Presidential Candidate in 2000 
• Interview with Prof. Irene Odotei (2008), Professor of History at the Institute of 
African Studies 
• Interview with Edem Adotey (2008), Institute of African Studies 
• Interview with Hildegard Thielmann (2009), head of the Kinderhilfswerk für Afrika 
e.V. Hamburg 
• Interview with Vera Kotrschal (2008), secretary of the head of the European 
Commission Delegation in 
• 
Ghana 
Interview with 
• Interview with Prof. G.K. Nukunya (2005), sociologist 
August Niadzi (2008), catechist in the Atiavi Area 
• Interview with Prof. A. Essuman-Johnson (2005), political scientist 
• Interviews with local actors of Hagodzi (2008) 
• Republic of Ghana (1992): Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 
• National Reconciliation Commission (2004): National Reconciliation Report, Online: 
http://www.ghana.gov.gh/ghana/national_reconciliation_commission_report.jsp_0 
(0509) 
• National House of Chiefs (2008): Statistics on paramount chiefs 
• USAID (2006): Ghana Strategy Statement. Online: 
98 
 
http://www.usaid.gov/gh/mission/css/ghana_strategy_statement.pdf (0409) 
• Survey 2005 
  
 8. Appendix 
 
 8.1 Abbreviations: 
 
CDO – Civil Defence Organisation 
CDR – Committees for the Defence of the Revolution 
CPP – Convention People’s Party  
DCE – District Chief Executive 
NTA – Neotraditional Actor 
NCD – National Commission on Democracy 
NDC – National Democratic Congress 
NLM – National Liberation Movement 
NLC – National Liberation Council 
NRC – National Redemption Council 
PIU - Project Implementation Unit 
PDC – People’s Defence Committee 
PNCD – Provisional National Defence Council 
PPTAP - Promoting Partnership
SAP – Structural Adjustment Programme 
 with Traditional Authorities Project 
SMC – Supreme Military Council 
TA - Traditional Authority 
TDC – Town Development Committee 
UGCC – United Gold Coast Convention 
VDC – Village Development Committee 
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 8.2 List of local actors (names changed): 
 
Hormeku Bandua: Spiritual leader, Opinion Leader 
Francis Bedzra: Head of the District Water and Sanitation Team  
George Benyefia: Mechanic, 'development chief'  
Theophilus Boateng: Manager of Jubilee Radio 
Richard Gekem: Quantity surveyor, sub-chief  
Norman Layisi: Teacher 
Kwame Layisi: Member of the Executive Council in Keta, Head Christian, teacher  
Dan Lawson: Catholic catechist, youth organizer   
Ben Makulay: Assemblyman 
Oswald Ndo: Tsiami (linguist) 
Benjamin Tunyo: Stool father 
Baako Tamoafo: Stool father 
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Abstract 
 
Since independence, the neotraditional actors of Ghana (e.g. chiefs, queenmothers, stool 
fathers, elders, ‘linguists’ and development chiefs) have gone through a fundamental 
transformation from intermediaries (between the colonial power and the African population) 
to more or less heterogeneous interest groups. The engagement in development business is 
one successful strategy of retaining power during this ongoing transformation. Neotraditional 
actors try to compensate their reduced political power with developmental activities. At the 
same time, however, the media, the state and the civil society also portray neotraditional 
actors as development brokers and thereby push them into development aid. 
The Ghanaian societies are still embedded in neotraditional structures, also in urban areas. 
Contrary to many prophecies of doom since independence, chieftaincy is still very popular. 
One of the reasons for this persistence is the remarkable malleability and fluidity of 
neotraditional systems. Especially on the local level, a considerable percentage of the 
population is permanently engaged in negotiations and disputes over neotraditional offices 
and corresponding claims. This leads to a high degree of political participation, but also to 
conflicts and to the abuse of chieftaincy as an instrument of elite formation. Membership in 
the neotraditional system enhances social status, facilitates contacts to politicians and 
foreigners, increases the possibility of going abroad and goes along with some sort of political 
immunity. The obtaining of a neotraditional office is therefore a rational and frequently 
envisaged stage in economic as well as political careers. The 'humble' decent of an aspirant 
can often be compensated with social, cultural or economic capital.  
This diploma thesis focuses mainly on the intersections between the neotraditional systems 
and the development arena of Ghana. I want to show how neotraditional actors interact with 
(and act as) politicians, business men, NGOs and development agencies and how these 
intersections can be described on the national level. The outcomes of the thesis can be useful 
both to international development actors and to local (public) actors.  
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die neotraditionellen Systeme Ghanas (bestehend aus Chiefs, Queenmothers, Stool Fathers, 
Elders, Development Chiefs etc.) haben sich seit der Unabhängigkeit grundlegend verändert. 
Aus Mittelsmännern zwischen der Kolonialregierung und der afrikanischen Bevölkerung 
wurden vielerorts private InteressensvertreterInnen. Das Engagement von neotraditionellen 
AkteurInnen im Rahmen der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit war und ist in diesem 
Zusammenhang eine Möglichkeit, den verlorenen politischen Einfluss zu kompensieren. 
Gleichzeitig gerät aber auch die Verwendung der Mittel aus neotraditioneller Herrschaft 
immer stärker unter Beschuss durch die Medien und die Zivilgesellschaft, was gegenwärtig zu 
einer medialen Überbewertung des neotraditionellen Engagements in der EZA führt. 
Die ghanaische Bevölkerung ist zum Großteil noch immer stark in neotradionelle Strukturen 
eingebunden und steht den neotraditionellen AkteurInnen überwiegend positiv gegenüber. 
Dieses Durchhaltevermögen der neotraditionellen Systeme lässt sich zu einem großen Teil auf 
seine Fluidität zurückführen. Vor allem auf lokaler Ebene befinden sich große Teile der 
Bevölkerung in einem permanenten Aushandlungsprozess über neotraditionelle Ämter und 
damit verbundene Rechte und Pflichten. Das Ergebnis ist einerseits ein hoher politischer 
Partizipationsgrad, der jedoch mit - bisweilen auch blutigen - Konflikten erkauft werden 
muss. Auf der anderen Seite führte diese Unbestimmtheit der neotraditionellen Strukturen 
verstärkt ab der Unabhängigkeit zu einer steigenden Instrumentalisierung durch lokale Eliten. 
Die Mitgliedschaft in neotraditionellen Systemen erhöht den sozialen Status, erleichtert den 
Kontakt zu Politikern, vergrößert die Chance ins Ausland zu gehen und geht auch meist einher 
mit einer Form von politischer Immunität. Neotraditionelle Ämter erweisen sich dadurch sehr 
oft als Sprungbretter für politische und ökonomische Karrieren. Eine nicht-adelige Herkunft 
kann dabei durch soziales, kulturelles oder ökonomisches Kapital kompensiert werden. 
Mit dieser Diplomarbeit soll gezeigt werden, auf welche Weise neotraditionelle AkteurInnen 
in die ghanaische Entwicklungszusammenarbeit eingebunden sind bzw. diese mitgestalten. Es 
soll klar werden, wie neotraditionelle AkteurInnen mit PolitikerInnen, Geschäftsleuten, NGO-
VertreterInnen und RepräsentantInnen der großen Entwicklungsagenturen interagieren bzw. 
inwiefern sie selbst als solche agieren. Diese Schnittstellen werden auch auf der nationalen 
Ebene abgebildet. Die Ergebnisse dieses Unterfangens könnten sowohl für internationale 
AkteurInnen der EZA als auch für lokale AkteurInnen von Interesse sein. 
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